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1ABSTRACT,
Pakistan! A Geopolitical Analysis ( 1947-74 )« A study 
in Political Geography* Arif Hassan Syed,M.A.,M.Phil. Thesis 
submitted for the Degree of Ph.D.,London,197§*
The main theme of the study is to examine and 
analyse aspects of the political geography of. PakisfailniBusome 
detail* secondary objective is to relate the
course of events^in Pafeistamper.foreign relations and boundary 
problems,to the socio-economic and. political conditions of 
Pakistan and her people as a whole*The study also endeavours 
to evaluate the inter-regional disparity in Pakistan*
The Partition of the Subcontinent and its 
effects are analysed in detail with special reference to the 
Radcliffe Awards*
\ ■ ' Geopolitically Pakistan emerged as a dislocated
state with a variety of inherent problems e.g., defence, 
political incoherence,economic and administrative disparities. 
Moreover,the birth of Pakistan was subjected to the tremendous 
psychological disadvantage that she would find herself in 
great economic distress and. that its vulnerability in politico-
v
economic fields would inevitably lead towards her eventual 
collapse.
Pakistan pursued an independent but active 7 
policy until 1954,and endeavoured to forge closer relations 
with countries of West Asia without jeopardising her relations - 
with any of the big powers.However,in 1954 Pakistan chose a 
path* of alignment with the western powers and entered into a 
number of bilateral and. multilateral defence pacts in view of 
her geopolitical compulsions.
dThe study demonstrates that newly independent states, 
especially states which are geographically discontiguous such, 
as Pakistan,are put under severe social,political and military 
pressures,In case such a state falls to achieve a measure of 
national unity and lacks a cohesive force,then the very exis­
tence of her separate regions might he threatened.In the case of 
Pakistan the bilateral and multilateral defensive arrangements 
became non-productive even counter-productive as was demonstrate 
during the Indo—Pakistan wars of 1965 and "1971®
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8CHAPTER 10
in tr od uct io n.
Geopolitics is the science of the relation of 
geography to politics.There is no universally accepted definition 
of the term geopolitics,and careful analysis is needed in order 
to distinguish between objective study of politico-geographical 
factors and power-political speculation in the field of geopoli­
tics. Anyone might construe it to be a term combining geography 
and politics,and mistakenly conclude it to be a substitute for 
political geography.This term,however,is never used in this broad 
sense.Geopolitics attempts to study the applicability of geography 
in relation to the activities of the primary political groups i.e. 
states.Within this premise the term carries three connotations:(i) 
the term refers to the relative power of nations,and the relating 
of that power to their natural environment,(ii) the word denotes 
applied political geography,as distinct from the history,princi­
ples and theory of political geography and (iii) the importance 
of relative location as a factor in political power-territorial 
base of political power.Political Geography,however,has been 
defined as 1 ...the study of areal differences and similarities 
in political character as an inter-related part of the total 
complex of areal differences and similarities.The interpretation 
of area differences in political features involves the stud# of
their interrelations with all other relevant areal variations,
" 1whether physical,biotic,or cultural in origin. _________________
1. Hartshorne,Richard,"Political Geography As a Pield of Study:
Definition" in the ed;Politics and Geographic Relationships,
J ack s on,W .A .D.London,1964,p.60.
oV.
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The relation of international political power to the 
geographical setting is the crux of geopolitical analysis„Geo­
political ideas vary with the changing pattern of geographical 
environments,and the interpretation,by individuals,of the 
inherent change.The"kernel"of political geography has been 
defined as," the political area,„ ,the political significance of
auiy area bears well-defined relation to its climate, 1 .andforms
2
and natural resources," Furthermore,individual *s political ideas 
might generate political forces within specific areas,"Political' 
idea,in this sequence,means more than just the state idea,It 
means any political idea,It might be the idea of the state,,,,
It might merely be a gregarious instinct,not consciously exp­
ressed, "War begins in the minds of men"and so does all other 
3
politics."
Areal differentiation singularly stands out as the
essence of geographical thought,whereas the differentiation of
political Phenomena from place to place is the soul of political
geography. " Political area,or space,is multidimensional,Space
is horizontal as viewed from the standpoint of the shape,size,
location and natural resources of one political unit,Space is
vertical as viewed from the interplay of man’s objectives,laws,
and economic and cultural tools upon the horizontal plane.Space’1
;
has a third dimension,time,which considers the interaction of
horizontal and. vertical sx>ace at any given period.Thus,tine can
be thought of as a series of points that constitute a curve
A
along the horizontal and vortical space axes." r . ________
2 . Whttlesey ,D. The Earth and the State ,IT,Y.Henry Holt ,1944 ,p. 5^5.
3. Jones, 3.B. " A Unified. Field Theory of Political Geography" in
the W.A.D.Jackson,edition,Politics and Geographic Relationships,
1961,p.101.
1,Cohen,3.B. Geography and Politics in a Divided World,Uethuen, 
London,1964,p - 6.
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The subject matter of geopolitics is derived from 
political geography,history and military strategy,The strength 
or weakness of a given state depends to a large extent on the 
geographic factors for example,location,size,shape,natural res­
ources ,manpower,industrial potential and political organisation 
( see below ),Geopolitics is concerned with the analysis of 
politico-territorial organization,the spatial and territorial 
aspect of power.
Despite their contrasting viewpoints,most of the geo­
political ideas quoted above contribute a measure of understan­
ding of past and present trends in the pattern of states.The 
underlying premise of these postulates is that configuration of 
lands and seas provides opportunities and sets limit within which 
the political relations of politico-territorial organizations 
have evolved and will continue to evolve.
The physical characteristics of the planet earth have 
invariably remained intact,and the geographic layout of lands 
and seas has retained its significance in the context of inter­
national power-politics.However,political values and the signi­
ficance of geographic realities have really been metamorphosed, 
especially in the realms of modern technology."To an extent far 
exceeding anything in the social sciences and humanities,scien­
tific and engineering knowledge is cumulative.Most of the import­
ant discoveries and inventions of past 300 years appear,in retro­
spect, as links in a more or less continuous chain of interrelated 
events,...Technological advances,once achieved,may be regulated, 
but rarely can they be eradicated.People may yearn for the good 
old days before H-bombs and ballistic missiles,but mankind is 
stuck with these and thousands of other machines.Technological 
advance,in short,is not only cumulative and accelerative;it tends
12
also to be irreversible,barring totally disruptive social 
5
catastrophe *1 Technological advancement as such effectively
operated to" ...alter the range of opportunities and limitations..
The same invention may expand or contract the opportunities of
both sides.Or more typically the invention may serve the purposes
6of one to the disadvantage of the other.” The significance of 
technological advancement,especially in the field of warfare and, 
international power-politics cannot either be denied or minimised. 
The experiences of the Korean and Vietnam wars,however,clearly 
demonstrated that the proximity of land routes had decidedly 
neutralised the technological advantages enjoyed by the Americans 
and their allies;and one of the major contributory factors to the 
failure of American military strategy in South Vietnam was the 
problem of logistics within the framework and concept of dis­
tance. In addition to location,the distance between East and West 
Pakistan played the most vital role in the terms of military 
strategy.These areas of conflict,within the field of power- 
politics,have abundantly demonstrated the strength,significance - 
and political validity of geographic variables.Distance,oceans, - 1
deserts and mountains still possess their political and strategic 
values in the context of geopolitics,
foreign policy constitutes one of the fundamental 
elements of statecraft,and geopolitics helps to identify the 
methods for the application of the laws of sps.ce,in the context
5• Sprout,Harold and Margaret,foundations of' International Politics: 
D.Van Nostrand Company,N,Y.1963,PP*215-216.
6,ibid.p.22 5.
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of foreign policy options,basing itself on the study of geography 
and history,Some of the assumptions of geopolitics incorporate 
a sense of continuous struggle among nations to establish 
preponderance,and the primacy of external policy over internal,. 
Political ideologies and state-systems are explained as weapons 
of national survival and expansion in a given set of geograph­
ical conditions.Geopoliticsiis,in some respects,designed to aid 
governments in planning their respective foreign loolicies.Plann­
ing was conspicuous in German Geopolitics.Both Germany and 
Japan launched their expansionist wars,and based their calcu­
lations and decisions on geopolitical estimates of the relative 
strength and power potential of the Axis Powers and their 
adversaries.The whole concept of their planning was based on 
a subjective estimate of power,howTever,overvaluation of their 
own and undervaluation of their rivals' potentials.
Planning is a vital objective of those who advocate 
geopolitics for the world at large.The geopoliticians employ 
the term to mean that a nation-state should formulate its 
national policy only after a careful appraisal of the natural 
environment as an inalienable condition of its power position. 
SLich untenable hypotheses,however,and their asstimptions that 
state is an organism and has a natural and s.n inalienable right 
to Lebensraum,helped to bring a war , hut did hot demonstrate 
how to win it.
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The Concept of the State;
By their nature,places ax°e complex 
and multi-component in character.„One component is the political 
variability of the earth's surface in the sense that the world 
is divided into a la.rge number of political areas( political
regions ) each of which (a) has a degree of independence of
c
action and (b) is administ/red to a greater or less extent diff­
erently from all other political areas.The most powerful of these 
areas are the so-called sovereign independent states.
Political subdivision may itself contain, 
therefore,impediments to self-fulfilment and may interact un­
favourably with other components of the variable character of 
places and areas,and thus augment the adverse or beneficial 
effects that these components nay have upon human material 
welfare.
A man's lot depends to some extent upon the 
environment in which he lives,the environmental effect being the 
total impact upon him at any time and through time of the vari- ' 
able character of places near and far.
The state idea.
It is desirable to discuss briefly here the
state-idea as it is understood by various geopoliticians,so as
to have a precise understanding of the emergence of Pakistan as
an independent political entity," A state is an area organized
'politically in an effective manner by an indigenous, or resident,
people with a government in effective control of the area,It is
7
modern history's repository of legitimate authority." The term 
7. Buehring, E . IT." Role of Hew States in International Politics", 
The Review,vol.8.pp.27-37*Indiana University,1965•
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state in Buehring’s usage implies the mechanism of government 
through which the will of the state is formulated,expressed and 
exercised*The small,local,territorial unit is in many ways a 
microcosm of the state itself* A state as SLich is a territorial 
society divided into government and subjects,claiming thereby, 
supremacy over all the institutions inhabiting its territory,The 
essential ingredients of a state are (a)territory,(b)population,
(c)government and (d)sovereignty,In case any one of these essen­
tial features or fundamental constituents are missing then the 
state may be classified as non-full state,a half-state or s. vass­
al. In most modern states people themselves have some bonds of 
union,for example,common language,common culture,common religion, 
common heritage.and common ends,These are some of the unifying 
elements within the state structure,which separate those people 
who possess different bonds of unity within the comity of nations 
Unity,disunity and the spatial structure of the state;
If and when the disparate elements within 
the state fail to achieve a semblance of national unity and. 
cohesion then the very substructure of the state-idea may be 
demolished,the superstructure is bound to disappear;and the state 
disintegrates,On the positive side,however,the state-idea suggest 
ts a strong possibility that if the unifying bonds are allowed, to 
flourish then national unity and cohesion can be achieved,and the 
vested internal and external fissipa-rous elements can be defeated 
ted,A coherent and viable nation-state may be difficult to achi­
eve if the balance between the centrifugal and centripetal for­
ces is not effectively maintained,In fact,the centripetal f o r c e s  
should be helped to maintain their preponderance in the interest 
of national'cohesion and unity,Polarisation of regional and intra 
-regional forces is likely to damage the fabric of the society, 
and as such the state itself is likely to be dismembered.
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In most recently-independent countries there is a 
need for an explicit unifying concept if centripetal forces are 
to he dominant.The force: of inertia,vested interests,and fear of 
the consequence of change may keep it going more or less effec­
tively for some time,hut if a state-structure has lost its ori­
ginal legitimacy then the sta.te is likely to collapse „ Those sta­
tes are the strongest in which the basic concept of state en­
compasses the entire body-politic.
If a state fails to achieve its ends and allows the 
fissip&rous tendencies to flourish or does not effectively nip 
the evil of parochialism,regionalism and sub-nationalism in the 
bud,then internal and external vested interests will almost in­
evitably exploit these weaknesses within the state structure,and 
the secondary political groups i «e.political parties( such as 
the Awami League in East Pakistan and now' the defunct National 
Awarni Party in West Pakistan) are likely to be used as vehicles 
of disruption by Internal and external political groups Jiost of 
the secondary groups operate largely in the advancement of in­
terests of various non-political groups,for example,linguistic, 
religious,industrial,commercial and agricultural.
The geographical basis of political power.
Political, groups differ profoundly from one another 
in the relative degree of political power at their command.There 
are two ways to compare the strength or weakness of these poli­
tical groups.One is "horizontal",that is,the relative power of 
coordinate groups is consideredsnation versus nation,province 
versus province,or party versus party.The other Is "vertical", 
the power of lesser groups being compared with that of the larger 
groups of which they forme component parts,for example,local 
government ^ s u s  province,or provincial government versus central 
government,In a loose federation of states,the political power
17
of the smaller component is greater in relation to that of the 
whole federation than in a highly centralised state,In a totalit­
arian state a single secondary group,a political party,dominates . 
the state structure,and necessarily practises monolithism.
Political power is derived from the inherent energy of 
political groups and from the material means that these groups 
possess for giving effect to that energy,The inherent energy of a 
group is largely a function of its cohesion,Cohesion may he ach­
ieved voluntarily hy the component elements,as in democratic 
societies,or else it may he enforced upon them hy the dominant 
elements as in a totalitarian state,autocratic politico-terri­
torial organizations or military regimes,Cohesion may well he 
maintained hy fear of aggression from without,Enforced cohesion 
brought about hy repression or cohesion due to fear may at times 
give rise temporarily to mighty political power( the rise and 
fall of the military dictatorship in Pakistan provide obvious 
examples of negative and self-motivated endeavours towards na- . 
tional cohesion),Such cohesion,however,may evaporate when the 
dominant elements have lost their grip or the causes of fear have 
been removed.
Infrastructure of spatial cohesion,
A state should formulate 
a policy of direction,and a framework of operation which in in 
consonance with the state-idea,and must lead towards cohesion 
and away from disharmony and disunity.The first priority of the 
state should he that " all regions of a state are clearly inclu­
ded under the state-idea and have complete loyalty to the overall 
concept of the national unit,regional differences inevitably ' 
cause some differences in interpretation and implementation of 
these concepts,If those differences are minoe.„.the regions may a
18
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accept unitary government from a single authority,If the diffe­
rences are great,the attempt to impose such a uniform system
Q
ina-y provoke opposition endangering the national unity,"
The position and power of a given politico-territorial 
organization depend upon (a) the national consciousness of the 
state-idea,(b)what it possesses in the shape of territory and 
natural resources,and (c) its position vis-a-vis other nation­
states and their wealth.
In estimating the power potential of a given state or 
of a region one must examine its location,size,shape and boun­
daries in order to learn how its natural resources rank in re­
lation to those of other political area.s of the world,
a ) locations The location of a state may invite or
answer a number of very important questions,The nearness to the 
world’s major trade routes could prove a great boon for the 
socio-economic development of the people of the adjacent state, 
and inclusion,within the territorial limits, of natural ses.ports 
r.is of extreme value for the development of economic and trade 
links,intercoastal or international.A landlocked country,however, 
may face socio-economic and political pressures ,for example, 
Afghanistan is largely dependent upon Pakistan’s goodwill for 
the majority of her exports and imports.
Some states have small pockets of land lying 
outside the main body of their territory,as islands within the 
territorial bounds of their neighbouring states,Such dislocation 
may also cause geopolitical problems,These tiny outliers,hov/ever, 
are very unlikely to render the state fragmented,but these 
"exclaves" do have some significance in political geography which 
in some cases is important,for example,West Berlin is an "exclav^ 
of West Germany but "enclave" of East Germany.The East Germans 
have^at times,blockaded the JIand^acc.gss^ tufGest Berlin JroiyWegt 
8 • RieL-cyf. af'CJr- .<)•?,
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Germany,and invariably these actions were designed to extract 
some concessions from the Western Powers.
In the South Asian Subcontinent there are good 
examples of "enclaves",for example,Goa,Diu,Daman,Nagar Haveli, 
Pondicherry and Cooch Behar( see chapter 2 for Gooch Behar).Goa 
was a bone of contention between India and Portugal until the 
Indians forcibly integrated the territory within the Indian Union, 
and Goa and other "enclaves" were formally incorporated within 
the administrative structure of the Indian Union in consonance 
with the provisions of the 14th Amendment of 1963(Indian Consti­
tutional Amendment Act 1963 )<> Cooch Behar posed some problems 
between Pakistan and India,but the two states seemed to have 
reached an amicable settlement(see chapter 2).
"&) ; The size of a given state is strongly
related in many ways to problems of effective national control 
and organisation.lt is a truism that the beginning of an empire 
is the very beginning of its end.The grossly exaggerated,enlarged 
and expanded state-areas are very difficult to control in an eff­
ective manner,and as such the centrifugal forces are greatly 
encouraged,and eventually succeed as the state collapses•The main, 
contributory factors are; the problem of logistics,the lack of 
effective authority and control,different and distinct ethnogra­
phic and cultural patterns,religious distinctiveness and economic
that
disparities.A number of states/have evolved over a period of time 
in different xoarts of the world eventually disintegrated or were 
dismembered because their frontiers were too extended.
Experts like Pounds and de Balij have further 
classified states on the basis of the size of the politico- 
territorial organization.In the context of this classification 
Pakistan may be designated as a large state.
c) g.hape. - In addition, the .,a"-po’ltrtIco~
territorial organisation is a significant contributory factor 
in determining the effectiveness or otherwise of the given state. 
For example,Pakistan as it emerged in 1947,consisted of two 
widely separated parts,interspersed by Indian territory,and as 
such was fragmented.This physical separation created a number of 
difficult problems,especially in the area of national integra­
tion since contacts between the population of the separate wings 
were very limited.These limitations were inevitably detrimental 
to national unity and cohesion.A longrange and more intractable 
problem for Pakistan has been the forging of national identity 
which trascended regionalism and parochialism,and which in­
culcated and embodied positive ideas than negative concepts;the 
development of a positive national identity.
Human Resources.
Human resources include not only manpower but 
also those characteristics required to make manpower effective 
for example, technical knowhow,national cohesion,sources of 
energy,resourcefulness,national traits and characteristics and 
the effectiveness of the government.The power and position of a 
state is measured by the degree to which it is able to achieve 
that which it desires. The surn total of these desires, end.s and 
objectives may be termed as her national interests.The means 
that a territorial society employs to secure these objectives 
is known as national policy so far as it relates to internal 
affairs,and foreign policy as it relates to external relation­
ships .
The soundness,or the lack of it,of a national policy may
22
effectively "be measured by the success with which it \ises the 
national resources and energies to provide prosperity,amica­
bility at home and abroad,and the means to safeguard its ■-
territorial integrity and political independence.
The Raison d*etre of Pakistan. -
Pakistan emerged as an inde­
pendent political entity on the basis that the Kusalmans of 
India were a separate nation,and as such entitled to a separate 
homeland.K.A,Jinnah expressed his thoughts on the subject in 
the following m a n n e r I t  has always been taken for granted 
mistakenly that the Musalmans are a minority.The lfusalmans are 
not a minority.The Musalmans are a nation by any definition,... 
The problem in India is not of inter-communal character but 
manifestly of international one,and it must be treated as :
such,,..The Hindus and Muslims belong..,to two different
civilizations which are based on conflicting ideas and
10conceptions,.,e"
The partition of the Sub-continent and the 
political boundaries of Pakistan were established. ( see chapter2).: 
on the basis of the Radcliffe Awards.Each of the two Commission's' 
was " instructed to demarcate the boundaries of the two parts 
of the Pun jab/Benge, 1 on the basis of ascertaining the conti­
guous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims.In doing so
11it will also take into account other factors."
This was in/conformity with the Lahore Reso- 
i— ■
lution which is popularly known as the Pakistan Resolution,
passed on 23rd March 1940,and asserted that " no constitutional 
10,
M.A.Jinnah,Address to the All India Muslim League Session,
Lahore,1940.
11,The Report of the Punjab Partition Committee,p.ii,1947.
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plan would be workable in this coimtry or acceiDtable to Muslims
unless it is designed 011 the following basic principle ,namely
that geographically contiguous units...be so constituted...that
the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority
as in north-western and north-eastern zones of India should
12be...autonomous and sovereign." In this manner religion formed 
the raison d ’etre of Pakistan’s territoriality as an independent 
state.
The present territorial limits of Pakistan,however,
’ in
are much more Taconformity with the ideas of the poet-philo-
sopher Muhammad Iqbal.In 1930,Iqbal expressed his thoughts in
the following manners" I would like to see the Punjab,Nort-West
Frontier Province,Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single
state.Self-government within the British Empire or without the
British Empire,the formation of a consolidated North-West
Muslim State appears to me to be the final destiny of the
13Muslims,at least of North-West India."
Religion was the main unifying forfc'e of the state- 
idea as it emerged and materialised in August 1947.It appeared 
howev erq'tbvbn,a very tenuous bond between the distant,distinct 
and dislocated parts of Pakistan.In addition to religion,as the ' 
reason for existence,one may as well incorporate and consider 
the desire of the Muslims,in the Northwest and Northeast of 
British India,to achieve economic independence,and the right to 
order their life free from economic suppression and exploi- 
tation internally or externally.The objective,therefore,was to
12.The Pakistan Resolution,Lahore,March 23,1940.
13.Muhammad Iqbal,Presidential Address ,The All India. Muslim 
League Session,Allahabad,1930„
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establish a state in which the Muslims could forge their socio­
economic and political development without the spectre of Hindu 
domination,and as such the nascent state had to he organised 
and administered with a view "...to establish complete and 
exclusive control over internal political relations...the 
creation and maintenance of law and order.Local institutions 
must conform with, the concepts and institutions of the central, 
overall,political organization..,a state may tolerate conside­
rable variation in its different regions...there is a tendency 
...to exert unifying control even over the institutions,..every 
state must strive to secure the supreme loyalty of the people 
in all its regions,in competition with any local or provincial
14
loyalties and in definite opposition to any outside state ■unit1.1
For a geopolitical analysis of Pakistan it is 
imperative to study the circumstances under which Pakistan 
emerged as an independent political entity,and as such 3. study 
of her economic potential,or the lack of it,is necessary for 
a precise understanding, of Pakistan’s geopolitical problems.
The partition of the Sub-continent was hasty, 
patcjsy and incomplete( see chapter 2 ). The actual political 
division and the territorial awards created more problems than 
the apparent solutions( see chapters 2,3 and 4 ),The chairman 
of the Award Commissions Sir ( now lord ) Cyril Radcliffe was 
not very familiar with the economic,social,cultural and
14cHartshorne ,Richard, op. cit. W.A.D.Jackson,p. 86.
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political patterns of the Sub-continent; thus his Awards in the 
Punjab and Bengal( see chapter 2 ) created serious difficulties 
for both the Hindus and the Fluslims.
The partition disrupted the water system,The irri­
gation complex in the Punjab,was one of the most ancient homes 
of hydraulic society,and the Pakistani Punjab was made dependent 
upon Indian goodwill since some of the important nineteenth and 
twentieth century headworks and embankments were allotted to 
India,
The partition also severed some of the main road 
and rail links,for example,the Grand Trunk Road,Lahore-Bathinda-' 
Delhi ,Lahore-Ferozepur-Delhi ,Karachi-Jodhpur-Jaipur-Delhi rail 
links in the west;and Jessore-Calcutta.,]?aridpur-Kushtia-Santi- 
pur-Calcutta,Comilla-Tripura-Agartala-Bahmanbaria-Silchar in the 
east ( some of the river channels of East Pakistan were also 
affected ) .
The political division and the territorial allotment 
also disrupted the long established social and cultural links, 
and seriously unrooted the existing economic structure ( see 
chapter 3 and 4 ) .
Pakistan faced tremendous socio-economic and poli­
tical problems at the very birth of this new country in 1947, 
and the nation was preoccupied with meeting its first real test 
— the transfer and relocation of more than seven million refu­
gees from India-an unparalleled migration of human beings in the 
history of mankind,This monumental task was carried out primarily 
in the Punjab,whose boundaries became a source of instability 
and tension,The problems of Pakistan need to be studied in the
proper historical context of her emergence as an independent ..
state,and this leads to an immediate reflection upon her poli­
tical boundarie s,
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CHAPTER 2„
A SYSTEHATIC ANALYSIS OF BQUHDARIES AND 
THE PROBJEhS AFFECTING THEI.'h
Before entering into a detailed 
discussion of the boundaries of Pakistan and the problems affec­
ting them* it seems reasonable at this point to study at some 
length the interchangeable terms i«, e „ frontiers and boundaries 
and the manners in which boundaries have been defined and denoted 
Invariably almost all the discussions of boundary problems tend 
to treat the word frontier said boundary as if these were syno­
nymous. One may speak of the boundary between Spain and Portugal, 
and in the phenomenon as projected on the map,a line or a string 
of positions separating the two states.It would be,however, 
advisable to denote frontier as a politico-geographical area 
lying beyond the integrated region of a given political entity, 
and into which expansion could be materialised.Experts like 
ICristof have very vividly expressed their line of thinking on 
the matter and suggested"frontier"implied whnt it suggests
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etymologic ally, that is, that which is "in front"... it 
designated an area which was part of a whole,specifically 
that part which was ahead of the hinterland. Hence it was
often called the foreland, or borderland, or march......
It had not the connotation of an area or zone which marks 
a definite limit or end of a political unit....The 
frontier meant quite literally Mthe front": the frons of 
the imperium mundi...Thus the frontier was not the end 
"tail" but rather the beginning "foreland" of the state; 
it was the spearhead of light and knowledge expanding 
into the realm of darkness and of the unknown* The
A
borderlands - the marches - were areas of dawn***" He 
further elaborated that "the frontier is outer-orientated* 
Its main attention is directed toward the outlying areas 
which are both a source of danger and a coveted prize.
The hinterland - the mother land - is seldom the 
directing force behind the pulsation of frontier life...
The frontier is a manifestation of centrifugal forces... an 
integrating factor. Being a zone of transitions from the 
sphere (ecumene) of one way of life to another, and 
representing forces which are neither fully assimilated 
to nor satisfied with either, it provides an excellent 
opportunity for mutual interpenetration and sway. Along 
the frontier life constantly manipulates the settled 
patterns of the pivotally organised socio-political and
1. Eristof,Ladis D. "The Nature of Frontiers and
Boundaries" in the edition Jackson, W.A.D.
Politics and Geographic Relationship.London 
1964, pp 154-35
2d
cultural structures. It is precisely this watering down 
of loyalties and blurring of difference, that the central 
governments attempt to forestall by substituting the
semi-autonomous frontiers with a controlled and exact
2
border line”. This concept postulates that stronger 
and more powerful instates were able to expand into the 
peripheral frontier, and gain control over more and more 
of it. In these modern times the frontier may be described 
as an area of darkness, of the unknown, of dawn. The 
apportionment of Antarctica amongst various states is a 
modern case in point. Boundaries were often d r a m  as a 
consequence of frontiers. The protagonists of expansionism 
invariably confronted each other and at times the 
resultant contact initiated boundary treaties. The 
colonial invasion of Africa is littered with examples of 
such a process.
Boundaries, on the other hand, may be described 
as thin lines on the maps marking the limit of state 
sovereignty. As a matter of fact a boundary is not a line, 
but a plane, a vertical plane that cuts through the 
airspace, the soil, and the subsoil of adjacent states.
To Kristof the word boundary"...indicates certain 
well-established limits (the bonnds) of the given 
political unit, and all that which is within the boundary 
is bound together, that is, it is fastened by an internal 
bond... is a term appropriate to the present day concept 
of the state, that is, the state as a sovereign (or 
autonomous) spatial unit, one among many.♦* the essentials 
of statehood both from the functional and legal point of 
view are: territory, people and a government in effective
2 ibid pp 155-37
control internally, independent externally, and willing 
and able to assume obligations under international (or 
federal) law. Sovereignty is territorial: hence it must 
have a certain known extent: a territory under exclusive 
jurisdiction limited by state boundaries.The borderland, 
the old march lands, are defined more and more exactly 
until there is, in principle, an exact borderline. The 
modern sovereign state is bound within and confined to 
its legal limits..integrated not only administratively 
and economically but also by means of a state idea or 
"creed”...*. The boundary..... is inner oriented* It is 
created and maintained by the will of the central 
government...* a separating factor.... the boundary 
separates the sovereign (or federal) or autonomous, or 
any other) political units from one another...it remains 
always a fixed obstacle? it impedes integration across 
the borderline..*"^. There is no denying the fact that 
all states have laws, and all boundaries mark the limits 
of territory where such laws are applied.All states have 
their respective policies, and all boundaries possess some 
degree of economic significance. Theoretically all states 
are sovereign and as such boundaries demarcate the limits 
of that sovereignty. However, these concepts, postulates 
'and internationally recognized principles have been 
shattered and demolished either directly i.e. through 
aggression and invasion or indirectly through subversion, 
and the sacred cow of the inviolability of state 
sovereignty has at times been mercilessly slaughtered on 
the altar of expansionism, and boundaries have been
pp.
3. ibxd^l 35-37
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redefined, redrawn or redemarcated. "Both frontiers and 
boundaries are manifestations of socio-political forces, 
and as such are subjective, not objective* But while the 
former are the result of rather spontaneous or at least 
ad hoc solutions and movements, the latter are fixed and 
enforced through a more rational and centrally co-ordinated 
effort; a conscious choice is made among the several 
preferences and opportunities at hand.• • • Boundaries are 
not boundaries of all political power. 9?hey are the 
limits of internal political power...External political 
power does not know territorial limits; it appears on the 
international soaie ... in order to have some stability 
in the political structure, both on the national and 
international level a clear distinction between the 
spheres of foreign and domestic politics is necessary.
lL
!The boundary helps to maintain this distinction"
A.E. Hoodie has expressed similar views "Bo aspect 
of international affairs reveals more clearly the 
limitations of mankind than the efforts to settle the 
disposal of these frontiers. Up to the present time 
decisions have often been reached by the exercise of 
force and they have succeeded in sowing the seeds of 
further antagonisms which are only worsened by the 
fantastic claims sometimes put irredenta" are shibbole­
ths which have all too often been used as excuses for 
aggrandisement.
Political geographers have iried to define the 
word boundary in such a manner that the definition would
4. kristof L.h. op. cit pp 145-44 '
5. Hoodie, A. E. "Geography behind Politics"
London, 1947, p-. 80
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cover every aspect of the term, hoping in this way to 
relieve the world tensions created by boundary disputes. 
Shis discussion gathered momentum during the interwar 
period and vigorous efforts were made to weigh the 
merits of "artificial” and “natural” boundaries.However, 
it was commonly argued that no exhaustive or "ideal” 
definition could be suggested without a definite reference 
to functions. A boundary is an integral part of a 
politicoterritbrial organisation, and the ba&fes for 
their establishment along with the effect of the use 
of these criteria will have. fhe term effect here 
denotes functions. A close study of the evaluation of 
international boundaries would reveal that a majority 
of political geographers have attached great significance 
to ethnic grouping and the boundaries defined, delimited 
and demarcated in accordance with this concept.
Accordingly an effort is made to devise boundaries which 
would separate peoples who are racially dissimilar and 
xinify those who are racially alike. £he South African 
Bantustan scheme is a case in point, where people are 
assigned "homelands” .according to their racial groups.
A boundary devised on this principle is considered to 
minimise the chances of friction and tension and hdp 
eliminate the dangers inherent in boundary disputes. But 
such a definition could not possibly cover the multifarious 
racial characters and meet the exacting needs of a 
heterogenous society. Invariably all the states have 
minority groups and it is very difficult if not well 
nigh impossible to identify correctly this specific 
racial group size. At times states have exchanged racial 
groups in an effort to mollify tensions, instead of
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reconstituting boundaries e.g. Turkey and Greece, Since 
the British gave independence to Cyprus in 1960, the 
Turkish and Greek inhabitants of the island have been 
engaged in bitter squabbling over the future of this small 
but strategically placed state. There have been suggestions 
from different quarters that the island should be parti­
tioned between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots or that the 
Turkish community should be exchanged with Greeks from 
the Salonika belt of the Greek Mainland so as to lessen 
tension between the two states, to eliminate racial 
tension by separating the racial groups through boundary 
demarcations, and at the same time to preserve the 
characteristics of their respective societies and 
institutions.
There are political geographers and political 
entities who have suggested and advocated the defining 
of boundaries on a linguistic basis - India is a typical 
example of this. The Indian Union has p*ef erred to organise 
herself on these lines and the emergence of Hariana and 
Andhrapradesh is a vivid example of boundary demarcations 
on the basis of languages, especially where there is a 
multilingual society. "The Times'* of London (5*/l*73) 
commenting on the Indian problem stated, "Ironically, 
the cause of separatism, which was espoused originally 
by those living in the Telengana region of the state, is 
now being urged most hotly by their Andhra neighbours.
This multiplication of the centrifugal forces at work has 
made it all the more difficult for the central government 
to play a unifying role." The same paper made some sharp 
but legitimate observations (16.1.73) regarding the
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separatist tendencies and age old parochialisms and
regionalisms in India, "The present trouble in Andhra
Pradesh, which threatens to split the state into tv/o new
units, has revived the old debate about the dangers of
regionalism in India*. •..India’s first Prime Minister who
had earlier endorsed the principle of linguistic states,
now set his face steadily against the idea. The Prime
Minister contended that fissiparous and parochial passions...
would be encouraged unnecessarily if the units of the Indian
federation corresponded too closely t© linguistic or
ethnic divisions.” Tayyeb has made similar observations,
"In spite of the geographic kaleidoscopic appearance of
India and the resulting chain of Indian geographic unity
and commensurate measures of political unity in India,
the history of India regurgitates innumerable instances
of cultural, political and social disunity, and the
emergence of Pakistan as an independent political unit
is the latest and the most comprehensive rebuttal to
6the claimants of such illusionary unity.11 This concept 
could have politically dangerous consequences and the 
politicoterritorial organisations might be liable to 
fragmentation and the unity of the state Jeopardised.
This type of boundary demarcation might create tension 
instead of eliminating it as the boundary would establish 
different characters and interests thereby separating 
the two peoples instead of bringing them together and 
developing a unifying bond. These groupings across the 
boundary might develop hostile attitudes and the 
significance of their mutual boundary could be undermined 
thus weakening the state structure.
6. Tayyeb A., op.oit. pp 24-2f?
Another method of defining a boundary is the 
recognition of a physical barrier, i.e. a mountain 
range, an escarpment, river or lake, such as the 
Karakoram Pass or watershed, the Haaf River, Ran of 
Kutch. Such physical features might have divisive or 
unifying effects. These physicographic boundaries have 
increasingly lost their significance in the face of 
technological development, especially in the field of 
warfare. The traditional geographic analysis of the 
South Asian Sub-Continent accepted the Himalayas as a 
very useful and effective physical barrier which helped 
keep the enemy at bay. But the concept received a 
shattering blow in 1962 during the Sino-Indian border 
conflict when the Chinese armies used the defensive 
mechanisms of this physiographic boundary to their . 
advantage. It would be totally wrong to assume that 
such boundaries have completely lost their usefulness 
because physiographic features are generally well known 
and could be recognised as tresspass line. The Crestline 
of the Safed Koh range could easily be recognised as 
the natural physiographic boundary between Pakistan and 
Afghanistan to consolidate the existence of the Durand 
Line and to eliminate the source of tensions in the 
region. The Andes have been considered the most conven­
ient and natural divide between Qhile and Argentina, in 
spite of the wranglings between the two states as to its 
correct definition and demarcation.
Rivers are very important elements in the process 
of boundary establishment but have not prevented friction 
or conflict. The Oder-Heisse line, the Beas-SutleJ axis,
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the Kavi and the Chenab lines, the Ganges, the SvStma. 
and the.Pooran Kusiyara lines are only a few examples# 
fhe use of the water by the riparian states is one of 
the major issues for discussion, and the signing of the 
Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 between India and Pakistan 
is a case in point. Moreover, the persistent shifting 
of the river course creates very tricky problems 
especially when ‘bhar-lands ,f are established thereby 
necessitating the redefinition and redemarc ation of the 
boundary# The rivers of East Pakistan have been notorious 
in this respect causing friction with India over the 
boundaryialignment. Physiographic boundaries sometimes 
coincide with ahthropogeogiaphic boundaries. Such 
boundaries are invariably related to various features 
of human settlement and culture, the boundary between 
Spain and Prance along the Pyrenees is a typical example 
of a physiographic cum anthropogeographic boundary, in 
spite of the fact that there are several cultural contracts 
across this border, which may be a reflection of the 
historical role played by such a feature in functioning 
as a divide. In addition such anthropogeographic 
boundaries may cause frictions and tensions, especially 
when precise definitions are sought and the socio-cultural 
and religious compulsions are hard to reconcile e.g* 
the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Some trespass lines of 
history served to separate independently developing power 
cores, and some survived to become permanent, modern 
international boundaries. Boundaries that were defined, 
delimited and demarcated before the maturing of the present 
cultural landscapes are termed as antecedent boundaries 
e.g. the boundary between U.S.A. and Canada, west of the
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Great Lakes* The boundaries that ran through the 
"virginal” territory were termed by Hartshorhe as 
"Pioneer" boundaries and after the main elements of the 
state system Imd been established on either side of the 
antecedent or pioneer boundary, then such an alignment 
was described as a subsequent boundary*
Power is the most important recurring element 
that cannot be mapped with any precision and which is 
constantly in change. Powerful states at will have been 
able to dictate the redefinition and redemarcation of 
boundaries.
"A boundary is not only a line of demarcating 
legal systems but also a line of contact of territorial 
power structures.•.Spykman evaluated power in terms of 
resources and strategy, both on a grand scale. Peace­
makers, he argued must think of the geography of power, 
for "interest in the frontier is now no longer in terms 
of the strategic value of the border zone but in' terms
7of the power potential of the territory it surrounds *,!
The two World Wars and their aftermath have 
provided sufficient material in the field of power 
politics as a result of which the powerful states were
able to dictate the demarcation of boundaries according
“'"V
to their interests; the two German statesh the two
O'* Jones,Stephen B. "Boundary
of place and Time" dackson W.D.A. edit; Politics 
and Geographic Relationship, London, 1964, p.135
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Korean Republics, the two Vietnams and the creation 
of Israel are living examples of this concept® However 
the permanence of such boundary demarcation is open to 
question®
Boundaries have also been defined in accordance 
with the geometric concept and most of these appear on 
the map as ruler-straight lines drawn along parallels 
or lines of longitude® These may also be represented by 
an arc drawn by a compass® "The use of long geometrical 
lines as boundaries required some geodetic sophistication.
“-— Their application to America was of European
origin. The Papal Line of demarcation - really a "line of
allocation" and not a boundary « was the earliest. The
Charters of English colonies specified geometrical
boundaries in many cases. The conflicting western land
claims of these colonies arose largely from the euqpioration
of their geometrical boundaries. The parallel of forty-
nine degrees was first suggested by the Hudson’s Bay
Company as a boundary between French and English
8possessions in eastern Canada, as early as 1714”
Geometrical boundaries are features of Africa's political 
geography much more than that of Pakistan though 
triangulation is important in the Horth West of West 
Pakistan*
The adjacent states may come to an arrangement 
whereby they mutually accept a particular line of 
demarcation and as such establish a boundary through
8. ibid. p. 131
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contractual agreement "®he assence of the contractual
concept of boundary is that two countries should agree
on a line and stick to it* as individuals agree on
property lines.•♦the contract may be a mere facade to
q
hide power polities." The boundary demarcations of 
Louisiana* Florida* Alaska and Gadsden strip may be 
cited as good examples of contractual boundaries. Ihe 
incorporation of the boundaries of Gawadar into Pakistan 
is another case in point.
Another basis of defining a boundary is religion.
Peoples of widely Waried races and tongues have accepted
the same faith. Peoples speaking the same language and
belonging to the same race have opted for different
religions. Uh@ Partition of the South Asian sub-continent
in 1947 was essentially based on the "two nations theory"
and the boundaries of the two states were defined by each
of the two commissions and was "instructed to demarcate
the boundaries of the two parts of the Punjab/Bengal
on the basis of ascertaining the contiguous majority
areas of Muslims and non-Muslims. In doing so, it will
iOalso take into account other factors" The subcontinent 
was partitioned on these lines and as a result Pakistan 
emerged as a fragmented "truncated" and a "moth-eaten" 
state 1 and the ill effects of a hasty partition have 
haunted her ever since. £he creation of the state of 
Israel and the defining of her borders in 1948 followed 
the religious concept of boundaries, and the effects of
9* ibid. p. 130
10. She Report of the Punjab Partition Committee,p.ii
1947.
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the redrawing of the boundaries in the region are still
being felt throughout the world. The resulting friction
and tension has increasingly threatened world peace and
at times has brought the "superpowers” on a collision
course; the partition of the South Asian subcontinent in
194-7 was described by Spate as "the expression of a new
economic nationalism that has inevitably taken into
its hands the immensely powerful weapon of immemorial
11religious and social differentiation."
Pakistan inherited approximately 7000 miles of
frontiers in 194-7» as a result of the partition of the
subcontinent. Amongst these were internationally recognised
12
boundaries e.g. the Durand Line in the north-west and the
Pakistan-Iran boundary in the southwest. Some State and
provincial boundaries were accepted as international such
13as Bahawalpur and Sind* and some District and Tehsil  ^
boundaries were transformed into international boundaries.
14
In East Pakistan the District and Thana boundaries m  
Assam and Bengal of the pre-partition period formed the 
boundaries between Pakistan and India. Consequent upon 
the boundary award Pakistan inherited a number of problems 
which were basically a reflection of wider political issues 
in the sub-continent. These concerned both the old 
established boundaries and the Radcliffe Awards of 194-7*
11. Spate, O.H.K. India and Pakistan, A General and 
Regional Geography N.Y. 1957 PP 14-4-•
12. The Durand Line was a recognized and established 
boundary,but still posed a number of problems for 
Pakistan thus, a problem boundary.
15. Tehsil is an administrative(sub-District) unit
in the Punjab.
14-. Thana was an administrative (sub-District) unit
in East Pakistan.
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THE BOUNDARIES OF PAKISTAN.
THE DURAND LINE.
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Pakistan was unique among independent states in 
being divided into two parts separated by 1000 miles of 
Indian territory. Moreover, each part has some boundaries 
that are subject to dispute• These may be classified as 
(i) established-unestablished, (ii) problem-non-problem 
and (iii) secure-insecure^ boundaries. An analysis of 
each section of the boundaries of Pakistan should give 
a better picture of her geopolitical problems in terms 
of this classification.
The Western Boundaries
The Durand Line Agreement was signed on November 12, 
1895? by Sir Mortimer Durand for the British Crown in 
India and by Amir Abdurrahman for Afghanistan. Tlie 
Agreement was reaffirmed in the Anglo-Afghan Pact of 
1905, the Treaty of Rawalpindi in 1919? and was further 
reaffirmed in the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1921*
The Durand Line starts ( 3 ) in the north­
west of Karamsar Pass in the north of West Pakistan then 
stretches to the west passing through the Baroghil pass 
and the Kaeh Pass bordering on the Wakhan Region of 
Afghanistan in the snowy Hindu Kush, and descending 
towards the Dorah Pass. Thus leaving Noshaq and Tirich 
^ir, the two lofty peaks, well within the Chitral region 
of Pakistan. The descent becomes steeper towards the Shui, 
Shiran Shing and Shingara Passes. Prom this point the 
boundary zigzags towards the famous Khyber Pass, and passes
15. Pakistan - Iran boundary was not fully demarcated, 
but still posed no major problems. The Pakistan ~ 
India boundary in the Rann of Kutch was neither 
established nor demarcated,therefore, an insecure
and problem boundary.
4?
through the important border post of Torkham, taking a 
westward direction to the Peiwar Pass in the vicinity of 
the Sufed Koh, leaving the scenic Pax^achinar and its 
poplar trees well within the Kiirram Agency of Pakistan.
The boundary then runs southwards through Waziristan, the 
Gonial Pass and the Quetta-Pishin region heading west 
through the dry and barren Chagai Hills and ending in the 
proximity of Koh-i-Malik Siyah, the trijunction of 
Pakistan? Iran and Afghanistan. The boundary alignment is 
in conformity with the expressed thoughts of Amir 
Abdurrahman in his autobiography, Life of Abdurrahman, 
and establishes the fact that the signing of the Duraifd- 
Line Agreement was free of duress and that it was mutually 
agreed upon”... to keep a recoxkl of every word which was 
uttered by Sir Mortimer Durand, myself, and other speakers 
of the mission, I had arranged for Munshi Sultan Muhammad 
Khan to sit behind a curtain without being seen or heard, 
or his presence known by anyone else except myself, to 
write down every word they spoke to me, or among themselves, 
either in English or Persian. He wrote in shorthand every 
word uttered by Durand or myself, and this conversation is 
all preserved in the record office. The short outcome of 
the conversation was this, that the boundary line was 
agreed upon from Chitral and Baroghil Pass up to Peshawar* 
and thence up to Koh-i-Malik Siyah (the trijunction of 
Persian, Afghanistan and Baluchistan) in this way that 
Wakhan Kafristan, Asmar, Mohmand of Lalpura, and one portion 
of Wasiristan (Birmal) came under my rule, and I renounced 
my claims from the railway-station of Hew Chaman, Qhagai,
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the rest of Wasiri, Bilind Khel, Kurram, Afridi, Bajaurt
16Swat, Buner, Dir, Ghilas and Chitral."
The Durand Line was largely demarcated in 1895, 
and the boundary it seems, was a compromise between the 
British and Russian interests in the area, and established 
Afghanistan as a buffer state between the two powers, the 
Wakhan ridge serving as the divide between the two 
spheres of influence* This point is substantiated by the 
Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, which acknowledged the 
line of demarcation of the two spheres of influence* The 
British in India had endeavoured to keep the Russians 
away from India and the approaches to the Arabian Sea, 
and as such "the first step forward in the new policy 
was taken in 1876" two years before the outbreak of the 
war with Afghanistan* This advance was made not on the 
Rorth-Vest Frontier but from Upper Bind into th© 
territory now known as Baluchistan. It was followed 
later by very important advances elsewhere, and consoli­
dated by the establishment in 1895 of an agreed frontier 
with Afghanistan* And it was associated with general 
policy*** to build a strategic line of defence against 
Russian pressure in Central Asia."^ The Horth-West 
Frontier Province has been the subject of innumerable 
irruptions and invasions and there is no denying th© 
fact that most of the invaders passed through the passes 
of this frontier region to subjugate India, therefore, 
th© British in India wanted to have a secure defence
16. Life of Abdurrahman,1900,Fol*ii,p*160
17® Caroe, Olaf, The Pathanss 550 B.G.-A.D. 1957,
London, 1965, p® 570.
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mechanism in the region to safeguard their geopolitical 
interests," the land frontiers of India appeared to th® 
British less secure* especially to the north-west, where 
Hussian expansion in Central Asia, along with her 
attempts to control the rulers of Afghanistan and Persia^ 
alarmed and preoccupied British opinion, Policy makers 
in London and Calcutta were perplexed between the 
advantages of leaving Persia and Afghanistan as buffer 
states, ox* of controlling Afghanistan and pushing British 
outposts into Central Asia or of standing firm behind a
iB
forward Indo~British Line of strong strategic outposts*" 
Alistair Lamb has expressed similar views, "However, in 
periods when it seemed as if the Russians might displace 
the Chinese in Sinkiang, the British gave thought to the 
extension of at least their theoretical sovereignty to the 
northern glacis of the Karakoram so as to keep Russia 
as far away as possible from the centres of Indian popu­
lation* This glacis possessed few inhabitants and would 
require very little administration* A British boundary 
which embraced it would involve less the extension 
northwards of British rule than the extension eastwards 
of a buffer strip, almost a continuation of the Wakhan 
tract of Afghanistan which Angl©-Russian Diplomacy had 
created in 1893-95*1 ^
18* Phillips, C.H* et al, (ed) The Evolution
of India and Pakistan, 1858 to 19A?s selected 
Documents, p* 440.
19, Lamb, H,A* Asian Frontiers, Studies in a 
Continuing Problem, London, 1968, 
p. 103*
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The tribal Pathans were not attracted by th© 
establishment of the Durand Line, and to project their 
disapproval they mounted attacks against the Indian 
positions in 1897-98, but were quickly subdued with 
determination by th© Indian Government« With the 
intention of placating the Pathans and of consolidating 
the defence line in the north-west the Indian Government 
on 9th November, 1901, created the North West frontier 
Province* The Districts of Peshawar, ICohat, Bannu, Dera 
Ismail Khan and Hazara were detached from the Punjab to 
constitute the new province. In addition the government 
created five Tribal Agencies of Halakand, Khyber, Kurram, 
North Waziristan and South Waziristan (Pakistan has 
added the Mohmand Agency since 194-7) • However, these 
Agencies do not cover the entire Tribal Belt, and the 
tribes such as Oraksiais, Bhittanis and Adam Khel Afridis 
are administered by the Deputy Commissioners of the 
respective districts*
The Durand Lin@(1 2,3 9 iias not been drawn in
4 ;
conformity with the ethnic groupings and thus in some
20cases cut across the tribal territories @*g* Mohmands, 
Shinwaris, Mahsud, and Waairi* The Durand Line is
20. As historical notes to C*I.Griffitha*s book
Afghanistan,01 af Caroe writes The fixing of the 
Durand Line was one result of the Second 
Afghanistan war...It was,and is by no means, 
arbitrary. It generally follows tribal boundaries, 
separating those tribes which go to market in 
Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Tarak and Quetta from 
those with economic links with Khurasan having 
Kabul, Ghazni and Kandhar as their market towns. •’*
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"illogical from the point of view of enthnography, of
21strategy and of geography." Irrespective of these 
local, potential causes of discord, the Line as a whole 
has been a constant source of tension between Pakistan 
and Afghanistan, hence it is certainly classifiable as 
a problem boundary, in spite of the fact that its 
alignment was mutually agreed in 1893? and subsequently 
upheld by the parties concerned as an international 
frontier. The boundary was fully demarcated in the early 
stages except in two areas (i) ^hitral - Afghanistan 
border and (ii) the Hawa Sar-Sikaram peak section. The 
ChirtaX - Afghanistan border was defined daring the World 
War II. In the Hawa Sar-Sikaram section a stretch to the 
west of the Khyber was demarcated in 1919* but the remainder 
has yet to be demarcated though an acceptable alignment 
would probably be easily found along the crest-line of 
the Safed Koh range. "Something should be said here of 
a sector agreed on the map but never demarcated on the 
ground, from the point on the watershed between Kunar 
and Ba~gaur, through Hohmand Country, across the west 
end of Khaiber, and thence skirting the Bazar Valley 
up to the great range of the Sufed Koh turning westward 
to its culminating peak, Sikarem. Along the Sufed Koh 
the failure to demarcate is of no consequence, for the 
range sukmit is unmistakable, one of the most obvious 
natural features in all this country. West of Khabiber 
the omission was rectified in 1919* But in Mohmand 
country there has been difficulty..• due to the fact 
that geographical watersheds and tribal boundaries do not 
coincide in this sector. The Durand Line was conceived
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as following the Kunar-Bajaur watershed as far as that 
was defined towards the Kabul River, leaving Lalpura to 
Afghanistan, and reaching th© river at Bhinpokh®*.left 
all the Kama Goshta Mohmande on the Afghan side , while 
it included on the side of India a number of Upper 
Mohmand clans*..on th© International line that divides 
tlia allegiance of a tribe is a fertile cause of 
disturbance*. British authorities9 who were compelled to 
reserve a freedom of action to deal with these elans in 
the event of their using their Alsatia as a base of 
hostile action* Failing agreement between Pakistan and 
Afghanistan it is certain that the last has not been
op
heard of this anomaly, "
The Indian suggestion in 1919 to Amir Amanullah, 
of an alternative boundary through Mohmand territory 
further to the east| offering the Bohai Dag Valley 
was not taken up* It is the Bagaur area of the 
undemarcated boundary which has been a constant source 
of friction and tension between Pakistan and Afghanistan, 
and in 1961 Pakistan was forced to .itlak© punitive 
measures against the Pathans on this section "Afghan 
forces had attacked two Pakistani posts at Miskinai 
and Sangpura in Bajaur area on May 19-20, 1961. Pakistan 
planes attacked*** and destroyed machine-gun and 
mortar positions| and prisoners confessed that 1000 Afghan
22® Caroe, 01af9 ©p. eit., pp. 382.
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2 3
troops crossed into BajjaurU
A very important question may tie asked at this 
point in time as to why the Durand Line has achieved such a* 
political significance since the very emergence of Pakistan as 
an independent state.The answer,in fact,lies in the successive 
endeavours of the various governments of Pakistan,which have 
gradually hut decidedly,through policy decisions,ISSSg made ser- 
ious efforts to integrate the frontier region into her effective 
administrative structure,and as such eliminate the existence of 
the Asad Illaqa(free and uncontrolled zone),from within her 
political boundaries,This determined policy seemed to have two 
main aimss(i) the incorporation of the frontier region and as 
such the termination of the overt or covert Afghan interference • 
in the internal affairs of Pakistan,and (ii) the socio-economic 
and political development of the region by a planned introduction 
of administrative reforms,establishment of edticational institu­
tions, growth of industrial units,building of roads and bridges, 
permanent supply of fresh water,irrigation schemes,hospitals and , 
the provision of other amenities so as to bring the life of the 
region at par with the other integral parts of Pakistan.This is 
not acceptable to Afghanistan since it is bound to lay-bare and 
expose the weaknesses of her outdated socio-economic and. politi­
cal structure,The Pakistani point.of view is that the above mea­
sures would help a great deal in consolidating the national 
traits of her people,and in addition would consolidate her poli­
tical boundaries in the northwest.Pakistan has shown no interest, 
at all,in the expansion of her territorial limits,especially in* 
the northwest,and as such the total abandonment of the ideas 
which were nurtured by the Old British Empire,when these areas
2 3 -Keesings,op,cit,,p.1 8 1 7 2 .
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served either as the areas of expansion or the buffer 
against possible Russian incursions at the expense of the 
British interests.In the eyes of Pakistanis and their policy 
makers the theoretical assumptions of Lord Curzon have lost 
their validity.In fact,Pakistan has endeavoured to terminate 
this concept in the interest of stability and permanent 
political boundaries.
The socio-economic and politico-administrative
developments in the frontier regions of Pakistan are bound to
undermine the vested interests of the anachronistic rule of
the Yahya Khel ( who normally speak Persian and not Pushto ),
and expose the temerity and the futility of the Afghan propo-
ganda machine that the Pathans and Baluchis of Pakistan are
living like serfs under the rule of the Punjabis.This is also
likely to discredit the Maliks and Sirdars of the region ( The
Sirdari Nizam has been abolished in Pakistan w.e.f.April 8,1976)
who had enjoyed almost complete social,economic and political
control over the poor masses of this region,and who have exploit
24ted the innocent people for their ulterior motives.
P aki s t an-Iran Boundary
The Pakistan-Iran Boundary in the south-west has; 
"been relatively a quiet one and has been recognised as 
an established boundary between the two states in spite 
of the fact that there have been some incidents which 
were of little significance in the wider context of the 
ever growing friendly relations and close cooperation 
between Pakistan and Iran. These two brotherly neigh­
bours enjoy common culture, heritage and ethnographical 
affinities, in addition to their common faith and a 
sense of collective responsibility in the region* Both 
are members of the Central Treaty Organization 
(previously the Baghdad Pact) and are active participants 
in the Regional Cooperation for Development. To cement 
these delations both the countries agreed in i94-7”4-9 
. to reach an amicable settlement of their boundary > r
alignment | this extended to approximately 590 miles
.^ 1 . upo(>^ gvi-
24. The question of Pukhtunistan has again been
raised very actively by the Afghan rulers since 
the coup in that country in July 1975* Sar&str 
Baud Khan the cousin of the ousted kind Zahir 
Shah has been installed as the leader of the 
military officers. Baud’s antagonism towards 
Pakistan is well known since his premiership 
during the late fifties* The difficulty with 
the Afghan leaders has been their failure to 
identify the "Pukhtunistan” problem or to give 
a correct definition of its boundaries. There 
seems to be a constant shift in tMs?/minds as 
to the degree of-'autonomy for this-so' called - 
land of the Pulchtuns of the extent; to which the 
boundaries of "Pakhtunistan” are to be delimited* 
Pakistan has largely been ignoring the Afghan 
propoganda in the interest of world peace and 
Muslim brotherhood but there are signs that Mfc. 
Bhutto might be forced to take a much more 
aggressive line towards the Baud regime if the
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along their common frontier*, The boundary which was 
partially demarcated, rims from the tri«junction of 
Pakistan-Iran and Afghanistan i.e, the Koh-i-Malik Si ah, 
to Gwadar *^ ay, in the Arabian Sea, Since this region 
had also been brought under the jurisdiction of the 
British Raj, Iran and the British India signed border 
agreements in 1871, 1896 and 1905® However, the 
Baluchi Irani an boundary was largely undemarcated until 
Pakistan and Iran reached an agreement in 1958, after 
carrying out a detailed and comprehensive survey of 
the boundary alignment® The agreement was fully 
implemented on 6th February 1959® when the boundary 
demarcation was formally completed. According to the 
agreement the Government of Pakistan transferred the 
Mirjawa-Zahidan sector of the Quetta-Zahidan rail 
track to the Iranian Railways, Pakistan and Iran 
exchanged the final protocol of the boundary agreement 
on^lst August, 1960. "The successful conclusion of 
this highly intricate work demonstrates once again 
what can be achieved by peaceful negotiations between 
two neighbourly nations whose relations are inspired 
by mutual respect, mutual goodwill and mutual trust*
Afghans do not adopt a good neighbourly attitude 
towards Pakistan* The Afghans must no t for gel; 
that there are approximately 5 million Pakhtuns 
in Afghanistan (41% of the Afghanistan population) 
but 10 millions in Pakistan, and if referendum 
were to be held to determine the wishes of the 
Pakhtuns on both the sides of the Duran Line then 
there are good reasons to believe that the 
decisions would in all probability be in 
Pakistan's favour. Moreover the Tajiks, Hazaras, 
Uzbeks, Turkoman and Baluchis of Afghanistan 
cannot for long be kept out of the lime light*
Pillars of the stone and mortar may conceivably fall 
into disrepair and crumble on© day* but I feel sure 
that the sentiments which inspire the settlement itself 
will remain untouched by the hands of time* for here
pc
is a boundary of love that joins rather than separates." y 
However* there was some criticism voiced in Pakistan 
against the agreement* especially in Baluchistan and 
the critics mentioned a figure of 3000 square miles 
that Pakistan had ceded to Iran under the agreement*
But the Pakistan Government vehemently rejected the 
accusation^ "It is not a fact that Pakistan has given 
away 3000 square miles to Iran. We agreed to give to 
Iran 310 square miles of its territory* wkeih had been 
forcibly occupied by the British* when they were rulers 
of the subcontinent* and against which occupation the 
Government of Iran had always protested...While the 
Government of Pakistan will transfer some 310* and not ; 
3000 square miles of territory which had been in de 
facto occupation of the British Government of India* 
the Government of Iran has ceded 93 square miles of 
territory, hitherto under its occupation* to the
t'
overmen!* of Pakistan..." dfhe two states on 16th 
July, 1963* completed all the formalities by exchanging 
the documents and the related material* Hr. Baqi Balueh* 
a vociferous member of West Pakistan Provincial Assembly 
initiated proceedings in the West Pakistan High Court
to question the validity of the agreement and the
25® General U.K. Sasa* Pakistan Ambassador to 'Iran '
as reported by Dawn,Karachi September 1 * 1960.
26® Bhutto, Speech in the National Assembly on
24th July 1963* Of. Important Speeches and Press 
Conferences p® 443®
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consequent transferee the territory but failed to pursue 
the matter and as such the case is still pending in the 
Court. It is this territory that Khan Wall Khan, the 
leader of the National Awami Party, which emerged 
dominant both in N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan, has mentioned 
in recent months and has accused the former government 
of President Ayub Khan of ceding national territory to 
3-ran, a territory, which has enormous mineral potentials, 
according to the Patlian leader. The Pakistan™Iran 
boundary has posed no problems of significance for 
Pakistan and for all intents and purposes been a secure 
and satisfactory line of demarcation between Pakistan and 
Iran; indeed a source of Strength for Pakistan.
fi?he Boundary with India.
Pakistan has faced a number of problems with 
regard to her boundaries in the south-east; (Rann of Kuteh), 
along the Sutlej River and in Kashmir- (The part which 
is in the effectual control of Pakistan.) Disputes have 
arisen owing to (a) unestablished boundaries, (b) confl­
icting interpretations of the Radcliffe Award (Lahore- 
Montgomery-Ferozepur Districts), and (c) the absence of 
a defined or demarcated boundary (Gilgit~Hunza~Sinkiang).
The Rann of Kuteh
The Rann of Kutch ( Fig:5,6) covers approximately 
8A00 square miles and except for small patches of higher
grounds (bets), it is a desolate area, unpopulated but
the result of
for occasional herdsmen. The Rann was/an earthquake in 
1819$ when it was sealed off from the waters of the
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Indus* It is Flooded from May to October by swollen 
rivers and high tides * and it is during this period that 
the bets are formed* Pakistan contended ( Pigs 5 )
that since the Rann was a march/lake a central boundary 
was to be preferred, she therefore claimed approximately 
3500 square miles to the north of the 24th parallel*
India completely rejected this proposal and claimed the 
entire Earn ( Figs $ ).In the absence of agreement th© 
Indian forces in the Rann occupied Ohhad Bet on 25th 
February, 1956, and in May 1965 an accidental patrol 
clash led to an enlargement of the incident* On 3$th 
June, 1965 a ceasefire was agreed on the initiative of 
th© British Government, and later the dispute was referred 
to a mutually agreed tribunal*
®h@ Tribunal first met in February 1966, in 
Geneva and ruled that it was not entitled to give a 
political award but an award based upon.th© actual 
claims of sovereignty. Pakistan whs represented by 
Hasrollah Entezam of Iran, and India by Ales Babler 
of Yugoslavia. Mr. Gunnar Xagergren of Sweden acted as 
the chairman. On February 19, 1968, by a 2-X decision, 
the Tribunal awarded 90 per cent of the Rann (3200 
square miles ) to India and 10 per cent (350 square miles) 
to Pakistan. The Tribunal ruled that there was no 
historically recognised or well-established boundary 
between Sind (West Pakistan) and the State of Butch 
(Gujrat-India). The presiding Judge remarked? ftIn 
respect of those sectors of the Rann in relating to wlick 
no specific evidence in the way of display of Sind
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authority? or merely trivial or isolated evidence of
such a character* supports Pakistan's claim* I pronounce
in favour of India.*. However* in respect of sectors
where a continuous and for the region intensive Sind
activity meeting with no effective opposition from
the Kutch side, is established I am of the opinion that
Pakistan has made out a better and superior title. Shis
refers to a marginal area south of Rahim Ki Bazar*
including Piol Valo Kun* as well as Dhara Banni and
Ghha& Bet* which on most maps appear as an extension of
the mainland of S i n d * T h e  Tribunal further decided;
"It may be taken as positively established that in this
century* prior to independence* outside Dhara Banni and
Qhhad Bet the police and criminal--jurisdiction of th©
Sind authorities over the disputed territory extended
in the sector between the eastern loop and Dhara Banni
to Ding* Yighokot, and Biarbet... Both the inhabitants
of Sind who used the grazing grounds* and the Sind
authorities must have acted on the assumption that Dhara
28Banni and Chhad Bet were British territory." With a
view to removing any further causes of tension in the
area the Tribunal awarded the two deep inlets* on either
side of Hagar Parker, to Pakistan "It would be inequitable
to recognise these inlets as foreign territory. It
would be conducive to friction and conflict* and since
this territory is wholly surrounded by Pakistan it is
logical that it should belong to Pakistan®" With a view to
27® The Times* London* 20-2-1968  "
28* Keesings, op. cit* p. 22838*
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removing any further causes of tension in the area the
Tribunal awarded the two deep inlets, on either side
29k
of Hagar Parker to Pakistan*
The portion of the boundary between the Western 
Terminals^0 ( Pig? 9 ) (marked as "WT") and the Western
TriJunction (marked as Point "A”) shall lie along the 
vertical line as demarcated on the ground...the Western 
TriJunction and Point "B", which is the easternmost 
point of the eastern loop...the boundary shall go in a 
straight line to Point "C" which is indieatedha 
"Sadariaja Gat'1 ... from there straight eastnortheast 
until at Point "D” in the vicinity of the reported 
Karali outpost® From Point "D" it shall follow the 
boundary symbols until. Point ”Ert...The boundary around 
Dhara Banni and Chaad Bet will be straight lines drawn 
from or through.. .the soulternmost (B) and easternmost(H) 
points of Ohhad e^t; as appearing on Indian map B-55 
amid two traverse stations marked on Indian map B-48 
as small circles, one lying at a distance of approximately 
5.8 miles south of Baliari next to the mark ,,5r,f and 
the other lying at a distance of approximately 1.7 miles 
south of the letters "D” and "H” in Dhara Banni."
The boundary shall go in a straight line through the 
middle of the first mentioned circle and touch th© second 
circle as depicted Point ”E" side of Nagar Parkar will 
constitute the territory of Pakistan*
297K” The Tribunal further stated, "It would be ™
inequitable to recognise these inlets as 
foreign territory.lt would conducive to 
friction and conflict,and since this territory 
is wholly surrounded by Pakistan,it is logical 
that it should belong to Pakistan”(Keesings
p. 228^8).
50. The boundary alignment is in conformity with the
Indo~Pakistan Western Boundary Case Tribunal Award, 
19th February, 1968.
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At the western inlet, th© boundary will have 
the boundary symbols indicated on Indian map 
the point marked thereon as ”26” more precisely where 
the cart track is indicated as departing from the edge 
of the Rann in southeasterly direction, Shis point is 
indicated as Point "L” (figure '9 3) on the other side 
of the inlet, the point will be that x-fhere the Camel 
track is indicated as Point . “M" (figure 3  ). Between 
Points ’’L" and "M”, the boundary shall be a straight 
line where that line reaches the boundary symbols on 
the northern edge of the Rann* Prom Point ffG-,f, the 
boundary shall go straight west until at Point ”2?1 it 
reaches the straight line originating at Point "EIT*
From Point ”B %  it shall proceed to Point "H”,touching 
the outer points of the two tongues of land as depicted 
(figure 9)r‘» From Point UH”, the boundary shall go in a 
straight line north^northeast until it reaches the 
boundary symbols appearing on the most recent survey 
map of that side,*,That point, is called Point "K", As 
from Point "K”, and until the eastern Terminus th© 
boundary shall follow the boundary symbols,,,, Indian 
Haps Pakistan Map 105 and Indian Map
TB-28, with the following deviations!
The boundary will cross the eastern inlet at 
its narrowest point in a straight linebetween Points 
"H" and "O'* (figure 9),
’>’y
This boundary marked by symbols along the outer- 
edges of the peninsula of Ragar Parkar and 'up to the
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Eastern Terminus la a Ragged one® As such it is 
unsuitable and impracticable as an international 
boundary® The boundary shall accordingly lie in 
conformity with th© depiction between theouter points 
on guttings out tongues of land from Point "M11 and 
until the Eastern Terminus, marked as
/
The Punjab Partition
The subcontinent was partitioned on 15th 
August* 19^7* and the important task of demising 
the boundaries of th© two Dominions was entrusted 
to two boundary commissions j both were headed by 
Sir Cyril Ra&cXiff© 'who held ultimate control over 
the award® The Commission for partitioning the Pimjab 
comprised Din Mohammad and Muhammad Munir for 
Pakistan* and Mehr Ohand Mahajan and T©j Singh 
representing India® The Bengal Boundary Commission 
comprised Abu Saleh Muhammad Akram and S®A®Rahman 
representing Pakistan and C*G® Biswas and B®K*Mukerji 
on behalf of India® Each of the two commissions 
was "instructed to demarcate the boundaries of the 
two parts of the Punjab/Bengal on the basis of 
ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of Muslims 
and non-Muslims. In doing so* it will also take into 
account other factors11 * ^ 4 Both Pakistan and India 
agreed to accept and enforce the awards® However, the
51® The demarcation of the boundary in this area has
since been satisfactorily completed®
5A® The Report of the Punjab Partition Committee 
1947* P® ii®
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terms of reference of the two commissions leave much 
to be ©plained and desired* The terms did not 
specifically state whether the partition was to be . 
based on majority or majority/contiguous principles 
or “other factors’*, and whether the majority principle 
was to be applied at the provincial, divisional, district, 
tehsil or thana level* Had the partition been devised 
and implemented on th© majority/contiguous basis at 
the provincial or, at least the district level, the 
people of th© two areas might have been saved from the 
haunting uncertainty and the massacre that followed the 
partition. The terms were so vague and so uncertain that 
both the Muslims and non-Muslims were perplexed and 
taken by surprise. For instance, when Muslims .were in a 
majority in one area, as in the Lahore District, and 
three of its tehsils, the whole of. the District should 
have gone to Pakistan; instead th© boundar ran diagonally 
(Pigs 12 ) across the Muslim majority Tehsil of Qasur, 
leaving the south-eastern half to India. This belied 
the economic, strategic, communal or special factors, 
which had evidently been ignored in this case. One 
fails to understand the necessity and advisability of 
such a division, especially when the Muslim majority 
Tehsil of Ajnala in the District of Amritsar was 
awarded to India in toto and the boundary was devised 
on the district basis.
The District of Gurdaspur represents another 
anomaly ( PiglL'2'L )• This was a Muslim majority area .
(50.2 per cent) ^and Muslims were in a majority in
35® C.M.Ali puts the Muslim majority at 51*4* VQX' cent
in his book The Pmergenc® of Pakistan.
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THE RADCLIFFE AWARD IN THE PUNJAB
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all but one of the four tehsils in the District®
The area was crucial strategically and economically 
and should have been awarded to Pakistan®
Instead the whole of the two Muslim majority 
tehsils and a big slice of the third (Shakargarh) wore 
awarded to India® This represented an irrational 
decision heavily favouring the Indians and seemed to 
have been based on "other factors®" "The award that 
Radellffe gave in the Punjab lopped off a number of 
contiguous majority areas from Pakistan, but not a 
single non-’Muslim majority area was taken away from 
vIndia®...Muslim majority Tehsils, or sub-districts, 
Gurdaspur, and Batala, were given to India®®®The Muslim 
majority Tehsil Ajnala, in the Amritsar district was 
also handed over, to India. In the Jullundur district 
th© Muslim majority t&hsils, Nakodar and Jullundur, 
which lie in the angle of the Sutlej and B©as rivers, 
were assigned to India* The Muslim majority tehsils, 
2ira and Perozepur, in the Ferozepur district, which 
were east of the Sutlej River, were also transferred 
to India. All of these Muslim majority areas were 
contiguous to West Punjab." ^
Had one set principle been applied, e.g. that 
of majority/contiguous areas, the Muslim majority 
district of Gurdaspur would have completely blocked 
Indian access to the State of Jammu and Kashmir® Th&
36. Ali$ G.M., The Emergence of Pakistan,N.Y®1967» 
p.213
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award of this Muslim majority area to India, in fact* 
paved the way for the future irruptions of the Indian 
armies in the State® As a result of the award in the 
Punjab the Indians were helped in establishing a direct 
link with the non-Muslim ruler of Jammu and Kashmir,
”Xt was Badcliffe's Award to India of th® Gurdaspur and 
Batala Tahsils with Muslim majorities which rendered 
possible the maintenance of an Indian fore© at Jammu 
based on Pathankot as railhead and which enabled India 
to consolidate her defence southwards all th© way from 
Uri to the Pakistan border®^
J
The Hadeliffe Award in the Punab was a constant 
source of tension between Pakistan and India, especially 
in Lahor@~F©rozepur and Montgomery-Ferosepur sectors®
The disputes concerned the Ferozepur and Sulelmanki 
Headworks and resulted due to conflicting interpretations 
of this Award® The Radeliffe Award in the Punjab left her 
irrigation system in jeopardy and the Pakistani Punjab 
was ’made dependent upon the Ferozepur and Hussainiwaia 1 
Headworks which were carved out to India though India had ' 
less, irrigated area dependent upon these headworks* 
Furthermore, the award of Ferozepur Tehsil to India left 
Pakistan very much vulnerable to Indian interests 
geographically and economically since Ferozepur was a 
very vital rail and road junction and a military centre 
of considerable significance. Th© Pakistanis generally
37* Lord Bir&wood, Two Rations and Kashmir,London, 
1956, p. 74®
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held the view that the award of Ferozepur Tehsils was 
not based on contiguous majority areas principle but on 
"other factors"® This point is sufficiently elaborated 
by Michel Hoys, "for both India and Pakistan®• • • • • 
Ferozepur represented a test of whether the " contiguous 
majority area " principle or "other factors" mentioned 
in the terms of refex^ence were to prevail» Although the 
Ferozepur District as a whole was predominantly non™ 
Muslim (5A®92) per cent in 194-1 census; 55*44 ^  1931) 
the two northern tahsils, Ferozepur itself and Zira 
were Muslim majority areas (Ferozepur, 55*25 1941,
50 $20 in 193*1; Zira 65*26 in 1941, 65*02 in 1931)* The 
Pasilka tahsil which extended southwest along the Sutlej 
to the B&hawalpur border was non-Muslim by 56*72 per 
cent in 1941, 56*36 in 1931* Thus the question arose 
whether a district should be partitioned®«,.under the 
terms of the Boundary Commission, Radcliffe had authority 
to partition Ferozepur District and to award the two 
Muslim majority tahsils to Pakistan on a "contiguous 
majority" basis, especially as neither, the Sutlej nor 
any non-Muslim tahsil separated them from the Lahore 
District* But here "other factors" came forward®
Awarding the Ferozepur tahsils to Pakistan would preserve 
the Sutlej Valley project as far as headworks were 
concerned®•,but "other factors" extended beyond 
irrigation considerations."^® Pakistan and India
38. Aloys A® Michel, The Indus Rivers A Study 
of the Effects of Partition, Newhaven, 
1967 s PP« 178“79<*
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2JQ
reached a negotiated settlement on 11 January, 1960*"^ 
According to the Agreement four disputed areas in the 
region were dealt with# 3?wo of the areas concerned were 
on Lahore-Amritsar "border (a) Chak Ladheke (140 acres) 
and (b) Teh Sharja Marja (200 acres)* Pakistan gave up 
her claims of ©hak hadheke and India renounced her 
claims on the three villages Sharja Marja, Rakh Hardet 
Singh and Pathanke*
3?he remaining two disputes related to the 
Hussainiwala and SuXemanki Headworks* Hussairdwala 
had been awarded to India according to the Award in 
spite of the fact that th© Dipalpur Canal took off 
from this headworks and Irrigated areas in Pakistan only* 
Radcliffe had however, suggested joint control of the 
water intake* Pakistan agreed to withdraw her claim over 
9*5 square miles of the disputed territory under Indian 
control to show her goodwill*
Regarding the SuXemanki Headworks, the Boundary 
Commission had ruled that the boundary between Ferozepur 
and Montgomery Districts would constitute th© frontier 
between the two states and as such recognised as the 
international frontier* 3?h© problem was that the Boundary 
Commission had awarded th© SuXemanki Headworks, which lay 
in Ferozepur District, to Pakistan and as such the 
district boundary had effectively been altered* Precisely 
what were the lines of demarcation of the Headworks, and 
to what extent this altered the existing boundary became
59* Kharas, J*V* Joint Secretary of th© Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, 
for Pakistan| and Desai, M»J*Commonwealth 
Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs for 
India*
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the crucial points® Pakistan maintained that the
SuXemanki Headworks covered an area of 25 square
miles hut India vehemently disputed this contention®
The 1960 Agreement allowed a total area of 15 square
miles to Pakistan and the remainder was considered
Indian territory, but the military commanders of India
and Pakistan at a Conference in Lahore agreed that
pending a final determination of the boundary and the
exchange of territory in the area, the two states
should desist from posting Border Security Porces
40within 150 yards of the de facto boundary®"
. The Uorth Eastern Boundary®
The dispute concerning the north-eastern 
boundary ( Pakistan was more complicated
since the final status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir 
is yet to be determined® This sector involved "Chin^s-c 
Sinkiang and the contiguous areas th© defence of which 
is under actual control of Pakistan"® The boundary 
alignment commences in the north- we stern extremity at 
Height 5650 meters (a peak, Longitude 7^° 34/E and 
Latitude 57° 03/N), generally running towards eastward 
and then southeastward along the main watershed between 
the tributaries of the Tashkurgan and Hunza rivers, 
and passes through the Kilik, Mintaka, Kharohanai, 
MutsjiXga and Parpik passes, before reaching the 
IChunjerab Pass, leaving th© main watershed to follow 
th© iUqjilga River, the Taghdumbash (Opr-ang) River and 
the Keliman Bu (Oprang Jilga)® Th© boundary line then 
runs up the Keleehin River (Shakagam or Mustagh) along
40® Text of Communique 1 Dawn, Karachi, January 12,1960®
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the middle line of its bed to its confluence with, the 
Shorbuiak Daria (Shimshal or BraX&u). From the 
confluence ©f Kelechin and Shorbuiak rivers, the 
boundary according to the Chinese, ascends the crest 
of a spur and runs along it to join the Karakoram 
Range main watershed, belonging to the Shorbuiak 
Mountain* According to Pakistan the boundary line 
from the confluence of Kekechin and Shorbuiak rivers, 
ascends the crest of a corresponding spur and runs 
along it, passing through Mgkt 6520 meters till it 
joins the Karakoram Range main watershed* From this 
point the boundary runs southward and then eastward 
following the Karakoram Range main watershed which 
separates the Tarim and Indus drain§ge systems, passing
p
through the East Muztagh Pass, Ohogri Peak (K ), the
tops of the Broad Peak, the G-asherbrum Mountain the
XndinakoXi Pass and the top of the Teram ICangri Peak,
and then reaches its southern extremity at the 
hiKarakoram Pass*
The two sides had widely varying claims of 
territory in the area. According to Pakistan the dispute 
related to a total area of 5400 square miles. According 
to the Sino-Pakistan Agreement of March 2, 1965, Pakistan 
gained 1550 square miles including 750 square miles 
which were under the control of the Chinese (such as 
Kuz and Sokli - BuXak). Pakistan also received the Oprang 
Valley and the salt-mining areas of the Shimshal Pass. 
China, according to the Agreement, gained 2050 square
41. The details of the boundary alignment are
based on the Siao-Pakistan Boundary Agreement 
of March 2, 1965.
miles, especially from the p@int where the agreed 
border met the Muztagh Elver, picking up another 
crest line and running through the Aghill Pass* 
However, the Indians claim that Pakistan gave up 
a total of 15000 square miles but Pakistan rejects 
the contention* Alistair Lamb has firmly supported 
the Pakistani contention, “...the 1899 proposed 
border runs north west of the 1963 line, and 
terminates at Husso-Afghan-British Indian terijunction 
near the Beyik Pass in the Pamirs * • .beyond the 
ShiuchaX Pass by the 1963 agreement Pakistan has 
been given possessions to the north of the main 
Karakoram Watershed. The Karakoram Pass marks the 
eastern end of the boundary agreed upon in 1963 and 
the beginning of the disputed Sinp-Indian boundary 
in Ladakh* The alignment here agreed (Kilik Pass and 
Kkunjerab Pass) upon in 1963coincides with that 
shown on most modern maps* It follows the watershed 
between streams flowing into the Indus and those 
flowing into the Taklamakan Desert of Sinkiang. This 
line, shown as the border on,many modern maps, 
represents a theoretical British border including the 
Mir of Hunsa*s claims over the Raskun Valley* The 
British, in fact, never administered north of the 
main watershed, and in 192? the Indian Government 
abandoned this boundary, even in theory. However, 
the 1927 decision did not find its way to to the 
maps, which explains why critics of the SIno-Pakistan 
Boundary Agreement of March 1963 have been able to 
find cartographical support for their claim that
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Pakistan has surrendered much territory to China,In fact, the
3.963 Agreement formalised the arrangement decided upon in 1927?
which , in turn , represented the state of affairs obtaining
42
since the end of the 19th century," The boundary has since been 
demarcated on the basis that where there are passes or dabans 
the watershed forms the boundary.
The end of the British Raj throughout South Asia in 
1947~4o brought in its wake the dismantling of a strategic 
system,and the emergence of a new geopolitical order,The British, 
in the last century of their political and military ascendancy 
in South Asia,had enjoyed naval supremacy throughout' the Indian 
Ocean area,and had carefully evolved a strategic frontier-zone 
policy based on control of the " reverse-slopes " of their land 
frontiers,This was much more than a frontier or zonal policy than, 
a boundary or linear strategy,It was obviously designed to pro­
tect their geopolitical interests,and as such the British 
endeavoured to create buffer zones in the areas beyond the 
" reverse slopes ", and guarded their rear with a string of 
military-cum-administrative encampments,These outposts were 
linked to major cantonments along the main trunk roads,The most 
vulnerable areas,notably those in the northwest,were the most 
heavily fortified and patrolled,however,the British did not 
attach much significance to the central Himalayan sector. The 
strategic ca3-cuius of the Himalayan region has been totally 
transformed,and India considers this sector as the most vulner-
able border in her military s t r a t e g y ,  „
42, Lamb,A,The Sino-Pakistan Boundary Agreement of lurch 1963?
Australian Outlook,Vol*18,No,3.
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Pakistan,however,has come to regard its common border with 
China as a major strategic and political asset.During the British 
Raj the delineation of linear boundaries in this region m s  very 
messy,patchy said incomplete,and as such open to varying inter­
pretations by the Successor states.The Pamirs constituted the 
trijunction of Russia,China and India,and one corner of Kashmir’s 
trapezoid shape pointed towards the trijunction.Kashmir was, 
however,divided culturally between kuslims,Hindus and Buddhists; 
the Kuslims were the most dominant of the three cultural groups 
( see chapter 5 ) .Outlying states such as Jammu and Kashmir 
were constructed as loosely cohering units around a core of 
paddy land in large intermont basins and eventually brought 
within the fold of the Raj.Afghanistan continued to enjoy the 
status of a buffer state,the Afghan Panhandle ( The V/akhan 
strip ) separating Russia and British India.Along the northwest 
a belt of Azad Ilians, ( uncontrolled and. unadministered tribal 
belt ) lay within the boundaries devised, by the politico-military 
strategists of the Raj.The Russian expansionist designs vere the 
real threat to the area,especially in the northwest and Kashmir 
region. To ward off any Russian or Afghan irruptions,as stated, 
earlier,the British had established a very comprehensive system 
of military cantonments which guarded the strategic passes,for 
example ,IChyber,Bolan,G*omal and Tochi.
This important and extensive defense infrastructure, 
along with the inherent security problems of the vr. stern end, 
nortwestern frontiers,was inherited, by Pakistan in their entirety 
The geopolitical significance of the northeastern boundary with 
China was fully recognised by Pakistan,especially after the 
sharp Sino~Indian differences and the extent of Chinese presence 
in the Ladakh region was unfolded in 1957.This area bordered the
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Pakistani held Kashmir and,therefore,Pakistan* s geopolitical and 
military strategy was directly involved.Pakistan was very keen 
not to disturb her existing relationship with China,and as such 
sought an amicable settlement of the northeastern boundary. The 
Sino-Pakistan Boundary Agreement of 1963,effectively removed a 
possible area, of tension,and helped Pakistan ih strengthening 
her relations with China.The Karakoram Highway ( largely const­
ructed with Chinese assistance ) has resulted in increased bartei
i
trade between Pakistan and China,and as such the old 1 silk route 
has assumed great strategic significance for Pakistan*
The Boundaries of East Pakistan.
Pakistan said India experienced tension and friction
in the various sectors of the boundary as awarded by Radcliffe
in Assam and Bengalf^and as in the Punjab the problems resulted
because of the varying interpretations of the Award.The Radcliffe
Award seems to have been unfair to both Hindus and Kuslims in the
area*The Hindus lost the southern part of Jalpaiguri and the
whole of Khulna District,and the Iv us liras lost the whole of
Kurshidabad"and parts of Sylhet,Nadia and Jessore Districts*
Disputes seem to have arisen where the demarcation
lacked a clear-cut basis*Frequently river channels served as li-ne
lines of demarcation,but it was not made clear whether the lines
were to lie at mid-stream or along the thalweg or,indeed,even
along one or* other of the river banks.Kore important still was
the failure of the Award Commission to take due account of the
future shifting of the channels"chars",a common occurence in
East Pakistan. __________________________ _
44*According to 3. report in The Times,London,Kay 17,1974,
.Krs.Gandhi and Sheikh Kujibur Rahman
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On December 14, 1948, Pakistan and India agreed 
to put their respective claims before a tribunal, and 
it was mutually agreed that it should be headed by 
Algot Bagge, former member of the Supreme Court of 
Sweden® Pakistan was represented by M® Shahabuddin, and 
C®Aiyar represented India® The ‘Tribunal held two separate 
meetings at Calcutta and Dacca in December 1949* and 
January 1950 respectively®
The first dispute related to the boundary 
( Figs 16 )following the Ganges, between Rajskahi 
and Murshidabad Districts, S\ib sequent ly the river changed 
its channel southward, Pakistan maintained that because 
of the shift in the course of the river the District 
boundary should be moved accordingly® This was not a 
sound proposition since it meant an ever fluctuating 
international boundary in the area. The Bagge Tribunal, 
therefore, upheld the Indian claim that the Radcliffe 
Award should form the permanent basis of the division 
irrespective of any shifting in the course of the river 
in that area.
The second dispute related to the thana boundary 
between Karimpur (West Bengal) and Daulatpur (East 
Pakistan) ( Figs 16 )* The boundary apparently followed 
one of the derelict channels of the Matabhanga (once 
active but now “non^perennial”), India maintained that
reached agreement on the elimination of 
scores of enclaves on both sides of the 
border whose history goes back to the 
days when Bangladesh was East Pakistan,”
Disputes :1 anr> ? 
Fif>: 16
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the map boundary as awarded by Radcliffe should be 
considered without taking into account the actual 
position on the ground. Pakistan argued that the 
boundary should follow the Matabhanga, and that the 
upper part of the river actually lay westward of the 
map position| and that the incorrection should be 
ractified. As a result of the Tribunal Award, which 
accepted the Pakistani contention, Pakistan gained 
approximately 5 square miles of "char land".
The third dispute related to the Patharia 
^orest (Pig' ^  ) . In the south-eastern corner of 
the Sylhet District the boundary was devised to follow 
the line separating the thana of Barlekha (East 
Pakistan) from the thana of Patharkandi (India). 
Pakistan argued that the whole of Patharia Forest 
was in the Barlekha thana, by pointing but that "The 
Barlekha police exercised jurisdiction over the 
forest in matters of crime} the census enumeration of 
1941, and the registration of bicycles under the 
Defence of India Rules during World War 11"^. India 
objected to the claim by Pakistan on the ground that 
the evidence did not prove that the thana boundary 
was wrong, and that it merely indicated that the area 
could easily be handed from Barlekha rather than 
Patharkandi. The Tribunal accepted the Indian line of 
argument and decided the matter in favour of India®
45® Ahmad, Geographical Review, 1953*P*332.
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The fourth disputed area was in the vicinity of 
the river Surma ( Figs 18 )® dispute mainly arose
because of the different names of the river Surma west 
of its junction with the Barak river. The two combined 
are known as Boglia, and after traversing some distance 
westward it assumes the name Kusiyara. Another channel 
from the Boglin a course farther to the south adopts 
the name Sonai or Fooran Kusiyara. The Radcliffe Award 
follows the Boglia or Kusiyara i.e. the northern 
channel.and then turns southwards to cross the Sonai 
or PoErran Kusiyara. Pakistan contended that the boundar 
did not follow the northern but the southern channel*
The Tribunal accepted the Indian stand that "the line 
di'awn by Radcliffe on his map going north from 
G-obindapur to Barisari and thence along the river to 
Karimganj, should be the boundary between East Pakistan 
and India*
Subsequently India produced further evidence 
and contended that the thana boundary which the Radcliffe 
Award had accepted between Barisari and Gobindapura was 
wrong, and that it shotild be between the thana boundaries 
of Karimganj and Beani Bazar* The implementation of the 
Bagge Award, therefore, was held up. In 1959 Pakistan and 
India reached an amicable settlement. The results of which 
were that the Pakistani view was to prevail in the 
Kusiyara River region, and the thana boundaries of Beani 
Bazar and Karimganj were to form the international 
boundary in the north«east.
46. ibid., p. 335*
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In addition to these disputes there were a 
number of outstanding boundary issues between Pakistan 
and India* along the entire borders of East Pakistan* of 
which Berubari Union^ Co och»Behar enclaves and. the
Parrakha Barrage need to be mentioned to as to understand
47“these petty eruptions here and there". r
Berubari union has a total area of about 9 square 
miles* and in accordance with the Noon-Uehru Agreement of 
195®, was to be equally divided between the two countries*
The population of Berubari was about 12000* out of which 
8000 Hindus had emigrated from East Pakistan* India has 
yet to transfer this territory to Pakistan in spite of 
the fact that the initial constitutional obstacles 
regarding the territory have been overcome* According
to The Daily -Sang, London, 20.3*74, Bangladesh has
48agreed to cede Berubari Union to India.
According, to the Noon-Neftru Agreement of 1958$
the enclaves of the former Gooeh-OBehar State in East
Pakistan* and the Pakistani enclaves in West fiengal
were to be exchanged without any compensation** Pakistan
was to receive 28 square miles and 11,000 inhabitants in
return for 1? square miles and a population of 9*000.
The decision to exchange enclaves was arrived at in
1955 in principle but this was never implemented since 
with
no. agreement/West Bengal on the.loss of territory
4Q
was ranched® '
47. Keesings,op.cit.»p*17035 (Hr. Wehru in Lok Sabha)•
48® According to these reports “The Jang International”
stated that a total of 1019 square miles have been 
ceded to India and the areas where the territory 
has been ceded are s1.Rangpur 133 square miles,
2. Dinajpur 250 square miles, 3®Bogra 93 squaremiles, 
4.Ra^jshahi 109 square miles, 5*Kushtia 11 squaremiles, 
6® Jessore 13 square miles, 7®Khulna 109 squaremiles
89
The Ganges Waters dispute dates back to 1951 
when India made her plans public regarding the expansion 
and preservation of the Calcutta harbour; and the 
greater supplies of water to the Hoogly and Bhagiri 
rivers® According to the Indian plans this was to be 
achieved through the construction of a big dam/barrage 
on the Ganges at Parrakha, about eleven miles above
the East Pakistan border in the area* Pakistan, vehemently
\
objected to this ambitious Indian plan which would render 
approximately 1,000,000 acres of land useless and barren 
affecting the lives of hundreds of thousands of people 
in seven of the Pakistani districts in the area; who 
dependent upon these waters for fishing,.transportation 
and farming. Mr. Arshad Bussain, the Pakistani foreign 
Minister stated, "first, because of the diversion of 
waters at the dam, almost the entire flow of the River 
Ganges into East Pakistan could be stopped in the dry 
season, turning hundreds of thousands ofi acres o f . - 
cultivated land into wasteland. Second, as a result, 
the channel of the river in East Pakistan will become 
silted, and in the flood season almost half 1he area of 
East Pakistan will be flooded every year. Third, the
8,Ghittagang 92 square miles, 9®Uoakhali 63 
square miles, 10. ^ommlla 34 square miles and 
11.Sylhet 1?4 square miles. Before the cessation 
of East Pakistan the total area was 55125 square 
miles but after these reported agreements Bangladesh 
has an area of 34106 square miles®
49® India and Bangladesh reached an agreement on 
these enclaves, according to The Times May 17,
1974*
coastal area of East Pakistan will become uhcultivable 
in consequence of tlie greater penetration of seawater into 
the delta owing to the lack of drainage of fresh water 
into the sea® Fourth, as a result of the drastic reduction 
in water supply* a number of agricultural projects* 
including those being planned* will be seriously affected.” 
Moreover* Pakistan rejected the Indian contention that as a 
Lower riparian State she had no claims on the River Ganges, 
which* according to Pakistan, was an international river, 
and that the Indian position was totally untenable in 
international law in maintaining that the river "is 
overwhelmingly an Indian river.” Pakistan1s claim was 
that the Gauges~Kabadak project on the Padma was = 
designed to provide irrigation facilities for 4.25 million 
acres on which depended 16 million people for their 
existence. The Indians rejected the Pakistan-i view on 
the grounds. that the whole of East Pakistan should hot 
be made.to depend upon the waters of the Ganges since, ' . 
in the Indian view,5,a considerable portion of East 
Pakistan really ftllii within the easy reach of the 
Brahamputra and the Meghna. According to the Indian 
experts "...the maximum area which can justifiably expect 
to receive the Padma waters cannot be more than one 
million aox^ es* The quantity of water required for thin 
acreage would be a fraction of the 49,000 Ousecs 
Pakistan is demanding. This quantity would always be 
available to Pakistan by the regeneration process alone
50. Poreign Minister Arshad Hussain's Statement in
the General Assembly, A/VP 1692, 11th October,
19&8®
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within its own territory. In other words, Pakistan 
would not have to depend upon any releases from 
Farakha for its reasonable needs. This implied that 
even if India diverted the entire waters of the 
Ganges into Hoogly Pakistan would not stiffen in the 
least...Whatever water India releases at Farakha, 
it would certainly be in excess of East ^akistan*s 
requirements and obviously, it would only pass through 
East Pakistan unutilised and flow into the Bay of 
Bengal. The Indians further argued that "The 
geographical area of the region (East Pakistan) 
dependent on the Ganges waters is 6.1 million acres 
with a population of 12 millions...the cultivatable 
area is 4.9 million acres...every acre of cultivatable 
land in this area is cropped at least once, and about 
quarter of the entire area has a second crop giving an 
intensity of 122.5 per cent cultivation. Pakistan wants 
more water to have two crops in the entire area i.e. 
about 200 per cent intensity of cultivation". The
Indians obviously wanted Pakistan to have more waters 
from the Jamuna, the Brahamputra and the Heghna leaving 
the Ganges entirely for the Indians to utilise it fully.
In the period December 1968 to July 1970 a series of 
five Secretary-level conferences were held, and 
eventually some progress was made efe the last of these 
meetings, \tfhen the two delegates agreed that "the point 
of delivery of supplies to Pakistan of such quantum of
51® Rangaswami Ganga Waters^Whose Needs are grater?
Ministry of External Affairs,New Delhi,1970,p.6
52. ibid. p.7*
water, as may be agreed upon, will be at Farraka"* This 
fully established, in principle, that India had accepted 
the Pakistani point of view that as a Loiter liparian 
State she was entitled to receive water from the Ganges 
below the Indian barrage and that the river was an 
. international waterway. However, no agreement was reached 
as to the quantity of the water that Pakistan was 
ultimately entitled to receive; and this left the entire 
question of the Ganges Waters unresolved and a potential 
threat to peace and security m  the area.
Regarding the demarcation of boundaries (East 
Pakistan-India) both the countries struck a hopeful note 
during their Secretarial meetings at Calcutta on August 
17^19§ 1959® ^he important decisions reached at the 
meeting were (a) peaceful defacto status not to be 
distuxhed where actual pillar emplacements had not been 
implemented, (b) where temporary demarcation marks of 
■land boundaries over river beds/become covered by water , 
during rainy season and new islands formed when the water 
level went down, adequate survey teams to be provided 
for Joint seasonal demarcation at the earliest possible
53® Text of Joint communique in Pakistan Horizon,
3rd Quarterly 1970
According to The Times 17®3*74 there were short 
^  differences between Mrs. Ghandi and Sheikh
Mujib over the Ganges Waters,"The £80 million 
Farakka Barrage, which will come into operation 
later this year, is designed to divert a large 
part of the winter flow of the‘Ganges into 
the heavily silted West jiengal rivers system, 
mainly with the aimq of improving the naviga­
bility of Calcutta Port. Dacca fears that a 
large-scale withdrawal would reduce surface 
water irrigation along the Ganges in Bangladesh 
and encourage salt-waters introsion up the delta"
time and (c) that the district officials to meet every 
three months to discuss administrative problems and to 
maintain law and order®
Regarding the East-Pakistan-Burma boundary the
two countries faced some minor problems which were mainly
due to the activities of the Muslim Hational Defence
Organization (Mujahids) on the Arakan coast® The
boundary question was solved peacefully and amicably
in 1964* when the two countries agreed in principle that
the "inherited fluctuating boundary" along the Naaf
54River should be transformed into a fixed b o u n d a r y T h e  
delineation of the boundary based on the hydrographic 
survey of the Naaf River, took the two sides more than 
one year; thereupon the two states agreed that the 
fluctuating boundary of the Naaf River that runs along 
the internationally agreed boundary between Burma and 
East Pakistan should be determined in accordance with 
the thalweg of the said river. The two states also 
agreed that their nationals should be guaranteed free 
navigation in the Naaf River but the use of the river 
flow for industrial purposes was excluded® It was also 
agreed that proper contacts would be established to 
redemarcate the mutual boundary whenever and wherever 
the "char land" emerged, and furthermore to fix re feme© 
pillars on the land portion on both banks of the Naaf 
River; the latter work was completed in May, 1966.
20026 (Bhutto-Uthi HanKeesings op« cit®, i 
Communique 22-1-1964
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The analysis of Pakistan's 'boundaries and the problems 
affecting them have me.de it possible to demonstrate to the effect 
that the nascent state started with a series of time and energy 
consuming problems#These problems were in addition to her enor­
mous socio-economic and political difficulties,retarded her 
economic development,created divisive forces within and "as such. 
Pakistan was unnecessarily engaged in repudiating the various 
territorial claims of her neighbours#This state of affairs was 
instrumental in delaying,especially during the initial period, 
the process of nation building which was so vital for consoli­
dating the territorial integrity and political independence of a 
united Pakistan.The different boundary disputes clearly demons­
trated the regional thinking,and identified the direction and 
approach,in the two parts of Pakistan,toward the political boun­
daries of Pakistan in general,and some of the territorial claims 
between India and Pakistan in particular,,
This was very true of the Kashmir dispute.The Bengalis 
were not directly affected by the territorial claims and counter­
claims since they believed that the state had practically no 
geopolitical importance , and therefore , they took very little 
interest in the future of this princely state,For West Pakistanis 
however,the state of Jammu and Kashmir possessed immense geo­
political and strategic importance.According to the West Pakis­
tanis , especially the Punjabis,this territory seemed to hold 
potentially very serious economic and political significance.
The future territorial disposition of the state ir likely 
to determine the possible answers regarding two very crucial 
questions,(i ) the validity of the two nation theory and the 
inherent principle of the majority/contiguous areas and (.ii) the 
economic future of the Indus Basin;and this is bound to affect 
the future geopolitical patterns on the Subcontinent.
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The Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent was partitioned on the 
basis of contiguous/majority areas.Kashmir is territorially 
contiguous to West Pakistan and is overwhelmingly r IJuslim 
majority area.According to the Pakistani point of view the state, 
should hatre-'aUitoiBditgrcally merged into Pakistan irrespective of 
the fact that the Eaharaja, of Kashmir was a non-Kuslim ( This 
was precisely the position of India vis-a-vis Junagadh and 
Kanavadar since the geopolitical factors were quite incontra­
distinction of the territorial disposition of the State of Jammu 
and Kashmir.India invaded Junakgadh and liana vadar in spite of 
the fact that the state had legally acceded to Pakistan). The 
Indian position was totally reversed in this instance simply 
because of the fact that India,right from the beginning,has 
endeavoured to negate the two nation theory and advocated the 
concept of Bharat llaata. The secession of East Pakistan and. the 
creation of Bangladesh in 1971 was vociferously recognised,in 
India,as a living proofIthat the two nation theory had finally 
been negated and demolished.
The three important rivers of West Pakistan i.e. the Indus, 
the Jhelum and the Chenab either flow through Kashmir or origi- ■" 
nate in the Indian held Kashmir.West Pakistan has the most comp­
rehensive irrigation complex and this system is very much depen­
dent upon the waters of these rivers,The protracted negotiations 
between India and Pakistan before the signing of the Indus 
Waters Treaty of I960,have left indelible marks,and there exist 
deep doubts in the minds of Pakistanis with regard to the future 
geopolitical designs and ambitions of India.
The history of Indo-Pakistan relations since 1947? is 
strewn with events which have effectively created a strong state 
of distrust between India and Pakistan,and which is not likely tc 
dissipate in the near future.
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The result of mutual antagonism has teen the establishment 
of enormous war machines in "both the countries at the expense of 
social and economic development which both the countries,with 
teeming million mouths to feed,need very badly.
This state of affairs has definitely affected,and in fae1! 
fact,blocked the process of consolidation of 0. nation in Pakis­
tan, National identity seemed to have been aligned with the policy 
of confrontation against India,and the consolidation of the 
nation was sought on very negative premises,These boundary 
disputes did not allow the devlopment of a Pakistani identity 
based on positive nationalistic principles within the confines 
of which the huslim homeland could be secured and fortified. 
Instead geopolitical relationships,at home and abroad,were 
sought on the rationale of negative thinking and attitudes which 
could only hurt the territorial integrity and political indepen­
dence of Pakistan.These principles of policy also encouraged the 
development of fissiparous tendencies which in turn were very 
effectively exploited by the vested interests at home said 
abroad and as a result Pakistan was dismembered.
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CHAPTER 3
An Analysis of the Inherent Regional Disparities in Pakistan.
The In&o-Pakistan Subcontinent is often described 
as a land of complex diversity and indeed,vast areas of this 
enormous landmass are mountainous in their terrain,possess very 
rich and fertile soil and scenic countryside,The diversity is 
much more noticeable in human terms e.g., cultures,castes,socio­
economic patterns,languages and religions.Both the northwest 
and northeastern regions of the South Asian Subcontinent are 
predominantly Muslim;the northwest/'' ‘ J'-~ d o  the
heartland Islamic environment whereas in the northeast a form 
of Southeast Asian culture predominates,1 East Pakistan is the
X  X~
population majority area,with 55 per cent of the total population
living under crowded rural conditions.Its basic economic 
*
characteristic is a monsoon rice-jute agriculture,and it is a,
relatively homogeneous cultural linguistic area.West Pakistan is
geographically much more diverse than Easjr Pakistan,is five times’
as large as the smaller Province,is dominated by an irrigated
wheat-cotton-rice agriculture,and enjoys a significantly a
higher per capita income than East Pakistan.West Pakistan is
culturally and linguistically more diverse,with several major
mother-tongues spoken in various areas of the Province."
This contrast as well as the obvious factor of spatial separation.
affected the integration of East and West Pakistan into a whole,
and a well-knit political entity.The perennial routeways in
the northwest frontier zones,and nuclei of power have persisted i
at least from the Aryan invasions of the first millenium A.D.,and- 
T 0Stephen. R.LewisllR. ,Pal?Istan fn^ustrialfsa^ion and*"Trad’e’
Policies,Oxford University Press,London,1970,p.XV.
According to the second census of Pakistan in 1961,the popu­
lation was 93*8 million compared to 72.99 million in 1951*The growth 
rate was 2.2/ per annum.East Pakistan! 54.3 pez* cent and West 
Pakistan?45* 7 per cent.Density,E.P. :922,W.P# :138.‘
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these geostrategic areas have retained their significance for ; 
f w  the present dag geopolitics.These zones have their recent 
past in the partition of the Subcontinent,in the difficulty of 
pairing the two truncated wings of Pakistan,in the survival of 
large areas(such as Baluchistan and parts of North West Frontier 
Province) economic silly and politically poor and backward, which 
set a problem of intraregional said interregional integration,'
The fact that East and West Pakistan emerged as an 
independent country in 1947,fundamentally established the over­
whelming weakness of this truncated political entity,West Pakistan 
had six-sevenths of the populationfThe hour-glass shape of its 
irrigated core aligned along the single railway up the Indus 
Valley,posed almost insuperable strategic problems in the event 
of war with India( this was amply demonstrated during the Indo-
Pakistan war of 1971 when the Indian forces succeeded in occupying
e
vast areas in Sind and thpatened to cut off the only railway 
link between Karachi and Lahore-Rawalpindi sectors).
Pakistan inherited a number of problems as a result of 
the Partition and which were very much in evidence in the very 
nature of Pakistan's emergence as an independent state with two 
separate and distinct pufts.In its early days the Government of 
Pakistan was faced with a difficult decision concerning the 
problem of language.There were arguments in favour of adopting 
the Swiss pattern,although the pro-Bengali faction, wanted Bengali 
as the national language since the majority spoke Bengali,But 
the pro-Urdu faction argued fervently in favour of adopting Urdu 
as the national language and emphasized that the no,scent stale 
should have a language which could be identified with the rising 
tide of national independence,and as m matter of argument they 
contended that Bengali was an adjunct of Sanskrit, and. therefore.
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closely linked with Hinduism and Hindu nationalism.While it is
true that Bengali was derived from Sanskrit more than 2000 years
ago,nonetheless a religious literature and a popular dialect
developed,which became a part of Bengali culture.
In West Pakistan several regional languages e.g.,
are spoken
Punjabi,SindhijPWshto,Baluchi and Brauh/,However, Urdu is widely
spoken and understood throughout West Pakistan and a proportion
of East Pakistanis also understood Urdu,"In 1961,Urdu was mother
tongue of 0.61 per cent of the people of East Pakistan,and 0.72
2per cent spoke Urdu as an additional tongue." Urdu had its origin 
in the United Province (TJ.P. )of British India. It spread into the 
northwest and became a language of convenience in the market­
places and,increasingly,in the classrooms( it was basically 
adopted as a lingua Franca for the armed forces comprising 
soldiers with multifarious backgrounds e.g.,Persians,Afghans, 
Mughals and Indians).Urdu?is rich and an exhaustive language"Urdu
has become more than a lingua franca;today it is a richly cultu-
o 2  A
ral language with substantial and beautiful literature. ..People
in East Pakistan were totally dismayed at the thought of Urdu
becoming one single national language," The attempt was abandoned
in 1954 after strong Bengali opposition,and both Bengali and Urdu
were recognised as national languages.But neither tongue gained
2Ba substantial acceptance in both the wings." ype 1956 Constitu­
tion also made English as an official language for an initial 
period of twenty years.
Like the rest of the Subcontinent,Pakistan possessed a mosaic
of language s, -ikfe ri ch traditi on,; and literature, The
TITeT®igrpiguhe'-s ■rhawe~~been '^ aIEen"’*f r om^taki s t an s try*” of
Home and Kashmir Affairs,Home Affairs Division,Population Census 
of Pakistan,1961,Vol.IV.statement 5.3«
2A.Anderson,David D.Pakistan's Search for National Identity,Yale 
Review,Vol.55,1966,p.560.
2B.Jahan,Rounaq,Pakistan;Failure in National Integration,Columbia 
University Press,N.Y.1972,p.l3.
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single deciding obstacle to the adoption of Urdu as the natio­
nal language was the fundamental fact that a minority language 
was being imposed by a minority region against the wishes of the 
majority.This untenable situation basically arose because of the 
historical role that Urdu had played in the development of Islam, 
and by a misconception that the raison d’etre of the state must 
be derived from the cultural characteristics of West Pakistan. 
Moreover,the Muslims of the United Province(U.P.now Uttar Pradesh 
India)were most sensitive to this issue since the leadership of 
the All India Muslim League generally came from their ranks and 
Urdu came to be closely linked with the Pakistan movement(leaders 
such as Liaquat Ali,Mohsin-ul~Mulk,Maulana Mohammad Ali and 
Nawab Viqar-ul-Mulk had strong following in these areas). The 
cultural solidarity of East Pakistan,however,proved too strong 
for the Federal Government,and as such a genuine compromise was 
reached in 1956,in the interest of a united Pakistan.
Languages in Pakistan 
Frequency of languages commonly spoken as Mother Tongues 
in Pakistan ( percentage of population ).
Languages East Pakistan West Pakistan Pakistan
1951 1961 1951 1961 1951 1961
Bengali 98.16 98.42 0.02 0.11 56.40 55.46
Punjabi 0.02 0.02 67.08 66.39 28.55 29.02
Pushto - 0.01 8.16 8.47 3.48 3.70
Sindhi •0^91 0.01 12.85 12.59 5.47 5.51
Urdu 0.64 0.61 7.05 7.55 3.37 3.65
English 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.02
Baluchi — — 3.04 2.49 1.29 1.09
Sourcej Pakistan,Ministry of Home and Kashmir Affairs,Home
Affairs Division,Population Census of Pakistan,1961,Vol.l.pt.iv,
Statement 5.3. m _Table.1.1
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This decision was a singular concession for East 
Pakistan andher cultural identity* The same line of 
argument had been followed in support of maintaining 
separate electorates after the Partition. West 
Pakistan supported the separate electorates while 
East Pakistan supported Joint Electorates. Here 
again, East Pakistan won an important but tactical 
victory when Joint Electorates were adopted in 
1956 Constitution of Pakistan.
National cohesion had also been retarded by 
a gradually widening gulf between the two parts of 
Pakistan in the rate of economic growth and develop­
ment. Economists; in East Pakistan were generally in 
agreement that although there was little difference 
in the per capita incomes of the two Wings in 1948* 
independence and its aftermath have not brought East 
Pakistan a fair share of the total increased production 
of the State * ^ This point of view was aijred in 1960 
when a group of economists from Dacca University 
insisted that ’’Pakistan had already become a two- 
economy country and that efforts should be made at 
the highest official level to approach the problems 
of East Pakistan from a;more autonomous perspective•
East Pakistan’s feeling of economic neglect
had been strongly influenced by the fact that the
Tl In 4^62-65 ihe per capita income in West
Pakistan was Rs. 562, and in East Pakistan Rs.280.
4. "Pakistan: East-West Split? Far Eastern Economic
Review, V o l .  41, 1965* P* 557-
Eastern Wing had contributed a large part of the 
hard-cash revenue of the government earned from the 
sale of jute but had received much less back in the 
shape of economic aid. In addition it was felt that 
much of the money spent in West Pakistan was for 
visible improvements e.g., Hangla Dam, Terbela Dam, 
Guddu Barrage, Cement and Textile Hills etc., 
whereas in East Pakistan most, if not all, of the 
funds were geared towards improving water transpor­
tation, constructing hydro-electric plants far from
' s '
population centres, and on other kinds of economic 
development which was not easily; observable by the 
ordinary citizen. The average farmer was actually 
conscious of the value of his’ cash crop i.e. jute 
and the cash crop of his counterpart in West 
Pakistan i.e. cotton. Each of these crops was the 
mainstay of its region, and as such a certain 
degree of rivalry could be detected in the agricultural 
policy of the Federal Government. This is supported by 
A. Tayyeb and as such the defeat of the Muslim League 
in 1954 elections in East Pakistan is ascribed to 
that effect and subsequently,; the East- Pakistan 
government insisted on an,increase in the acreage 
and production of jute. :
However, for a fuller; appreciation of the 
efforts made by the Federal Government to accelerate 
economic development in East Pakistan, it is necessary 
to bear in mind the state of the ecpnomy of East
5. Tayyeb A. Pakistan; A political geography,
London, 1966, py124 i
Pakistan at the time of the Partition in 194-7* It is 
only in that perspective that the enosmeity of the problem 
and the extent of efforts made to solve it can be 
correctly and realistically analysed.
“At the time of political independence, Pakistan
Y
had no industry wojth mentioning. Agriculture contributed 
more than two-thirds of domestic product and nearly all 
exports. The movement for Pakistan was led by an elite 
of Muslim landlords, traders and businessmen of India* 
Phis elite saw the opportunity for industrialising and 
modernising the nation through private enterprise,and 
this was attractive to them because it would ensure 
their leadership of the country.'11 At the time of 
Independence, East Bengal (East Pakistan) inherited an 
economy which was to a very large Extent dependent upon 
West Bengal for the processing of its raw material, 
export of excess commodities and supply of essential 
goods. Modern industrial capacity was insignificant and 
the infrastructure was extremely inadequate to foster 
economic development. West Pakistan had some advantages 
as a result of the measures taken by the British Indian 
Government primarily for strategic reasons. Phis region 
was generally better developed than the eastern wing and 
all the characteristics of a higher stage of development 
were present*
6. Griffin, K*.,& Khan, A.R. Growth and inequality
in Pakistan, London, 1972, p* 124*
A very comprehensive canal irrigation system had been- 
completed during tble British Raj which has since been 
enlarged* There were very good" roads which were 
primarily Completed for; geostrategic reasons; and the 
administrative and educational infrastructure was 
superior to that of East Pakistan*
East Pakistan inherited a poor and inadequate 
system of communications particularly in respect of 
rdads* At the time of the Partition there were only 
disconnected sections of roads, except in Sylhet. The 
to^al mileage of high-type roads was only 240 miles 
as compared to 5053 in West Pakistan* Similarly, the 
total numbers of vehicles (buses, trucks, etc,) was 
East Pakistan: 4380 and West Pakistan: 21023* There 
were good national waterways in East Pakistan but the 
development: of inlands® ports,navigational ai&sn&nd ; 
transport“had.either largely been neglected or ignored* 
The rohte imileage ; of;railways , in 1948-49 was only 
1^19 iuEast Pakistan as compared to 3316 in West 
Pakistan* In 194?, East Pakistan had only Chittagong 
as the sea-pprt with,the limited capacity of 500,000 
tons per annum, and the major portion of the, exportable 
produce of the province was routed through Calcutta.
On the contrary, West Pakistan had one of the major 
natural seaports of the subcontinent i.e. Karachi, 
with a handling capacity of 2*8 millioZ tons annually.
7* These figured have been taken from
Pakistan; Basic Pacts, 1968-69, 1970-71*
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At. the time of Partition, both Easb and West 
Pakistan were industrially'tUndiardeyeloped, but large 
scale industry was more extensive., in West Pakistan*
While East Pakistan had a few jute bailing presses 
and 115’ tea estates, the Western Wing had a variety 
of industries including chemicals, footwear and 
metals*
According to the estimates of the Central 
Statistical Office the gross value:added by large- 
scale industry in West Pakistan was Rs. 200 million 
in 1949-50 as compared to Rs* 50 millions in East 
Pakistan*, While there can be some; controversy as 
regards the extent of disparity at the time of Inde­
pendence ,there can be little doubt;that the Western 
Wing had a much better and a larger industrial base 
to start with® The census of the manufacturing indus­
tries carried out by the Central Statistical Office in 
.1957$ indicated that the total .value of fixed assets
' ■?- 'V
of reporting large-scale induetries in East,Pakistan 
was 26 per cent of the total for Pakistan, and the - 
census disclosed the position of different important 
industries as infgjab#l.2 may1 also be noted here-, - 
that the generating capacity of public electricity 
supply undertakings in East Pakistan stood at 
7,675 k*w* in 1948, whereas in West Pakistan the 
figure was 68,610® k^w* : .
It is generally accepted that the shortage of 
private capital had been more acute in East Pakistan, ;
since there was very little ..indigenous Muslim participation
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Value of Fixed Assets of Some of the Important Industries
East West
Number of reLr  ^ tered reporting factories 341 1,045
Average daily employment in Pakistan factories 55,074 117,355
Income from mining and manufacture,assessed to tax
Rs.2.15 Rs .3.8
crore crore
Industry East West
(in crore rupees)
1.Food Manufacturing Industries 1.87
2.Cotton Textiles 4.39
3.Jute Textiles 15.36
4.Pacer and Allied Products 6.68
5. Chemicals 1.21
6. asic Chemical Industries 0.18
7.j oni-Metrllic Minerals and Products 0.9 
. rtallic Industries
A.Basic Metal Industries 0.05
_______ B.Metal Working Industries 1.06
9.14
47.51
2.50
11.22
1.34
5.41
2.89
3.01
iource.The Central Statistical Office(1948-49)Reports,Karachi.
108
in trade and industry at the time of the partition,and that in 
West Pakistan,capital had been made more freely available by 
private enterprises.At the time of independence,West Pakistan 
enjoyed a considerable experience of large-scale development 
and as such,data and skills were available for launching new 
projects. On the contrary, there was a general lack of date, and 
skills in East Pakistan,because no major investment in the 
public sector had been undertaken there before 1947«
Therefore,it could safely be stated that economic imba 
alance and disparity between the two Wings had been inherited at 
the time of independence,and such facts must he taken into acc­
ount when considering the prevalent economic inequality between 
East and West Pakistan.As a result of inadequate attention paid 
to such an important factor,the various governments in Pakistan 
were guilty of gross neglect and the economic development of East 
Pakistan did not achieve its proper rate of growth.Although,from 
1958,the administration gave its most sexhocis considerations to, 
this vital problem and adopted a much more viable economic policy 
especially for the rapid economic growth in East Pakistan.
■ In spite of the efforts by the Central Government to 
eliminate economic disparity between the two parts,the Bengalis 
were not pleased, with the situation and argued in favour of 
distribution of reserves on the basis of population,and pointed 
out that the revenue resources at the disposal of the respective 
provincial governments remained meagre.The Bengali elite gradua­
lly rejected t|re concept of greater scheme of Central taxes and
demanded greater pover in the field of taxation.The effects of
were
the post 1958 policies on the inter-regional economic dispe,rity/
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widely debated embodying optimistic thoughts and ‘
pessimistic realism, "She second Five Tear Plan basically
laid the foundation for accelerated economic growth
of East Pakistan* • .there is enough evidence to warrant
the conclttsion that the economy of East Pakistan has
registered a:signlfieatnt improvement for the first 
7B
time®" During the mid-plan review the Planning
Commission stated, "interregional disparity is much
more complex and stubborn a problem than was originally
conceived. It can be resolved only through substantial
70
efforts over a period of time"
Relations between the two parts of Pakistan 
were considerably strained not only h^ government pricing 
and export policies toward the two cash cz*ops of the 
country but also by resentment in East Pakistan .against 
a goverment that was reluctant to adopt suitable agrarian 
system* This was particularly important to East Pakistani 
farmer, since policies under British India tended to 
create big landlords, and well over half of Bengal had . 
fallen into the hands of large landowners. On the 
contrary, West Pakistan with its newly occupied irrigated 
lands, comparatively enjoyed a superior land tenure 
system, especially in the Punjab, whose average holdings 
were much larger ^ than in the rest of Pakistan® The Bengal 
Estate Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950, abolished land­
lordism, but very little progress was made tintil the 
establishment of Land Reforms Commission in 1958. Although 
both regions suffered from their respective tenancy
Pakistan, National Finance Commission Report 
1984—65, PP® 9—1 0© *
Pakistan Planning Commission, The Mid-Plan 
Review of the Third Five Tear Plan, 1965-70,p.45.
7B
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systems. East Pakistan was more volatile about changing 
it, owing, at least in part, to population pressure and 
to a-lack of alternatives to staying on lahcL . /
Employment opportunities and foreign trade
were inextricably bound together in East Pakistan. Jute
production had consistently given East Pakistan a trab.fe
surpPus, and over the years East Pakistanis contributed
more; than two third of the total exports of Pakistan
; while absorbing only approximately one-third of the 
, imports g
total/. /,( -'Tab. 1.3) These figures clearly
demonstrate a poorly diversified agrarian economy with
few import demands. In sppte of.the fact that jite gave
East Pakistan the position of surplus province in th© .
national economy, yet she continued to enjoy the position
of a deficit partner' in intercoastal trade with West 
Pakistan, "This trend of heavier imports by East 
Pakistan is quite constant and shows the more limited
economic range'of this unit as well as its Jseavier
q "i
dependence on West Pakistan for many of its needs.nJ
Interprovincial trade enjoyed a superior position and 
increased at the expense of closer trade links'klth . 
India. This was one of the major arguments in the hands 
of East Pakistanis who favoux^ed full autonomy and those 
who ^accused West Pakistan of enjoying the position of a 
growing industrialised region at the expense of East
■ - ' ' r  S'1 ■ f  /
Pakistan. They also argued that East Pakistan was
gradually being turned into the position of a supplier
9?;; . Tayyeb, op. cit. pp 153®
■ 8„ Andrus9 J>Ra & Mohamrned, A * F „ Trad© 9 Finance and Developme
in* Pakistan, Stanford, 19-66. p . 2 6
Ill
FOREIGN Trade By Province 
(in million of rupees)
Trade Year EXPORTS IMPORTS
E . PAK. W 0 PAK 0 TOTAL E.PAK. W„ PAK. TOTAL
1949-50 628,9 565.2 1,194.1 384. 8 912.2 1429771:
1950-51 1,211.1 1,342*5 2,553.5 452.9 1167.1 1,620.0
1951-52 1,086*6 921*9 2,008.6 763.4 1,473.9 2,237,3
1952-53 64?.5 867.4 1,509.9 366. 4 1,017.3 1,383.6
1953-54 645.1 641.0 1,286.0 293. 8 824.2 1,118'. 6
1954™55 731.6 491.4 1,223.0 320.2 783.0 1,103.3
1955-56 1,041.3 742.4 1,783.7 360.7 964.4 1,325.1
1956-•57 909.4 698.2 1,607.6 818.5 1,516.1 2,334.6
1957™■58 . 988,1 433.6 1,421/7 735.6 1,314.3 2,050.0
iCOLTsC7>H •59 ■ 880*9 444. 4 1,325.3 553.8 1,024.6 1,578.4
lcn 
ln1—I *60 1079.6 763.1 1,842*7 655.3 1,805.7 2,461.0
1960--61 1,259.0 . 540..2 . . 1,799.4 1,014.4 2,173.3 3,18776
1961--62 1,300*6 542. 9 1,843.0 872.8 2,236.2 3,109.0
1962--63 1,249.2 784.5 2,033.7 1,018.7 2,800.1 3,818.8
1 1 1
1963--64 1,208,0 ■ 835.0- 2,043.0 1,449.0 2,9-81.0 4,430/0
Sources Central Statistical Office,Bulletin,Karachi, 1965. 
1Provisional
Table.1.3-
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and as such open to. socio-economic and political 
exploitation, which, the people were hound to reject®
The real problem was to look for an equitable solution 
so that.both the regions could achieve development in 
harmony® This was made more and more difficult by the 
very infrastructure of the economy in East Pakistan,
since this region had few minerals, i-an inadequate/
transportation system, a poorly developed power supply, 
and a pupulation that could hardly feed itself®
The correct answer to anp: such investigation of the 
economic limitations’- of a given region should not be 
based only on an assessment which is essentially 
orientated towards the physical environment of the 
region® Nevertheless, soon after the creation of 
Pakistan, the government had to make certain very 
important decisions vis-a-vis the potentials of the 
two regions and their future development® Both the 
Pirst Five Year Plane and the Second Five Year Plan 
allocated the greater part of the funds to waterpower, 
mineral, fuel, industrial, and transportation projects 
in West Pakistan, since this region promised healthier 
development, and the fact .that private capital, was 
much more forthcoming than in East Pakistan® Muslim 
investors such as Maaimons and Khojas from Bombay and 
Northern India flocked to Karachi and invested with 
initiative and zeal the cash balances that they had 
brought from India® There was no such migration of 
rich refugees towards East Pakistan and in contrast, 
many rich Hindus migrated to Calcutta, and East
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Pakistani private capital was very shy.Only when industrial
development became more competitive in the Western Wing did
the private investment begin to turn toward East Pakistan.Given
the superior infrastructure and investment base of the Western hi
Wing,and the relative immobility of labour in East Pakistan,it
was obvious that the two regions could increasingly become
disparate economically and socially; " even the acceleration
of the country’s development programme is likely to accentuate
10rather than reduce the disparity between the two units."
The pace of development in East Pakistan was 
particularly fast during the Second Plan period when a growth 
rate of 5.0 per cent was maintained ans as such exceeded the 
planned groeth target of 4*7 per cent,and this was achieved 
in spite of the bad year fo agriculture at the end of the Plan 
period.The comparative rate of growth in West Pakistani was-X-X-
5»5 per cent , which was primarily achieved due to a-b&tter
10. ibid,p.162.
Sartaz-Aziz has given different figures of growth rate for 
the period in question.According to him the figures were as 
follows; Pakistan 5®2 per cent
East Pakistan 5*3 per cent 
West Pakistan 4*9 per cent 
( The Second Five Year Plan, Targets and Achievements, 
Pakistan Quarterly,Vol.13,1965>PP*36-43*)»
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a better performance of the province in agriculture.However,the
growth rate in the non-agricultural sector,which is more directly-
influenced by the level of investment and policy variables was
higher in East Pakistani Tables. 1.4,1*5*1*6).
It may be observed from the above figiire that over the
Plan period,a growth rate of 7.9 per cent was achieved in East
Pakistan,compared with 7.2 per cent in West Pakistan in the non-
agricultural sector.
The position regarding fluctuations in the level of
disparity in per capita income between East and West Pakistan is
summarised in the figure below£L. 4-1.6 ).The income disparity
between East and West Pakistan developed at a steady pace between'!
1959-60 and 1969-70,As well,the Government of Pakistan conceded
that the disparity measured by the difference between per capita
incomes in West Pakistan a.nd her Eastern Wing expressed as a iDer-
centage of the per capita income of all Pakistan,excluding three f
per cent for allocable items,had increased from 38.1 per cent in
Ilf
1964-65 to 47.1 per cent in 1969-70, However,G.W.Choudhury has
made the following observation," In 1959-60 the per capita income 
in West Pakistan was 32 per cent higher than in the East.Over the 
next ten years the annual rate of growth of income in V/est Pakis­
tan was 6,2 per cent, while it was only 4.2 per cent in East 
Pakistan. As a result,by 1969-70,the per capita income in West 
Pakistan was 61 per cent higher than in the East.Thus in ten years
... the income gap had doubled in percentage terms; it had widened
llg
more in absolute terms,"  -
Ilf,Ministry of Finance,Government of Pakistan,The Budget in 
Brief 1970-71(Islamabad 1970),p.78,
llg.Choudhury,G.W.The Last Days of United Pakistan,C.Hurst & Co., 
London,1974,p.15*
115
Growth in Gross Domestic Product in East and West Pakistan and Regional
Disparity in per capita Incomes
Growth Rate Per capita income as per cent Level of
of all Pakistan average Regional
Disparity
East West East West
1950-60 - - 84.6 111.6 27
1960-61 5.8 3*9 85.5 110.5 25
1961-62 6.2 5.0 85.9 110.2 24
1962-63 0.1 6.6 83.3 113.7 30
1963-64 11.3 5.5 85*6 110.7 25
1964-65 1.6 6.8 83.4 113.3 30
1965-66 4.5 2.6 83.7 111.4 28
Source: l) Pakistan Economic Survey, 1973-74, 1974 Islamabad.
2) Pakistan Year Book 1973-74, 1974 Islamabad.
3) Pakistan Basic Facts, 1967$ 1968, 1969$ 1970 Islamabad.
Table.1. 4.
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Growth Hates of Agricultural and Non-Agricultural Sectors (percentages)
Agricultural Sector Non-Agricultural Sector
East Pak. West Pak. East Pak. West Pak.
Growth rate; 
1959-60 to 1960-61 6.1 (-)0.2 5.5 7.7
1960-61 to 1961-62 **.** 6.2 9.2 3.9
1961-62 to 1962-63 (-)3.** 5.2 5.8 8.0
1962-63 to 1963-6** 9.5 2.5 1**.0 8.1
1963-6** to 196**-65 (-)l.l 5.3 5 .** 8 .0
196**»65 to 1965-66 2.3 (-)0*5 7.** 5-0
Annual Compound 
Growth Rate:
1959-60 to 196**-65 3.0 3.8 7.9 7.2
1959-60 to 1965-66 2.9 3.0 7.9 6.8
Source; 1) Pakistan Economic Survey, 1973-7**, 197** Islamabad.
2) Paid,stan Year Book 1973-7**, 197** Islamabad*
3) Pakistan Basic Facts, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970 Islamabad.
Tabled* 5*
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Per Capita. GDP in Ea.st and West Pakistan in
1959-60 constant prices,
Per Capita 
©DP
East
Per Capita
GDP
West
West-East 
Disparity 
Ratio
Ind. ex 
of
Disparity
1959-60 269  ^Pj FJ 1.32 100
1960-61 277 363 1.31 97
1961-62 286 376 1-31 97
1962-63 277 393 1. 42 111
1963-64 299 408 1.36 113
1964-65 293 42 6 1.45 141
1965-66 295 427 1.45 141
1966-67 290 448 1.54 169
1967-68 307 468 1. 52 163
1968-69 312 490 1. 57 178
1969-70 314 504 1. 61 191
Growth 17 f 42 $
over the
Decade
Growth in 7 1o 18 #
Third Plan
Period
Source: Planning Commission,Government of Pakistan,
Reports of the Advisory Panels for the Fourth Five
Year Plan 1970-75,vol.i.( Isisniabad July 1970),p.22.
Table.1. 6.
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phe economists from East and West Pakistan shar- 
ply disagreed as to the factors which, were responsible for such a 
growth in disparity.The East Pakistani economists were of the view 
that the West Pakistan policy makers were really responsible for 
sLich a trend in economic disparity because the interests of the 
Eastern Wing were ignored and systematically neglected.From the 
West Pakistani economists view,it V%§’e the economic factors,over 
which they had no control,and not the policy makers,and since 
according to them,East Pakistan received twice the public outlay 
of West Pakistan throughout the 1960S; "During this period consid­
erable difference in private sector investment between East and 
West Pakistan and a dramatic brefekthxtough in agriculture in West 
Pakistan based on the new seed-based technology were
the major factors resulting in the growth of disparity*Institu­
tional arrangements for implementing large develoixment programmes 1
in the public sectors remained week in East Pakistan despite
llhconsiderable improvement *"
This war of words and the growing 
intere-regional disparity built a bitter sense of'.‘opposition and 
resentment,in East Pakistan,towards the Central Government which 
was dominated by the Panjabi element,especially at the secre­
tarial level in the Centre," In some of the key ministries asso­
ciated with economic policy making,partieularly at the secretary 
level,all the officers until 1969 were from West Pakistan or had
emigrated from the Muslim Minority Provinces of India.In 1969*..
Ilksome kind of parity in the secretariat was brought about..." 
l’fb. Re ports for t'he Eourt'h Five Year PTan,1970“^5? Islamabad, p. 1077
I l k . S a y e e d "The Breakdown of Pakistan's Political System" in 
International Journal,p.389. ( Vol.27)1971-72,
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It may,however,be observed that the basic data available 
for annual regional income disparity is far from adequate and 
reliable to give a firm picture,and this is further complicated 
by large fluctuations in agricultural production and divergent 
nature of these fluctuations in East and West Pakistan.
The concept of economic parity was not of primary 
concern to Pakistan at its very ineeption,since per capita 
income was almost equal in the two parts of Pakistan. A belated 
recognition of the importance of the feelings and welfare of 
the inhabitants of East Pakistan resulted not only in ma^or 
concessions ( such as Tax holidays and increased public 
investment ) to that Province but also in the reappraisal by 
the Government of the environmental limitations found there.
The stereotype of the Eastern Wing as a high density,food deficit 
agrarian society doomed to a perpetual second class economic 
citizenship gave way to a belief that it was possible by govem-r 
ment policies and programme,and by incentives in the private 
sector,to realise a long-term target of economic parity and 
equality between the two regions of Pakistan.Pew other nations 
in the world had ever engaged in planning on such a broad-based 
scale. In most countries inhabitants tend to move
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freely from a poo'rly: developed economic region to a 
better-developed5 one' seeking ^obs and opportunity® 
Moreover, Geographical separation made commimications 
between Bast and West Pakistan difficult and expensive, 
resulting in little mobility of population and 
resources between the two Wings® Pakistan with, its 
physical discontinuity and diverse cultural regions, 
could not afford' to be adventurous regarding regional 
economic difference-," and- therefore, demands for a 
real economic parity gained a considerable political 
significance®
As noted above a real effort was made to 
reduce regional economic dispai'ity, and at the 
completion of the Second Plan in 1965 & sharp 
acceleration in the rate; of economic development in 
East Pakistan had been achieved® '■...
It would be fair to observe here that 
planning in Pakistan had not proceeded within the 
framework of any definite political philosophy, and •; 
economic plans.were concerned as mere technical 
■ exercises’ which took the existing political and 
social institutions for granted rather than contained . 
a blue-print for their orderly transformation*. The 
economic system continued to be a curious mixture of 
free enterprise and public intervention, and the 
declared objective of the Pakistan Government was to 
encourage private enterprise, but its bureaucratic 
procedures and controls tended to favour allocations 
to the public sector® However, it was felt that 
economic planning could not proceed indefinitely in
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such a philosophical vacuum*, especially in a long­
term perspective, the ultimate objectives of planning 
must be clearly defined and.the socio-political 
framework must be charted*
The process of planned economic growth 
demonstrated the fact that East Pakistan was highly 
dependent on the largesse of the Pederal Government, 
and a considerable amount of capital in the private 
sector continued to come from West Pakistan* To this 
effect the Pakistan Government made adequate provisions 
in the 1962 Constitution so as to eliminate inter­
regional disparity in per capita incomes in the shortest
. 1.. j
possible time, "the plans*shall be to ensure that 
dispaxdties between the provinces and between different 
areas within a Province, in ‘relation to income per 
capita, are removed and that the resources of Pakistan 
(including resources in foreign exchange)are used and 
allocated in such manner as to achieve that object in
the shortest possible time% and it shall be the duty
/^
of each Government to make the utmost endeavour to
11ftachieve that object*". To make the policy more 
effective, the 1962 Constitution gave a greater 
responsibility to the two regions by making larger 
allocations from the national revenue®
The geopolitical framework of Pakistan allowed 
the development of another centrifugal force which was
11V The Constitution of The Islamic Republic
of Pakistan, Article 14-5, clause 4, 
p. 53.
largely due to the gre at "lungers of ‘Wes.t/;F^ i;ist'^ is 
who oyedvM'gfr positrons/In ' ci^ilpf^^
, serTioes . of/PakiatOn® The '.ddir j jiant ' ^ o i ^ t h ^ ^ e s t  ■ ■ ■ 
Pakistan played in' the uctj sl&uo was-dtfey-'-.at-;'"lpast_: 
in -part,.,-to--’the, .concentrationj;of. politicalpower" ;.y 
there , Karachi, •,. the ' initial;0 apiit'al ci by § was 1 go at e d - : 
in the' West*'; .ahd'.tiie
adjacent afeas, were more likely., to succeed:)in. their'J\ ■ 
end© at cur's, than .the s e in the,. f e mjot e Eas b f During, the 
initial .stages 'of nation "building a large .majority of 
officers»V©£\necessity,-- hailed' from the West* In , v 
military appointments, tradition played a .prominent role 
in perpetualtng an existing situationV 'Historicallys ' . 
higher physical health standards and a;>gieater, readiness , 
to serve under the British Bap/g&ve .West Pakietaii/an ; . 
added advantage* The officer, corps whs overwhelmingly vr 
from Vest Pakistan. ©lijpyed .military traditions of 
'many centuries» and moveoyer *’..thejwere in a good ■ ' .
" strategic position to; serve the <^ f.ehce needs of ;the, 
nascent state® On the Contrary the Bengalis had; shown 
little enthusiasm in adopting-military'as ;a‘baneexv p
\ •-However, a better’-"'regional 'balance in the 
Civil Services wasmore easily, attainableand the 
acute dominance by the 'Western. Wing was only a temporary 
phenomenon® The fact should he? noted here that the 
Punjabis played, a deciding role to that effect, especially 
after the creation of the One Hnit in 1955k when under 
the sol called ”Paultana Doctrine” they accepted -a 
40, per cent representation instead of their natural '
. right to 56 per cent in accordance with their numbex^s
i
,'; , ■ ■ - - .. 'T V '  ■ • 123
within' the framework of West Pakistan®vAnother very : 
important measure adopted, to ‘achieve inter-regional 
parity was' the fact that ifJai c^ndidate. f ronr;East
;/-J 1..'* T . -
Pakistan was placed.amongst'the; first 20 percent 
successful candiates then he .was to. be. awarded a merit 
seat, but if a Punjabi candidate, was placed in, the 
merit quota then his. seat was allocated, to him from, 
the Pimjabi.;. quota®"Thi.s px^ ocedur.e heiped the; East 
Pakistani candidates to ehjpy a, higher percentage of . '
. seat allocations than they woul& have enj dyed'other- 
wisei Thi s was a re al .step.towards cre ating
interregional parity in the-Civil Services of Paid,stan®. '
Hareover, Pakistan'‘decentralized its
administration & j a variety of actions.®;:'-' East 
Pakistanis were, allowed to fill government Jobs in ;.
their, own region whether or. not) they met. the pivil 
Service requirements* : last Pakistan , had her own ;■ t;
legislative body and Dacca, was-made the.'legislative :u 
Capital, of Pakistan* Pakistan*s] social, economic and - 
political decisions making wehtia long way m  inducing 
the centrifugal force cx^eated'by the feeling that the ’ 
people from the Western Wing:;had been' exercising undue 
political pressure and control® Some observers were of 
the view that Pakistan Government had gone too far in y
succumbing to the pressures f m m  East .Pakistan: in the., 
name of regional parity, and there was ;th-widespread and 
<* genuine feeling in the Westjthai; such 'i}s<pciO“ec.bhomiq' 
and political pressures in the name of regional, parity J i-;
would shake the basis bf a two-part state.5 and the  ^V> -
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concept ojf compromise might he misconstrued and the separatist 
tendencies would he encouraged and as such divisive forces would 
thrive at the expense of national unity and independence,,
The economic planners in Pakistan endeavoured to 
accelerate the pace of industrial development of East Pakistan, 
with a view to removing the inter-regional economic disparity the 
time they realised the geopolitical realities of the situation*
The Government of Pakistan made a more concrete and positive 
contribution towards the development of East Pakistan in the face 
of shy capital and the lack of enterprise in the private sector.
One of the first measures taken hy the Central Govern­
ment was to make industries a subject of Provincial List,as a '
result Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation was bifurcated .
EPIDC
into two provincial concerns namely/( East Pakistan Industrial
Development Corporation ) and WPIDG ( West Pakistan Industrial
Development Corporation ),on July-1,1962, These Corporations were
primarily concerned with the industrial development,in the public-
sector,in their respective jurisdictions*After the bifurcation,
the EoP0I0D 0Ce inherited 21 completed projects having a capital
outlay of Rs,83*3 crore,and the W,P.I.D,C0 was transferred 33
0 -x- x-
completed projects costing oO,3 crore.The completed projects in 
East Pakistan comprised 12 jute mills, 2 shipyards and dockyards, 
one cotton mill, 3 sugar mills and the giant gas fertilizer 
factory at Fenchjigap.j.
The inception of Pakistan was based upon the 
Two Nation Theory,a premise that the Indian Muslims nedded a sepa­
rate state,where ” they could, rule according to their own code of
life and according to their own cultural growth,tradition and 
12Islamic Laws,1
** One Crore =ten million,
12, Jinnah M.A. quoted in Sharif al-Mujahid,National Integration
in East Pakistan,Bureau of National Reconstruction,Pakistani 
P k
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This particular theme presupposed an Indian Muslim 
Society with her own distinct culture, although it 
did not emphasize the diversity of their cultural 
heritage and background, "It is true that Society 
and Culture in both East and West Pakistan are
A^
based on Islamic Principles®" v Hoitfever, there were 
imp Distant differences in both the Society and Cultural 
values of the two regions of Pakistan, and it was to 
be expected that each province would zealously guard 
its language and cultural distinctiveness* This was 
in evidence in the day to day broadcasts of Radio 
Pakistan," a typical day* s program for Radio Paidstan 
includes new programmes in English, Urdu, and Bengali; 
Children's storyhoixrs in the vernaculars, stressing 
both folk tales and stories of contemporary life, 
music programs from both ti*aditions, lectures and
informal talks on a variety of related topics; and
* * ■ i i fdaily readings from the Koran" * It was strongly 
argued that the news media would help a great deal in 
establishing an standing of the cultural patterns
of the two regions, and in,time, more people in Pakistan 
would become bilingual or trilingual, and certainly the
inhabitants of the two.Wings would know a great deal
• in
more about each other* This should have resulted/increased
/ - . ' 
eohe-siveness, and the tenuous thread of the Islamic
13* See Qureshi, I*H. The Pakistani Way of Life;
Ikram, S»Me and Spear,p*eds.The Cultural
Heritage of Pakistan®
Anderson, David D® Pakistan’s Search for 
National Indent!ty, Yale Review, Vo* 55?^966, 
PP. 557-558*
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faith.would have been strengthened considerably,, It was 
also argued that the diversity of culture and language 
often inhibited the development lbf national identity»; J v ;;: 
but the example• of Switzerland and Canada were1 not lost- ; 
since, a high degree of national- imity had been achieved' ■• 11 
in spite of cultural and'language dlspaidtyp and it was 1 • 1
fervently hoped that with the*. sincerity, of purpose 
such a success could also be! achieved, in Pakistan® If \ 
Pakistan continued to make visible progress in re- 
dressing, the grievances of the ..majority, and in evolving 
a national culture flexible enough to allow a maximum 
amount of variations between the two regions,: then its- 
geographic dislocation, although unique as; a spatial * ..It.
phenomenon, ‘should not have .unduly affected the; solution 
of the!:problems that were strongly polarising the socio- lyt 
economic a M  .political differences 5-' a .veritable- bo stye-to . iv ! 
separatism and secession»p;. 111;' ' 1 ■ ‘ pi .b-
" “ 'Pron'P■the'’ preceding argument it may ;
be deduced that the Government of Pakistan could not effective
' - ' 1 ii': ’h v - . . ft, h  1-1...In--
ely plug the widening agapkb'etween the two hajyes of • the coun--,
try,and as a.resultvthb-original territoriality of the\state~;
. idea could not be held" together, ,
. : .Tlie, following argummmiit would go a long
way .in' demonstrating the . reasons and- explain the gradual "but
definite alienation of pub lip opinion in East'Pakistan which :
eventually ended the.legal- bonds between the two halves of. /
Pakistan.Itywould be quite evident from the following that py.
the state-idea i.e.':- a Muslim homeland,as it emerged in.. 1947‘&1
was very much weakened by*the interplay of centrifugal forces
which effectively Outmatched the centripetal forces,and;;ast h
such the balance of power was seriously jeopardised,and both
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the internal and external vested interests were effectively
allowed to exploit these inherent weaknesses to the disadvantage
a
of a united Pakistan. The Central G-ovrninent ,as/result, was unable 
to hold the country as it had emerged in 1947?and the territori­
ality of the raison d'etre was severed.
The effective operation of the centrifugal forces 
in Pakistan may he ascribed to the following elements; i) the 
economic disparities, ii )fhe linguistic and culttiral distinctive-' 
ness,iii)the administrative and bureaucratic elitism,iv)the pre­
dominance of the military machine,v)the electoral differences, 
vi)the effective operation of s. quasi-unitary system, vii )anti- 
state activities of some of the secondary pressure groups,viii) 
the lack of allegiance,to the state-idea,amongst the Hindu min­
ority , ix) the gradual spread of parochialism,regionalism and 
sub-nationalism(Bengali sub-nationalism),x)the gradual aliena­
tion of the intellegentsia in East Pakistall,xi)the entrenched 
opposition by India of the Two Nations Theory,and xii) the 
spatial separation of the two halves of Pakistan.
A very important area of activity of the centrifugal :
forces in Pakistan has been the process of constitution making,
a
and the failure of the national leadership to fram^at an early 
stage,a coherent and a workable constitutional framework for 
Pakistan.The obvious choice should have been a true federal 
structure since it would have been compatible with the spatial 
separation of Pakistan and very much inconformity with her geo­
political compulsions „ Instead,a/lot of valuable time and energies
I
were wasted.The country was ruled from 1947 to 1971 by leaders 
who were indirectly elected or held senior posts in the armed 
forces.In 1970 the first general elections were held on the basis 
of universal adult franchise,and as such the people of Pakistan 
were denied their political rights under the guise of "indirect
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democracy", "controlled democracy" or " Basic Democracies".Most
of the time the national political scene was dominated by Punjabi 
or a Pathan,and the Bengalis were relegated to a secondary posi­
tion especially in the area of decision-making in spite of the 
fact that they formed majority of the population.This gradually 
led to the alienation of Bengali political opinion,urban educated 
class(teachers,students,administrators and business groups),and 
the farming community( who resented the attitudes and the remote 
decision-making operation of the military and civilian machine).
 ^ The operation of a quasi-unitary system
/strongly
worked/ against the interests of a united Pakistan, and the
state-ideayva/sa aeyjaag irreparably damaged. The first real blow was 
struck by the late Malik G 1ml am Mohammed( the Punjabi Governor 
General and a former Finance Secretary)who dismissed the Khawja 
Nazim-ud-Din cabinet( the East Bengali Prime Minister)in 1953?and 
dismissed the Mohammed Ali Bogra cabinet(another East Bengali 
Prime Minister)in 1954 and at t$ie same time dissolved the Consti­
tuent Assembly* the East Bengali Speaker of the Consembly;,Kaulvi 
Tamiz-ud-Din won the first round of legal proceedings in The Sind. 
High Court but lost the appeal against the Governor General’s 
dissolution order in the Federal Court of Pakistan^ the presiding 
Chief Justice Muhammad Munir was a Punjabi),and the Court upheld 
the Governor General’s action.The dismissal of the Fazlul Haque * s 
ministry in East Bengal( Fazlul Haque was popularly known as the 
Lion ojg Bengal),which was demanding a greater share of revenue for 
East Bengal,provoked a tremendous outburst in East Pakistan against 
the Central Government(incidentally the dismissal orders were iss­
ued by the Punjabi Governor General).Such drastic actions by the 
Central Government( with a Punjabi Head of State),against the 
Bengali leadership,both at the central and provincial levels,were 
considered highly provocative and indicative^according to the
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Bengali point of view,of the Punjabi hegemony and as such unacce­
ptable to the majority province.
The political parties in East Pakistan
/°n
capitalised the conflicts between the Centpal and the Provincial 
governments,and gradually but surely made a determined effort to 
advance their demands for greater provincial autonomy,and empha­
sised that it was an absolutely legitimate demand within the 
framework of a united Pakistan,The leaders of political parties 
in East Pakistan also exploited the conduct and the result of the 
Indo-Pakistan war of 1965.The Central Government was accused of 
leaving the Eastejjfi Wing undefended,and at the mercy of the Indian 
armed forces,The criticism and resentment was particularly direc­
ted towards the army for failing in their supreme duty,and as 
such the Bengalis particularly emphasized the futility of allo­
cating the lion*s share of the Central budget ( 50-65 per cent) 
.for the maintenance of the large army which had apparently left 
them defenceless( there were only about 8,000 men and officers in 
East Pakistan),and had failed in their thrust against the Indian 
held Kashmir,This meant,directly or indirectly,a criticism of the 
Punjabi domination,the a,rmy was overwhelmingly of Punjabi origin, 
The Pakistan army has been almost entirely recruited from four 
districts of northern Punjab( Rawalpindi , Campbellpiir, Jhelum, and 
Gujrat)and two districts of the Frontier Province(Peshawar and
Kohat).Sixty per cent of the army is Punjabi and 35 per cent is 
Pathan," ,
Sayeed,K0B. " The Role of the Military in Pakistan" in Jacques 
Van Doorn,ed,Armed Forces and Society( The Hague),1968,pa276,
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One of the fundamental aspects of elitism in a
society is its exclusiveness,and to maintain their hold on the
society,and to legitimize their policy-decisions,these elements
are obliged to exploit the politico-ideological sentiments and
aspirations of the masses„These were singularly missing in
Pakistan,and therefore,the development of political institutions
was painstakingly supervised by the elitist group comprising the
civil and military services,especially in the newly emergent
states( this is particularly true of the indigenous elements of
the old British Colonial civil and military personnel^in which
these elements acted as masters and not as public servants , This
is particularly true of the civil servants who were posted in
East Pakistan,Their dealings with the Bengalis were very officiou
very
us and they tended to stay aloof’g ' J ';k /small minority
ever ventured to learn the Bengali language,and this
alienated the Bengalis,Bothethe military and the civil services
used the democratic institutions for their self-aggrandisement,
instead of acting as the instruements in the service of democracy
for the socio-economic and political development of the people at
large,The civil service of Pakistan( C.S.P.) is particularly 
accused
/ of misbehaviour and maladministration especially those 
officers who were costed in East Pakistan.The civil service wor­
ked as " the most well organized political party in Pakistan", 
jealously
and very/ 1 guarded their service cadre,They were on top
of the elitist group in Pakistan,and retained their preponderance 
in spite of the installation of the military regimes(since 1958) 
in Pakistan,In fact, the advent of the Ayub Regime in 1958,intro­
duced the norm of regularly nominating military personnel to high 
civilian posts( most of these were filled in by the Punjabis or 
Pathans),and as such the so-called fusion of the civil and mili­
tary personnel v-as launched,To cement this relationship the Mili­
tary Junta decided in 1960S to send the civil service probationers
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to the Pakistan Military Academy,Kakul,tor a period of three 
months,to gain basic military training and discipline.The whole 
scheme backfired - and the probationers were sent back to the Civil 
Service Academy,Lahore,and in fact Hafiz Muhammad Aslam,a proba- 
tioner from Azad Kashmir(Pakistani held Kashmir)was removed from 
the C.S.P,cadre,though ,as an act of mercy,he was allowed to hold 
his post from Azad Kashmir.However,the Bengali probationers were ' 
said to be in the forefront of the group who resented the very 
idea and the programme of military training*
The devastations of the 1970 cyclone in East Pakistan 
generated further hatred of the Central Government^ and the masses 
in East Pakistan vociferously criticised the apathy and failure 
of the Government of Pakistan in their care of the millions who 
were devastated by the ravages of the huge tidal waves,The remo­
teness of the federal capital,the decision-making machinery,the 
elitist group,the military and the Punjabi hegemony were clearly 
identified as the real villains of the whole tragedy.This human
tragedy was very effectively exploited by Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman 
League
and his Awami/, during the general elections of 1970,and. they
did not fail to point out the various other drawbacks of the 
existing relationship,and as such , with added vigour the
acceptance of the Six Points,which in effect,meant the establish­
ment of a confederal structure.
It would not be wrong to emphasize at this point in 
time,that the more the Central Government endeavoured to impose 
a unitaiy. cultural-religious concept,the more difficult it 
became for the state-idea to hold sway over the territoriality 
of a united Pakistan.lt is quite evident from the preceding a rgu­
ment that the more the politico-military leaders struggled to 
strengthen the unity of the state,the more certain its eventual 
severence became.
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It is self-evident, from the preceding pages that the 
inherent regional disparities were accentuated,and in fact 
magnified over the years .There was a growing sense of politics.! 
and economic injustice among the Bengalis*The burden of their 
complaint was that they earned much of the country’s foreign 
exchange,but most of the proceeds were utilised for the indus­
trial development in West Pakistan which then exported often 
inferior products at comparatively higher prices to East Pakistan 
under the protection of tariffs and exchange controls.As stated 
earlier the Bengalis were quick to point out that most of the 
development projects,for example,the Liangla and Tarbela dams, 
among the biggest earth dams in the world,the most comprehensive 
irrigation scheme,especially under the Indus replacement project, 
heavy industries and a new national capital—went to West Pakis­
tan* The Bengalis also argued that enterprises set up in Bast 
Pakistan were generally branch factories,banks and insurance 
agencies,and branch trading firms'administered by non-Bengali 
entrpreneurs on behalf of the West Pakistani ca.pitalists.lt was 
for most Bengalis an unteno.ble si'taxation and a matter of consi­
derable concern,therefore,that West Pakistan,with approximately 
55 million people,seemed to be on their way towards more pros­
perity while,by comparison,East Pakistan could barely support 
in mere subsistence its population of about 70 million*
The Bengalis were highly suspicious of the Army and the 
top echelons of the civil service as well a.s the Central Govern­
ment since these were predominantly controlled by the Punjabis* 
The Bengalis seemed to have arrived at the conclusion that the 
interests of the eastern region had for too long been subordi­
nated systematically to those of West Pakistan,and therefore,they 
sought a radical readjustment in the balance of political and 
economic power within Pakistan*
133
CHAPTER 4.
Economic Implications of the New 
Geopolitical Structure,
Political potentials and foreign policy options of a 
given state are closely related to its economic system.
Natural resources, military power,industrial base,lines of 
communication and transportation,‘effective administrative 
structure and sound financial institutions are important 
instruments of statecraft.A state’s ability to back up its 
demands on other states,to attract and support allies,to bring ■ 
pressure to bear upon adversaries,but above all to develop 
and maintain internal coherence,requires the ability to manipula* 
ate goods and services of many kinds,qualities and quantities; 
and even the intangible called national prestige may to a 
greater or lesser extent depend upon the characteristics of 
that states economic system.
Strategy and national policies are often subject to • 
the economic strength of that state.Ideas and concepts which 
are advanced by various national leaders are directly or indi­
rectly associated, with the economic potentials of their respec­
tive politico-territorial organisation.
The magnitude and comparison of a. state's economic outpuit 
depend upon a complex of variables: natural resources,manpower . 
and socio-economic patterns of its institutions.The economic 
structure of a given state has a, direct bearing 011 the external : 
relations of that state.This may impose limitations on. her 
foreign policy options or on the other hand remove such inhi­
biting constraints from the area of her international activities 
and relations.
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The disruption of the existing system.
For a geopolitical analysis of Pakistan 
it is imperative to analyse the circumstances under which it 
achieved its status as an independent sovereign state,and 
therefore, an examination of its economic potentials is necessary 
for a better understanding of Pakistan’s geopolitical problems.
The partition of the Indo-Pakistan 
Subcontinent in 1947,creat&dca number of very intricate socio­
economic , political and territorial problems which have practi­
cally eliminated any chances of good neighbourly relations 
between India and Pakistan,Although the Chairman of the Award 
Commissions Sir ( now Lord') C3rr.il Rad cl if fe had envisaged that 
after the chaos of the partition had died down,the two indepen­
dent states,India and Pakistan, would develop very harmonious 
relationship- and that there would be a political reconciliation 
between them;any outstanding boundary problems being settled in 
can atmosphere of mutual understanding and cooperation,1 I have 
done what I can in drawing the line to eliminate any avoidable 
cutting of railway communications and of river system,which are,., 
important to the life of the Province;but it is quite impossible 
to draw a boundary under our terms of reference without causing 
some interruption of this sort,and I can only express the hope 
that arrangements can be made and maintained between the two „ ;
States that will minimise the consequence■of this interruption
1 ;as far as possible,"
1, Radcliffe Awards,12 Angust, 19 4 7 •
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The partition disrupted the water system,and the irrigation
complex in the Pakistani Punjab became dependent upon Indian
political goodwill since some of the most important hcadworks
and embankments were a'warded to India, " Of the 48 million acres
of cultivable land in the Indus Basin ( 3? million in Pakistan •
and 16 million in India ) , only 26 million acres ( 21 million
2
in Pakistan and 5 million in India ) receive irrigation,,."
The partition also severed some of the most important 
rail and road links ( Some of the river channels in East Pakis­
tan were also affected ) , the political division also disrupted-
the social and cultural bonds,and as such seriously uprooted the 
existing economic system,
A number of important market towns gained, their socio­
economic and cultural importance because these were sites of 
some of the most revered religious shrines ( rap.zaars ),temples, 
and religious centres( One must not,however,minimise the impor­
tance of some of these cities which are also the centres of
economic and commercial activities,and which have played a signi­
ficant pant in the industrial-'and economic development of their 
respective regions,for example,Lyallpur is famous for its textile: 
industry and is called " Manchester of Pakistan 11,Multan is very 
important financial,economic and commercial city.Again Chi j rat is
known for its pottery,in addition to the Shah Bov/11 ah Shrine ), 
Ajmer(India)is highly respected by the Muslims,Hindus and Sikhs*
A number of Pakistanis still travel to Ajmer,annually,if allowed
by India,Thousands of Sikhs have been allowed by Pakistan to
visit Nankana Sahib and Panja Sahib, The Alimadis (kirsais )had their
religious centre in Batala(India),and large parties have been
permitted by India to visit their holy place*Lahore is a very
2.IChosla,A.N. "Development of the Indus River Sysjrem" , India
Quarterly,XIV,No.3(July-Serteraber 1958),pp,233-?53.
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important socio-economic,political and cultural centre,and its 
added attraction to the huslims of the Sub-continent is the 
shrine of Datta G-anj Baksh(l)atta Durbar).Thousands of people 
visit the shrine every day to pay their respect and homage to 
this Iiuslim religious teacher.
In addition,a number of urban centres had achieved 
their significance because of the fact that annual horse and 
cattle shows were held there,for example,Lyallpur(Pakistan).This 
city was and is very famous livestock market for the whole of 
the Punjab.But as a result of the partition its links with the 
Indian Punjab have been severed in this respect.
The above examples clearly demonstrate the fact 
that the partition of the Sub-contineht has resulted in the 
emergence of a new geopolitical structure,and £3a4# bas effecti­
vely disrupted the existing bbbnbmic system.
As a result of the political division of the 
Sub-continent,East Bengal(East Pakistan)received three quarters 
of the jute growing area but negligible manufacturing capacity, 
India on the other hand received one quarter of the jute growing 
land but all of the jute manufacturing industry.
India duplicated the jute production of Pakistan, 
which in turn was obliged to look for new and distant but 
unfortunately more expensive markets for her raw jute.In addi­
tion,Pakistan launched a comprehensive programme to achieve 
self-sufficiency in the manufacture of jute.There was a tremen­
dous growth of interprovincial trade between East and West 
Pakistani approximately 800 million Rupees per annum);this was 
obviously expanded at the expense of trading and commercial 
links between India andEast Pakistan in particular,and India 
and Pakistan in general.Loreover,the Indians were forced to
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reroute the transportation of their tea from Assam which 
proved to be quite an expensive policy change since the 
traditional channels of transportation through East Pakistan 
were denied to India0 Again, for political reasons, Pakistan 
preferred to import coal from People's Republic of China, at 
comparatively very high costs,than the natural source of supply 
i * e,India,
The agrarian base;
Pakistan is predominantly an agrarian 
country,and more than seventy per cent of the civilian labour 
force is engaged in agricultural pursuits. This figure rose 
to 85,25 per cent in East Pakistan ( Bangladesh ),In Pakistan 
the man/land ratio was 0,66 cultivated acres per person,with a 
distinct disparity between the two parts of Pakistan ( 0,53 acres 
in East Pakistan and 0,8 acres in West Pakistan )„In spite of 
this ratio the dependence on land is considerable end the existing 
situation is not likely to change in the near future ,11.. .Pakistan,.
4 ;
will remain predominantly an agrarian,..for many years or decades, 
Since the very inception of Pakistan the various agrarian reforms
4„ Spate,O.H.II. and Learmonth, India and Pakistan, 
Llethuen,1967,p.225°
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in
/Pakistan have endeavoured to eradicate sub-division and fragmen­
tation, achieve a reasonable standard of land holdings and to better 
the lot of peasants and haris or cultivators.
abolished the Permanent Settlement as established under Lord 
Cornwallis in 1793-The 1950,Act limited the individual holdings 
of Zamindars to 33 acres,and as a result of the amendment in the 
Act the ceiling of Khas(self-cultivated) land was raised to 120 
acres, " With 120 acres in East Pakistan, one can have adequate 
production if one is prepared to work,The land is fertile and 
responsive." To consolidate the land tenure in East Pakistan the 
Central Government fixed a minimum of three acres at " subsistence" 
and eight acres at " economic " levels.
In West Pakistan the Ayub Regime in 1959,implemented a 
very comprehensive scheme of agrarian reforms,The Land Reforms
limited the individual ownership to 500 acres of irrigated or 1,00' 
acres of unirrigated land.The Government promised to make the com­
pensatory payments over a period of 25 years for the dispossessed 
land.
land holdings," The Bhutto Land Reforms were announced on March 1,
1972,affecting the landlords and jagirdars throughout the country.
These Reforms put a ceiling of land holdings in the irrigated areas:
at 150 acres and 300 unirrigated acres or the equivalent to 15,000
6
produce index units."
The partition in 1947 resulted in the disappearance 
of many non-Muslim moneylenders,Some Pathans who practised usury 
in towns were limited in their resources and were unable to advan­
ce any considerable loans to the village cultivator,The situation 
in East Pakistan was particularly serious because The Baniya 
8#Syed,A.H.World Survey " Pakistan",The Atlantic Education Trust,
The East Bengal State Acquisition and Tenancy Act,1950,
size of
The Bhutto Land Reforms of 1972,further reduced the/
No.76.April 1975?London,p.6,
5.Khan,m.A, Erienas Not Masters,Lahore,1967,p.91 
Production of Principal Crops, 
wheat and rice
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( the Hindu moneylender) migrated to West Bengal and Assam, The 
Village Agricultural and Industrial Development Programme,the I 
Democracies and the Agricultural Development Corporation have 1 
responsible for procuring and distributing fertilisers,implemei 
improved seeds,pesticides and agricultural extension activities 
Pakistan has had a serious foodgrain problem,especi^ 
with regard to East Pakistan until 1971-The problem had been pj 
cularly serious because of recurrent floods,water-logging and
■55-
salinity, which seriously affected agricultural production, re du,< 
yield per acre,While population was growing at the rate of thr< 
per cent the growth of food, production was two per cent,This h; 
necessitated the import of foodgrains in large quantities,Durr.- 
1950s Pakistan imported 500,000 tons of foodgrain annually whl 
had grown to 1,000,000 tons during 19603,The gap between the d, 
tic supply and demand was widening and the import requirements 
1971 had reached approximately 2,5 million tons,This placed Pa
an in a very difficult situation since the import of foodgrain
■
very heavily burdened the foreign exchanege earnings and serio 
hampered her development planning.
The main source of supply was the United States of 
America,The Americans were very willing to meet Pakistan’s foe 
requirements especially since 1954,the year Pakistan signed th 
Manila Treaty and joined the South East AsianTreaty Organisatl 
The foodgrain requirements of Pakistan were met Linder the prov 
of the Public Daws 480,The whole programme was carried out as 
follows:
Item i,iiid was provided on local currency terms i,e„tl
sale of U.S.surplus agricultural commodities against payment c
Rupees in cash which was to be deposited in the U,S.Account- ol
State Bank of Pakistan,The bulk of this amount was given back 
Pakistan in the shape of loans or grants,
^Wat’er^XoggTng ^ an^sallnTFy are widespread in West”Pakist anHru 
floods invariably affected agricultural products in East Pakif
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Production of Principal Crops, 
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Table.1.8.
Acreage, Production and Per Acre Yield of Cotton
Year Acreage 
(000 acres)
Production 
(000 bales)
Yield
per acre 
(Ma.unds)
Percentage 
change in 
yield per 
acre
1970-71 4,284 3,051 3.4 -
1971-72 4,837 3,979 3.9 +14.7
1972-73 4,967 3,947 3.8 -2 .6
1973-74 4,559 3,704 3.9 +2 .6
Source: Pl£inning Unit, m/ 0 Agriculture
Area, Production and Per Acre Yield of Wheat
Year Area 
(000 acres)
Production 
(000 tons)
Yield 
per acre 
(l-launds)
Percentage 
change in 
yield per 
acre
1970-71 14,771 6,374 11.7 -
1971-72 14,325 6 ,782 12 .9 +10.3
1972-73 14,754 7,325 13.5 +4.7
1973-74* 16,076 8 ,5 0 0 14.4 +6.7
* Provis:ional Source: Planning Unit, Pi/ 0 Agriculture
Area, Production and Per Acre Yield of Rice
Year Area 
(000 acres)
Production 
(000 tons)
Yield 
per acre 
(ma.unds)
Percentage 
change in 
yield per 
acre
1970-71 3,715 2,165 15.9 -
1971-72 3,599 2,226 16 .8 +5.7
1972-73 3,656 2,293 17.1 +1 .8
1973-74* 3,720 2,405 17 .6 + 2.9
* Second Estimate Source: Planning Unit M/o Agriculture
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Item II,The Americans provided the assistance on convertible 
local currency terms,The surplus U.S.agricultural commodities 
were supplied and Pakistan was required to pay back in U.S.dollars 
within a period of 40 years.
Item III,The U.S.Government made gifts and donations of U.S. sur­
plus agricultural commodities to meet relief requirements and to 
combat hunger and malnutrition.
However,there were far reaching conditions which very 
clearly affected,and in fact,limited Pakistan*s relations with 
other countries especially those which were considered unfriendly 
states by the Americans e.g.,Cuba,North Korea,North Vietnam and
(.A-
for a considerable time China,There was^definite clause of the 
agreements that if and when Pakistan accepted aid and assistance j 
under P.1.480 then she must not have trade relations with Cuba, 
North Korea and North Vietnam.
In addition to these limitations on Pakistan*s 
foreign policy options the Americans made Pakistan to purchase 
a certain amount of her agricultural requirements from American 
markets with cash payments.This stipulation was within the scope 
of P.1.480 and was known as the Usual Marketing Requirements(UMR), 
and as a result Pakistan had to import 100,000 to 160,000 tons 
annually at comparatively higher costs.
In addition the rece&pient was required to pay the 
freight charges for all the aid and assistance received as such. 
Pakistan was not allowed to export the same or the like commodity 
either domestic or of foreign origin without U.S.clearance.
The total aid received under P. 1,480 was U.S.$ 1.196m.,
, w
upto 1965 9 and m  1974 the total had reached U.S.$ 1,303/. The fact
?,A11 these figures have been taken from The Pakistan Times,lahore, 
4.4.1975.
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that the total aid received hy Pakistan under P *1.480, from 1965 to 
1974 amounted to U.S./ 107 millinn,clearly demonstrates the point
that the American aid closely approximated/###$ her political cor- 
dialty with Pakistan ,and this definitely affected Pakistan’s imports 
from the United States for the period in question*This point is 
further substantiated by the trade figures of Pakistan,especially 
from 1971 to 1972( see figure; 52) with regards to her imports from 
U.S.A. The reason being that the United States has been the chief 
donor of aid to Pakistan and very effectively influenced the deci­
sions of the Aid Pakistan Consortium,The Americans were instruemental 
in the suspension of the Consortium aid to Pakistan d^lring the East 
Pakistan crisis in 1971,and the fact that the aid was not rehablitate 
ed in full till Pakistan recognised Bangladesh in February 1974,is
proof enough of/political limitations which Pakistan has been obliged 
to reeognise,at times,because of her economic requirements.
Rs,6,620,000,000,as a result of her aid and assistance programme 
under"P.L,480.The Americans have used this massive fund for the 
maintenance of her Embassy personnel,propoganda publications,the 
award of scholarships and exchange programmes.This huge fund has been 
a source of socio-economic and political embarrassment to Pakistan,
was predominantly agricultural and she had no major industrial cen­
tres,and was without capacity for processing indigenous raw materials! 
" At the time of independence,there were only 34 factories in Pakiste: 
an with a total daily employment of 2 6,400 persons.Although 
Pakistan inherited twenty per cent of the Sub-continent *s
to
the
total U.S.deposits in Pakistan stood at
Pakistan’s economy at the time of her independence
that a total of U.S.# 107 \ ^ e :-
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a) Jute;
population, her share in industry was less than 7 per cent
and even this consisted of small scale and minor industrial
units. 'Thus for instance, Pakistan was the home of jute,
hut had not a single jute factory.11 ^ The growth of the
domestic manufacturing industry in Pakistan, especially 
stemmed
jute,/from the Partition of the Indian Sub-continent in 
194-7* which split the world's main jute growing area in 
; Bengal between East Pakistan and India. The division 
left India with almost all the processing and weaving 
facilities and only about a quarter of the growing area, 
and Pakistan with the bulk of the growing area but with 
negligible manufacturing facilities. In 194*7 Calcutta was 
much the largest terminal market for jute from East 
Bengal t(East Psdcistan). This facility was disrupted in 
194*9 as a result of the dispute concerning the exchange 
rate between Pakistan and India. The Government of 
Pakistan were obliged to take measures aimed at reducing 
the impending hardships of the jute growing farmers and 
issued the Jute Ordinance 194-9 (replaced by the Act in 
1956) to establish the minimum support prices, to administer 
the purchase, sale and storing facilities on behalfbf the 
government. Since the entire output of raw jute was exported 
and domestic requirements were met by imports, Pakistan 
found it imperative to set up her own Jute industry so 
as to eliminate dependence on foreign manufactured jute 
products, especially Indian* The jute manufacturing capacity
9* Pakistan Tear Book, Karachi, p.215.(Pakistan Basic
Facts,1967-68,An official publication indicates that 
at the time of the Partition there were 14-, 569 
industrial establishments in the undivided India and 
only 1406 units were located in the area which now 
formed Pakistan.This establishes that Pakistan had
10 per cent of the industrial units,but these were 
mainly flour mills,rice mills and cotton ginning 
factories).
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increased from a negligible level in 194-7 to 8070 looms 
in 1961, and to 194-28 in 1969*^ The Third Five Tear 
Plan of Pakistan estimated a total installed capacity of 
24,619 looms by 1970* The development of jute manufactur­
ing industry in Pakistan and the diversification of her 
raw jute exports was a good example of the characteristics 
of Pakistani geopolitical problems, and a reflection on 
the unhappy Indo-Pakistan relations*
A study of jute, production and manufacture in 
Pakistan indicated that until 1952 Pakistan imported jute 
manufactured goods to the time of 22*9 million rupees 
and her exports of jute manufactures amounted to only 
0*2 million rupees* In 1967-68 the exports in raw jute 
amounted to 758*9 million rupees and the jute manufactured 
goods exported from Pakistan earned 619*6 million rupees* 
This picture of the jute production and manufacture in 
Pakistan materialised as a result of the realigned 
geopolitical priorities of Pakistan*
Raw jute and jute manufactures constituted the 
largest single source of foreign exchange earnings for 
Pakistan. In 1967-68 the exports earned a total of 1379 
million rupees* After the Partition in 1947, the jute 
export trade has passed through some major vicissitudes* 
India was at the outset by far the most important consumer, 
taking 5*3 million bales as against 0.8 million by the rest 
of the world in 1947-8. In 1948-9 Indian purchases were at
10. The total looms installed were located as follows: 
18,928 in East Pakistan and 300 in West Pakistan,at 
Jaranwala in the Punjab.There were 40 jute mills in 
Pakistan in 1968 and the consumption of raw jute 
amounted to 2.88 million bales and the production 
of jute goods was 490,335 tons. In March 1970, 
according to the Financial Times, August 17, 1970, 
there were 21,700 looms in Pakistan*
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the more normal level of 3*9 million bales, exports to
other countries increasing to 1*8 million bales. By
1950-31 two-thirds of Pakistan's exports of jute were
absorbed by countries other than India, chiefly the U.S.A.,
the U.K., Prance, West Germany and Belgium...as Indian
domestic production of raw jute rose from 1.7 million bales
in 194*7-8 to about 6*3 million bales in 1961-62, and
Indian imports of raw jute from Pakistan were ■under 0.4
million bales in the latter year. India has thus achieved
its goal of virtual self-sufficiency in raw jute...loss to
Pakistan's exports is being absorbed by increasing
11manufacturing capacity (at home).... • The changed pattern
of Pakistan's jute industry since 1947 was indicative of 
the eventualities of the division of the Sub-continent and 
its inherent geopolitical problems. The old and established 
channels of inter Dominion trade were gradually being 
eroded and new but economically expensive trade connections 
were established. Pakistan was exporting her raw jute ana 
manufactured jute goods to distant markets. This involved 
extra and unnecessary freight and insurance charges which 
were endangering the competitiveness of the Pakistanis 
jute and jute manufactured goods in the world market. India 
was the closest and the most natural customer in the 
field but the political considerations of the parties 
concerned outweighed the economic benefits, and which 
should be construed as a serious error of judgement. By 
1960-61 Pakistan was exporting only 5 P©2? cent of her
11. Andrus, J.R. and Mohammed, A.P. Trade, Finance and 
Development in Pakistan, Stanford University Press, 
Stanford, California, 1966, pp.27,30*
** These were expensive in the sense that had there been
a continuous exchange of goods between India and Pakistan 
then both the countries woiild have saved unnecessary costs
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commodities to India and was importing only 5 per cent
from India. Since the Indo-Pakistan hostilities of 1963
the trading relations between the two neighbours have
11Abeen almost at a standstill*
Ootton is both the chief cash crop and the main 
kharif crop in West Pakistan and is grown mainly on the 
doahs (canal irrigated areas) of the Indus Valley*
Since 1914 good quality seeds have been imported 
from U.S.A. to improve the production and quality of
r /
cotton known as the Punjab-American has taken well to the 
indigenous soil and climate and now 87 per cent of the 
area in West Pakistan is under these improved varieties 
producing 90 per cent of Pakistan's cotton production* 
These varieties of cotton are grown in well-defined zones 
north to south along the Indus Basin of West Pakistan. 
Approximately three million acres were under cotton 
cultivation in 1947, but the acreage has been increasing 
gradually over the years and in 1967-68 there were 4.3 
million acres under cotton cultivation in West Pakistan 
(3*7 million acres in 1964-65). In East Pakistan cotton 
is grown on the slopes in the Chittagong Hill Tracts 
(Approximately 35,000 acres) and is generally known as 
"Comilla Ootton”. area produces between 10 to 55000
bales of harsh short-staple cotton, ”The cotton is mainly 
used for mixing with wool and its acreage fluctuates 
widely because it depends on shifting cultivation 
(jburning) by primitive tribes,predominantly Buddhist.”11B
11B. Ahmad, K.S. Op. Cit* Page 96.
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As a result of improved qualities of cotton and 
increased consumption at home and abroad the production 
of cotton has increased considerably in the last few 
years. The average production from 1955-56 to 1959-60 was 
1.68 million bales (392 lbs* each bale) which increased 
to 2.92 million bales (4-50,000 tons) in 1966-67 and 2.92 
million bales ( 511*000 tons) in 1967-68* In 1952-53 the 
crop reached a peak of 1*8 million bales* The food 
shortages that emerged in 1953-54* led to an official 
discouragement of cotton growing in favour of summer 
grains. Because of the increase in cotton consumption at 
home, which resulted from industrial expansion in this 
sector, a campaign was launched to grow more cotton in 
1955-56 but it did not prove very effective* Yields 
remained stationary at 189 lbs from 1955 to 1960 and the 
failure of measures to increase the yield was ascribed to 
several factors. "Recurring weather difficulties insect 
damage and water shortages in the canals were held 
responsible in earlier years. Later, there was increasing 
recognition that the causes of stagnation lay deeper.
Low applications of irrigation waters, the accumulation of 
salts in soil, unreliable seeds, inadequate plant 
production and uneven cover of plants have combined to keep 
the yields low* Market incentives have also worked against 
cotton. Sugar-cane has proved profitable* encouraging the 
diversion from cotton not of land as such but of precious
12 mirrigation supplies and peasant energy.*1 * -to improve 
the cultivation, marketing and manufacture of cotton 
centres of research and technology have been established
12. Andrus, Mohammed, op cit. p. 29
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especially at Karachi and Lyallpur in West Pakistan* 
Egyptian cotton is being experimentally grown in Malir 
to Tatta acreas of Karachi*
At the time of the Partition in 194-7 the bulk of 
the cotton crop was exported and the industry was 
underdeveloped. This state of affairs was maintained 
during the first five years of independence. However, 
the need for development was realised and this sector of 
the industry was gradually being given importance.
The figures of 194-7 (29*7 million lbs* and 881 million 
yards of cloth) and those of 1967-68 (569*7 million lbs 
and 782*5 million yards of cloth )highlight rapid devel­
opment of the industry since the Sub-continent was 
divided in 194-7*
The fact that Pakistan emerged as an independent 
country with widely separated wings (East and West
political problems. In addition to social and economic
defence. Her physical separation underlines the need for 
welding the peoples of the two wings into a united whole, 
because without complete unity the security of Pakistan 
would always remain in jeopardy. The geography of Pakistan 
suggested her onerous responsibilities with regard to the 
defence of the frontiers in the northwest (of West 
Pakistan) and northeast (of East Pakistan). As the 
guardian of these frontiers Pakistan was obliged to 
undertake measures to strengthen her security and defence.
This has been a very heavy and expensive exercise,n### ^
anrl c o n s e q u e n t ly
lines and
transportation, haA complicated her socio-economic and
development, Pakistan faced a very heavy burden of
159
is not unusual to find defence expenditures constituting
more than one-half of revenue expenditures, although it
cannot hut he regarded as unfortunate that so much of a
poor country’s meagre tax revenues should he spent for
non-development purposes. In the earlier years, through
1953-54* substantial expenditures on defence were debited
to capital account; in 1952-5 there was peak spending of
Rs. 211*2 million in addition to Rs* 783*4- in the revenue
budget, for a total Rs* 994-* 5 million as against receipts
on revenue account of Rs. 1,334*5 million. Total defence
expenditures were at a level of Rs. 1,000 million in the
five years ending in 1962-63* •• ^he allocations to
defence in 1964-65 indicated a marked increase (Rs.1296.5
million) and the Indo-Fakistan hostilities of 1965 effected
14a further rise in the defence expenditure.
14AIn addition to the vast defence expenditures 
Pakistan had to spend a considerable amount on the 
development of her own shipping industry so as to enable 
her, to some extent, to maintain a link between the two 
parts* This was considered to be a matter of crucial 
importance because the sea link was the only direct link 
after India withdrew permission for Pakistani flights over 
her territory (the railway connection had already been 
suspended)•
13* Andrus, Mohammed, op cit* p* 218
14. These figures do not include American military aid.
14A* The events of 1974 and the aftermath have clearly 
demonstrated the overwhelming burdens of defence 
on the meagre economic resources*
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The Changing Pattern of Pakistanis International Trade.
International economic and political relations are 
very closely interrelated,,The volume of aid and trade closely 
approximates to the degree of political cordiality that exists 
between states.Both aid and trade have,at times,been used as the 
instruements of political pressure,for example,the ban on 
American military aid to Pakistan during the undeclared Indo- 
Pakistan war of 1965; the ban 011 American military supplies to 
both India and Pakistan during the Indo-Pakistan war over 
Bangladesh in-1971.Again the suspension of economic aid to 
Pakistan by the Aid. Pakistan Consortium during the East Pakistan 
crisis,and during and after the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971,is a 
case in point.
Since Pakistan is predominantly an agricultural 
country her main exports ( Figss39~55 ) consisted of primary 
products,though industrialisation provided considerable oppor- 
tunities for the export of manufactured goods,especially textiles 
The main imports ( Figs;., 39~*55 ) of Pakistan consisted of indus­
trial raw materials, food and live animals ,machinery and. trans­
port equipment,animal and vegetable oils etc,Pakistan generally 
has had an unfavourable balance of tra.de since 1947(Figs: 42,42A),
161
Foreign Trade
(in crore rupees)
Year
(July-June) Import Export Balance
1948-49 100.92 54.24 - 45.68
I949-5O 87.38 53.51 - 33.8
1950-51 116.71 134.25 + 17.54
1954-55 78.30 49.14 - 2 9.I6
1955-56 96.45 74.24 - 22.21
1959-60 I8O .57 76.31 -104.26
1960-61 217.32 54.02 -163.30
1961-62 223.62 54.29 -169.33
1962-63 280.01 99.81 -180.20
1963-64 298.16 107 .50 -190.66
1964-65 367.24 113.96 -253.28
1965-66 288.03 120.36 -167.67
1966-67 362.57 129.73 -232.84
1967-68 332.72 164.48 -168.28
1968-69 304.66 169-99 -134.67
1969-70 328.51 160.86 -167.65
1970-71 360.24 199.84 -I6O.4O
1971-72 349.53 337.14 - 12.39
1972-73 839-83 855.12 + 15.29
1973-74 (July—Max.) 875.10 627 .23 -247.87
Source: Statistical Division
Notes: (a) Data on sea-borne trade with India are included since
April 1948 beaa.use of the stand still Agreement up to 
March 1948, and land-borne trade since July 1, 1949*
(b) Data on exports to Afghanistan are included since July 
1949 whereas data on imports from Afghanistan are 
included from March 1951*
(c) Data on land-borne trade with Iran are included since 
July 1949.
(d) Data on exports do not include re-exports from 1959-80.
Table.2.4.
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Jute (lab.2.2. ) and cotton (Tab*2.3. ) formed
the basis of Pakistan*s exports (approximately 75 pe^ cent), 
though a relative decline in the importance of export of 
the raw jute and cotton was registered* During the period 
1%4/65 raw jute and cotton constituted 46 per cent of 
total export^ in 1967/68 these shared 59 P®r cent of total 
exports* Jute still occupied the traditional role in 
exports, but cotton exports have dwindled for a period, 
because of increased domestic consumption, and wide 
fluctuations in prices coupled with tough competition in 
the itforld market* Jute and cotton manufactured goods were 
promising exportss and textile manufactures increased from 
25 per cent in 1964/65 to 29 per cent in 1967/68* In spite 
of the Increase in the export of manufactured goods,Pakistan 
is still dependent upon a limited number of agricultural 
products, which are affected by weather conditions and 
their fluctuating prices: in the world market® In addition 
to these major exports Pakistan earned valuable foreign 
exchange by exporting, on a small scale, sports goods, 
carpets, rugs, oil cakes and tea*
The structural modifications in the economy of 
Pakistan necessitated substanial changes in the composition 
of her import trade ( 2,5,2.6. ! )« Ihe expansion of 
industry (Pig:24 ) relegated the importance of consumer
goods, and the import of machinery, raw materials, fuels 
and spare parts have taken precedence* Moreover, the fast 
growth of population and relatively slow rise in agricul­
tural production has compelled Pakistan to import food 
grains to meet the increasing requirements* In 1947/48 the
164
total imports were worth Rs.359*? million,and since then
there has been a steady trend towards rising imports which
1
amounted to Rs*5,374*? million in 1966/67*During the fiscal 
year 1965/66 Pakistan’s imports fell considerably because of 
the undeclared Indo-Pakistan war of 1965,tighter import restric­
tions and the temporary stop in the flow of the American economic 
assistance.The imports,however, in the financial year 1966/67 
recorded an increase of twenty three per cent which was basically 
necessitated by the increased import of food stuffs,coupled with 
the relaxations in the import policy*The imports fell by ten per 
cent in 1967/68 as compared with the previous financial year 
owing to’ the decreased import of food stuffs and the delay in 
the import of iron,steel and non-ferrous metals,caused by the 
pending negotiations of loans and credits*
Pakistan’s trade relations with other 
countries have been largely determined by the following 
considerations: i) The inherited, pre-partition trade relations,
1* All these figures have been taken from:
i)Palcistan Basic Pacts( 1965,66,67,68,69.)
ii) Statistical Pact Book,A U«S* A*I„B* Publication,Lahore, 
1966-67*
iii) Central Statistical Office(Pakistan)Bulletins, 
iv) Economic Report"Pakistan”Lloyds Bank Ltd,,London,1969*
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11) The source of foreign aid and the conditions thereof,
iii) The structural changes in the economy of Pakistan and 
the development of markets for the newly manufactured 
products, iv) The Commonwealth Preferences and v) The 
development of barter.trade.
At the time of partition in 1947* U.K. was the
X
main source of imports' (Tab,2.5,2.^and destination for 
Pakistani exports ( 2.5,2.6.0 (B.K® imported 17 cent 
of Pakistan's total exports in 1948 and 25 per cent of 
Pakistan's total imports for the same period originated 
in U.K.). The United Kingdom has maintained her top 
position as the chief importer of Pakistani exports,which 
amounted to Rs. . 396 millions in 1967/68, and the United 
States has been chief exporter (Tab.2.5,2.§ Pakistan,
p
and in 1967/68 she exported goods worth Rs. 14*36 millions 
to Pakistan. Pakistan has been diversifying her trade ever 
since it became aware of Bx’itain's interest in joining the 
European Oommon Market. The United Kingdom is still 
Pakistan’s main customer although the relative importance 
of the British market has diminished Pakistan's exports to 
U.K. constituted about 14 per cent of the total in 1963/64, 
but only 12 per cent in 1967/68. Pakistan has mounted 
export drives in the Afrasian and the communist countries. 
The increasing trade with the communist countries, whose 
trade is state controlled, prompted Pakistan in 1967 to 
set up the Trade Corporation of Pakistan. The commodities 
that the Trade Corporation of Pakistan is now importing 
include pig iron, rubber, sugar, betel nuts, aluminium
2. ibid* Oxford Economic Atlas of the World
Third Edition,O.U.P.1965.p.234
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ingots, copper rods and copper ingots * The Government 
of Pakistan intend to authorise the Q?*G aP« to import bulk 
commodities as the sole importer© Pakistan’s trade with 
U©S*S®R. and the Peoples Republic of Ghina provides a 
good example of the changing trends in Pakistan’s 
international trade ( Tab„2,5-3*1* Jn 1.960/61 Pakistan 
imported from the Soviet Union, goods worth Rs* 25 *025* 000, 
and her exports to the Soviet Union for the same period 
amounted to !te*14,201,000® In 1966/67 the imports from 
Russia totalled Rs* 179 millions, and the exports to that 
country for the same period amounted to Rs*13? millions©
Pakistan's trade with Ghina (Tab,2,5-3*1* ) has 
considerably increased over the years© In 1960/61 Pakistan v;/ 
imported goods worth Iis.15f4-63»'000:» from Ghina, and her 
exports to Ghina for the same period amounted to Rs*7^*784,0OQ, 
Pakistan in 1966/67 exported goods worth Rs.‘2£2 millions to
Ghina, and for. .the same p.erio.d imported-goods totalling
. . . .  /. . = / v - -I ' ' /*'•' 7"'"-X"V-V/
Rs,159 millions" from-r.China© The barter deals between ;
Pakistan and the Sino^Soviet block provd.de a very important
element in the ever increasing trade .relations.-of .-Pakistan
with the communist countries®
In percentage terms Pakistan’s imports from t
GhiOhina in 1959/63) amounted to 0.$ per cent,and exports for , 
the same period stood at 2.4 per cent (see figures; 48,49) *./• 
Por the period 1964/65 Pakistan’s exports to Ghina were U vy
7,5 per cent as against her imports from Ghina for the ■ . .
*1‘. -* . ')
same period/stood at 1*8 per cent, 1
iT i- Ibid
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Since religion formed the raison d ’etre of
Pakistan as an independent political entity,her leaders, in the
scheme of things,naturally sought closer links with the Muslim
countries of South East and West Asia.Pakistan’s trading and
commercial links,and her economic ties with these countries
have greatly heen improved and strengthened.Pakistan has set up
joint ministerial commissions with Iran,Turkey,Saudi Arabia,
United Arab Emirates,Abu Dhabi,Jordan,Kuwait and Libya,to carry
out joint projects on bilateral and multilateral b&ses in the
economic and industrial fields.^- This policy has been carried
out with added vigour since the secession of Bangladesh,and
Pakistan has
4.
Iran is setting up industrial complex in Baluchistan to meet 
the growing needs of the region,and this is bound to affect the s 
socio-economic and cultural life of thebpeople in the region,and 
/  s ik Si  a number of their genuine grievances would have been met,
Abu Dhabi,Kuwait and Dubai are giving economic assistance 
for the development of chemical and textile industries in 
the Punjab.
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"been very successful in finding new market for her products whi'crh 
were previously consumed in her former eastern wing.Pakistan has 
earned a considerable amount of .badly needed foreign'exchange as a 
result of the imperative redirection of her trading links which 
are very much inconformity with the changed geopolitical structure, 
and since 1971,substantially,a new pattern of her international 
trade seems to have emerged,1 Y/est Pakistan’s exports amounted to 
/ 419-8 million in 1970/71*Ah increase of 40*3 per cent was recor-. 
ded for 1971/72,and the exports were to the tune of / 590 million. 
This was made possible to some extent as a result of the diversion 
of exports which were previously earmarked for East Pakistan,and 
the bulk of this diversion had been effectively managed by June 
1972.The resultant increase of exports by 38*3 per cent to / 816 
million in 1972/73 were highly encouraging for the.economic growth; 
and the growth momentum seems to have been maintained,especially is 
in the exports sector..1
A recent statement from an official 
spokesman oS'" the'"'Economic Affairs ©ivision of the Government of 
Pakistan clearly 'established^the point that the oil rich states 
of West Asia have been more than generous in extending signifi­
cant economic assistance to Pakistan,and as such Pakistan,after 
all,survived the oil price rises far more easily than India or 
Bangladesh.Pakistan’s Islamic image was a very important contri­
butory factor in her relations with Saudi Arabia,Libya,Iran,Abu 
Dhabi,Qatar etc;and the large economic assistance that Pakistan 
received from these countries.
^  Syed,A,H. op cit* World Survey "Pakistan",p.8,
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According to the official spokesman ( as reported 
in Daily Jang,London,21-1-1976 ) the economic assistance covered - 
general purposes credits,as well as loans,for the implementation 
of priority development projects,and as such Pakistan had secured 
commitments of general purposes credits to the tune of 770 million 
dollars-Of this,Iran would contribute 150 million dollars during 
the next financial year i.e. 1976-77.The remaining 620 million 
dollars had already been received towards meeting the balance of 
payments needs of Pakistan.
The breakdown of these commitments was as followss 
Libya 80 million dollars;Abu Dhabi 100 million dollars;Qatar 10 
million dollars;Iran 580 million dollars.
Besides general purposes credits,Saudi Arabia, 
Libya,Iran and Abu Dhabi have further pledged a total of 391 
million dollars to finance Pakistan1s various projects through 
loans and equity participations.Out of this 84 million dollars 
had already been disbursed,and Pakistan expected further economic 
assistance from her rich friends of West Asia e.g.,Saudi Arabia 
has agreed to pay 30 million dollars towards the completion of 
the fertiliser plant at Mirpur,and Kuwait has pledged to finance 
the additional Tarbela-Karachi transmission line (500 KV/),to the 
tune of 44 million dollars.
The magnitude of economic assistance clearly 
reflected their confidence in Pakistan’s economic growth,planning 
and management.Moreover,Pakistan had taken concrete steps to 
stimulate exports to these countries,consonant with her endea­
vours to forge closer economic,social,cultural and political ties 
with the Muslim states of West Asia.
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PAKISTAN
IMPORT TRADE
VALUE OP PRINCIPAL IMPORTS (RUPEES MILLIONS) 
(FISCAL YEARS ENDING- ?OTH JUNES)
1970/71 1971/72 1972/73
WHEAT 63e2 269*8 1112*1
IRON AND STEEL 573*7 372*9 737*8
PETROLEUM AND 
PETROLEUM PRODUCTS 262.7 256*5 649*1
SUGAR AND HONEY 0*8 27*4 431*7
ROAD MOTOR VEHICLES 195«4 139*8 398*2
MANUFACTURED
FERTILISERS 117-6 52*8 389*9
TEA 11*3 160*5 536® 6
ANIMAL AND VEGETABLE
OILS AND FATS 181*9 130*8 329*7
TEXTILE AND LEATHERS
MACHINERY 142*8 198*8 214*7
ELECTRIC POWER 
MACHINERY 87*0 110.3 164*0
ELESTRSS 
MEDICINAL AND 
PHARAMACEUTICAL 
PRODUCTS 55*8 79*5 120*0
TOTAL5INCLUDING 
OTHERS® 3602*4 3495*4 8398*3
* FIGURES PRIOR TO DECEMBER 1971 REFER ONLY 
TO NEST PAKISTAN.
Table,, 2,7*
Scairces Lloyds Bank Ltd* " Pakistan n Economic 
Report,London,1974.
PSINCIPAL SOURCES OP IMPORTS (RUPEES MIDDIONS')
■ v , \ v' . & , $
1970/71 1971/72 1972/75
U.S.A. : 1029.6 728.8 2094.1
WEST GERMANl.. 405.8 344.0 • , 748.7
JAPAN 358.5 349.6 721.1
UNITED KINGDOM ,402.1 . 353.3 683.5
SAUDI ARABIA 3719 ' 92.0 . . 365.9
CHINA : 55.2 . 99.1 361.9
*Pigures/prior to December 1971 refer only 
to West Pakistan.
- 2?abli#2#8.
Scmrce'i LLoyds Bank Ltd* "Pakistan"
- ■„ Economic Report,London,1974*
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In 1970-71,the value of Pakistan's total exports to
the Middle Eastern countries were to the tune of 48,80 million
dollars,a mere 12 per- cent of her total exports. But in 1974-75
these figures had more than doubled since Pakistan's exports to
these countries were one quarter of her total exports,The trade
with Iran has been expanded in an enormous manner,for example,
in 1972-73 exports to Iran stood at $ 5,786,000 but in 1974-75
, ***
the exports had risen to $ 60,025,000,an unprecedented increase.
These figures more than vindicate the earlier contention $hat
the volume of aid and trade closely approximates to the degree
of political understanding and cordiality between states.
It is evident from the prceding argument that Pakistan's
international trade has &ad to be realigned to meet the exigence©
ies of the situation,and it responded to the new geopolitical
structure on the Sub-continent.Initially the trading links with
India were maintained but later on Pakistan had to reorientate
her economic and commercial activities in line with her changed
geopolitical interests.The first and foremost reorientation took
place in 1949,when Pakistan declined to devalue her currency in
line with the Indian devaluation in November 1949,and as such
Pakistan took effective measures to diversify her trade links.
The Korean War was. a God-sent gift for Pakistan since her surplus
of cereals and raw material was readily purchased,and Pakistan .
was fully compensated for the loss of traditional Indian market.
Moreover,Pakistan developed a comprehensive inter-provincial
trade on permanent lines which effectively diminished and neut-
ralised the importance of the Indian market.________________
*** All these figures have been taken from Daily Jang,London, 
21-1-1976.
*** Daily Jang,London,6-12-1975*
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Pakistan has begun to emerge from the deep crisis 
that engulfed it in 1971,and as a result of which the unity of 
the state was shattered;the severed wing,East Pakistan,comprised 
fifteen per cent of the total area of the state.The 1961 census, 
population of East and West Pakistan respectively was 50,800,000 
and 42,900,000.The common economy of the two parts of Pakistan, 
built up and progressively improved over a period of twenty-five 
years,was disrupted and the whole situation required totally a 
new look at the geographical set-up of what was left of the 
state,its resource base and distributable services.
The break-up of Pakistan in 1971,and the emergence of 
Bangladesh as an independent sovereign state brought in its fold 
a number of very serious problems for Pakistan,and doubts were 
cast at the very existance of Pakistan as an independent poli- ' 
tical entity.A number of important questions were asked with 
regard to the politico-economic viability of Pakistan after the 
loss of its eastern wing along with its massive jute earnings.
In addition,Pakistan lost a very substantial market for its 
manufactured goods which were said to be of very inferior quality 
as compared to the accepted international standards.
The advent of the Bhutto Regime in the last days of 1971, 
brought in its wake a number of far reaching socio-economic 
reforms in quick successions.The change,therefore,in the economic 
and socio-political context in 1972 led to the replacement of the 
Fourth Five Year Plan ( The Plan had already defaulted as a res­
ult of the East Pakistan crisis and the resultant emergence of 
Bangladesh as an independent state ),by a series of annual plans 
geared to extend a more flexible response to the urgent and 
pressing problems of the country.The state lay split,resources 
had shrunk,debts were high and the external economic assistance
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was in a state of suspension.Public sector had little investable 
capital and the private investment was very shy indeed.
The main objective,therefore,was to bring about a recovery 
of the battered economy in the shortest possible period. It 
aimed at revival and acceleration of production process based on 
the socio-economic reforms launched by the new Government in the 
first few months of 1972.The concerted effort to regain momentum 
of growth ainrlproduction and to inject a new life in the sagging 
economy was,however,met with obstacles by way of severe infla­
tionary pressures by the close of. 1972-73.This had a particu­
larly adverse effect on the countrys efforts to raise earnings 
through the expansion in her exports.
The task in 1973-74 was to strengthen the process and 
consolidate the measures adopted for economic recovery during
1972-73.The idea was to achieve a semblance of stability and to 
make the economy broad based,while initiating a strong anti- 
inflationary policy.The results achieved were encouraging in 
spite of the huge losses suffered due to the disastrous floods 
that ravaged the country in August 1973.
Some of the targets achieved were: wheat 8.5 million tons, 
rice 2.4 million tons,sugar cane 22.7 million tons and cotton 
3.7 million tons.
The economic progress,therefore,has to be examined in the 
light of the new problems that have emerged in Pakistan’s economy 
as a result of changing trends in the world price situation.The 
prices of the country’s major exports are no longer rising. As a 
matter of fact,a reversal of the earlier gains in prices of 
Pakistan's major exports began towards the latter part of
1973-74 in the midst of slackening demand from major trading 
partners.
On the other hand,Pakistan was required to bear a very
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heavy "burden arising from rising prices of major import items- 
the heaviest "being that of oil and oil products which directly 
raised the national energy "bill,and indirectly affected the 
cost of items which are influenced by petroleum prices as raw 
material or energy &n£ut.The balance of payments which had 
shown signs of favourable emergence,registered a sharp adverse 
swing.There were,as a result lesser resources for consumption 
and saving and far lesser opportunities of employment.
The current economic strategy is aimed at short term revive 
al of the national economy within the framework of distribu­
tional justice in a balanced setting,the Annual Plan 1974-75 
aims at initiating programmes and policies which would tackle 
longer term problems.lt also endeavours to coordinate the 
strategy of the annual plan with that of the more comprehensive 
Five Year Plan.
The major problem facing the economic development in Pakis­
tan is to overcome the impact of the world energy crisis and the 
resultant inflation.This demands not only an interim solution 
in the shape of efforts to maintain a viable balance of payments, 
mobilise higher domestic saving and obtain larger forein inflow, 
but also a strategy to strengthen the domestic economic base 
with particular emphasis on sectors where Pakistan's vulner­
ability has been exposed in the recent world developments.
The basic economic strategy,therefore,is primarily geared 
to augment agricultural production,develop domestic resources, 
reduce dependence on external assistance and provide increased 
benefits to the common man.
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It is quite clear ( from the preceding pages ) 
that Pakistan has managed to cope with the new geopolitical 
structure in spite of the overwhelming difficulties,es$eblially 
since the state was dismembered in 1971,and the direction of 
her socio-economic and political development M is a response to 
the^prophets of doom who were predicting the total demise of 
Pakistan after its eastern wing had been lopped off,and to those 
who castigated Pakistan for exploiting the riches of East 
Pakistan,and were suggesting that Pakistan with the loss of its 
" colony " could not survive economically as a viable state.’1
6.ibid.p.8.
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EXPORT TRADE
VALVE OF PRINCIPAL EXPORTS (RUPEES MILLIONS)
(FISCAL YEARS)
* *
1970/71 1971/72 1972/73
TEXTILE YARN AND 
THREAD 357*5 606© 5 1977*7
COTTON FABRICS 511*3 387*1 1247*1
WOVEN
9 « 9 «.*285*3 982*5 1199*7
COTTON RAW 
RICE 173*0 274*1 1136*1
LEATHER 107*0 173*5 544*9
FLOOR COVERINGS 
AND TAPESTORIES S6®7 109*8 282 0 4
FISH,FRESH AND 
PRESERVED® 52*9 96*8 192.5
ANIMAL FEEDING 
STUFFS® 15*2 15*2 148*1
RE-EXPORTS 112*4 51 *8 72*3
TOTAL,INCLUDING
OTHERS® 2110*8 3423*2 8625*5
* FIGURES PRIOR TO DECEMBER 1971 REFER ORLY TO 
WEST PAKISTAN®
Table,2,9,
Source: Lloyds Bank Ltd* 1 Pakistan " Economic 
Report,London,1974*
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DESTINATIONS OP EXPORTS (RUPEES MILLIONS)
1970/71 1971-72 1972=';
JAPAN 194.6 540*1 1562*1
HONG KONG 246 ©5 305® 2 961*0
INDONESIA 50.3 30*3 659 0 0
UNITED KINGDOM 188.3 259*3 630*2
ITALY 65® 5 125*3 434a 4
XT«S i* A 126*3 174*29 348*8
NEST GERMANY 61® 7 105.3 303*9
SINGAPORE 60*8 61 © 3 295*8
TJ.S.S.R. 162*0 133®S 222*6
SRI LANKA 37*9 65® 3 205*3
FIGURES PRIOR TO DECEMBER 1971 REFER 
ONLY TO WEST PAKISTAN*
Table.3.1.
Sources LLoyds Bank Ltd. "Pakistan" 
Economic Report,London,1974.
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CHAPTER 5.
Analysis of Each Problem of External 
Relationship.
Pakistan’s external relations have 
throughout been formulated on the basis of sovereign equality 
of states and non-interference in the internal affairs of other 
states.Since religion formed the raison d ’etre of Pakistan’s 
territoriality as an independent sovereign state,one of the 
cornerstones of Pakistan’s external relationship has been the 
development and further strengthening of the close political, 
social,economic and cultural bonds with the Muslim states of 
West Asia.Two of the Sixteen " Directive Principles of State 
Policy*1 as enunciated by the second report of the Basic prin­
ciples Committee ( presented on December 22,1952,by Khwaja 
Hazim-ud-Din,the Pakistan Prime Minister,to the Constituent 
Assembly ) embodied (a)**strengthening the bonds of unity between 
Muslim countries ” , and (b) 11 promotion of peace and goodwill 
among the peoples of the world
Since the establishment of Pakistan, 
however,there have been a number of external problems which have 
haunted this nascent state.The most significant of these are 
discussed below.
The Kashmir Dispute.
The Kashmir dispute is more specific 
locationally than the general attitude of India towards Pakistan, 
and it is complex in detail.lt is essential,therefore,to trace 
the history and geography of the dispute with great care.
l.The Basic Principles Committee' Report,Karachi, 1952.
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The State, of Jammu and Kashmir has an area 
of 84,571 square miles which is only slightly smaller 
in area than the U.K. According to the Census Report of 
1941, the population of the State was 4,021,616 i.e. 
four fifths of Lancashire. The following figures give a 
comparative percentage of the various communities in the 
State :
Hame of Province. Total Muslims Uon-Muslims
Population.
Jammu \ 1,981,433 1,213,676 765,757
Kashmir 1,728,705 1,615,478 113,227
Frontier Districts 311,478 270,095 41,385
These figures clearly indicate Muslim majorities in all 
three major divisions of the State though the Indians now 
claim a Clear cut non-Muslim majority in Jammu (According 
to the 1961 figures published in India, Muslims constitute 
38 percent and Hindus 59 percent of the population). This 
change can be explained first by the continuing emigration 
of Muslims to Pakistan and, secondly, by planned settlement 
of Hindus and Sikhs by the Indian authorities in order to 
strengthen their claims.
"The ..State occupies a strategic ppsition in
the extreme north-western corner of the Indian subcontinent.
Hot only does :it have common borders with India and
Pakistan, but also with the Chinese controlled regions of
Tibet and Sinkiang, and for a shorter stretch, with
Afghanistan as well.. Dess than fifty miles of unpopulated
mountains separates the extreme north-western tip of the
1State from the territory of the Soviet Union.n
1* Lamb, Alastair, Crisis in Kashmir: 1947-1966,
London, 1966, p. 17»
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The Kashmir. dispute seems to have been engendered, in 
the absence of a precise understanding among the dive 
devisers of the partition plan of 194?, in the Hindu 
obduracy which has failed to accept the "two nations 
theory" and in the Hindu "refusal to recognise the full 
implications of Pakistan". Had the Radcliffe Award been 
pronounced oh the majority/contiguous basis 
and had the District of Gurdaspur (A Muslim majority 
area) been transferred to Pakistan, the Kashmir dispute 
would have been nipped in the bud.
The partition of the subcontinent in 1947 ended
the British Paramountcy over the Princely States, which
were given the choice to accede either to Pakistan or
positive -.
India. The Maharaja of Kashmir failed to reach a/f 
decision to this effect though he signed a Standstill 
Agreement with ■Pakistan on 12-15 August, 1947, but no 
such agreement was exchanged with India. The massacre 
of. Muslims in the State and the District of Poonch by 
the Hindus and the Dogra Forces resulted in a popular 
uprising. The tribal Pathans from the North Western 
Frontiers of Pakistan entered the State on 24th and 25th 
October, 1947, with the hope of saving their brethern 
from genocide. On 25th October, 1947, Lord Mountbatten 
presided over a meeting of the Indian Defence Committee 
in which it was decided to send V.P. Menon to Srinagar 
to negotiate the accession of Kashmir to India. Menon 
flew back and forth, and during his second trip to the 
State capital, he; succeeded in obtaining the Instrument 
of Accession on 26th October, 1947, and on 27th October 
a:Sikh Battalion was flown into Srinagar; thms began the 
Indian occupation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
The entry of the Indian forces in spite of the
Instrument of Accession is difficult to justify since
the Standstill Agreement had entrusted the defence,
foreign affairs and communications to Pakistan* More
important still the letter accepting the Instrument of
Accession on behalf of the Indian Government clearly-
established the right of the people to self determine™
tion... in the case of any State where the issue of
accession has been the subject of dispute.... it is my
Government's wish that...the State's accession should
2be settled by a reference to the people."
Pandit Nehru emphasised the same point in a 
telegram sent to Liaquat *A1I Khan, the Prime Minister 
of Pakistan, on October 28th, 1947**. In regard to 
accession also it has been made clear that this is 
subject to reference, to people of State and their 
decision.• The promise was repeated in Nehru's 
radio broadcast of November 2, 194*7* "We have decided 
that the fate of Kashmir is ultimately to be decided 
by the people. That pledge we have given, and the 
Maharaja has supported it, not only to the people of 
Kashmir but to the world.,We will not, and cannot 
back out of it. We are prepared...to have a referendum 
held under international auspices like the United 
Nation..."4- These promises and pledges abundantly 
establish the interim nature of the Indian occupation
2.
3*
4-.
Lakhanpal, P.,.,Essential Documents and Notes 
on Kashmir Dispute, New Delhi, 1965? P*57
White Paper on Jammu and Kashmir,New Delhi 
194*8, p. 4*8. . ■: j j " '
Ibid., pp. 52-5.’ '
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of the State, and the right of its people to decide 
their future; ,±n a fair and free plebiscite. The Indian 
leaders committed themselves unequivocally to the 
right of the Kashmiris to self determination. This 
was further endorsed by the Security Council of the 
United Nations in a resolution passed on April 21st,
194-8. ..Noting; was satisfaction that both India and 
Pakistan desire that the question of the accession 
of Jammu'and Kashmir should be decided through the
* Y v- ; ’ 5
/democratic method of free and impartial plebiscite.,,y
Thefe:tis no .denying the fact that considerable , 
economic progress has been achieved in Pakistan and 
although the socio-economic problems facing Pakistan 
have scarcely been so vast and complex as those of 
India, it is perhaps not surprising that she should 
have sought to strengthen her position in the 1950s 
by securing economic assistance from the United States.
To India this seemed to threaten the delicate structure, 
of her version of non-alignment■which she was endeavour­
ing to build Jand as such her immediate, reaction was 
to wriggle out of her international commitment vis-a-viz; 
a fair and free: .plebiscite in Kashmir. Kashmir is of ? 
greater economic value to Pakistan than to India since 
much ^ f the irrigation of the Punjab and the Lower 
Indus Plains depends on the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab; 
the Pir Panjal foothills supplied much timber to the 
Punjab and there are, enormous resources of hydro­
electric power, (Mangla Dam & Tarbella Dam), anthracite,
i^ -iron- ore -marginal to, India's needs -"but perhaps 
sufficient' ito?4idake- -al 1 that difference to Pakistan's 
future industrial development. Ihe natural economic and 
geostratigic links' of'Kashmir are decidedly with Pakistan.
The Indus Waters
"(The Indus gave India its name. How it is to 
give India a large portion of the waters of its eastern 
trihutariesv This is provided for in the recent Indus, 
Waters Treaty which took twelve years to negotiate and 
will take ten years; to implement.- The^Indus Waters 
.Dispute onginated in the partition of the Punjab (Land of 
five rivers) in 1947v and quickly became critical when, 
on April 1, 19^8, the flow of canal water from East-Punjab 
(India) to West-Punjab (Pakistan) was Q>ut off.
\ \ 'I
The Indus.,Waters Treaty was signed on September • 
19, 1960, between Pakistan,, India and the World Bank. The 
treaty ■provided that the three western rivers the Indus, 
Jhelum and the Chenab were to be used oDlusively by 
Pakistan, and India was to be allowed their use only for 
-domestic, non-consumptive and agricultural purposes and 
for the generation .of hydro-electric power. India was given 
the exclusive right over the three eastern rivers the 
Ravi, the Beas and the Sutlej., Pakistan was authorised to 
use the eastern rivers for "domestic and non-consumptive" 
purposes. In addition Pakistan was given the right, for 
agricultural development, to use the waters of Basantar, 
Bein, Tarnah■and Ujh tributaries of the Ravi. Pakistan is
6 Mueenuddin, G*. Indus Waters Treaty,Lahore, 1960,p • 7
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authorized to withdraw from the Basantar' such waters 
as may he available and- necessary to irrigate not more 
than 100 acres annually...may also withdraw... for 
Sailab cultivation of as much area on each of the four 
tributaries Basantar, Bein, Tarnah and Ujh, as was 
cultivated on 1st April, 1960, and which cannot be so 
cultivated after that date, to maximum of 14,000 acres 
on Basantar, 26,600 acres on Bein, 1,800 acres on
f
Tarnah and 3,000 on Ujh annually. If, however, there are 
extraordinary floods during any year then Sailab 
cultivation may be extended beyond these limits. The 
treaty does not give Pakistan any rights to any releases 
by India in the tributaries of the Ravi or Sutlej
Both Pakistan and India agreed to cooperate 
in the effective implementation of the treaty and 
accepted their responsibilities in the setting up of 
"hydrological and meteorological observation stations 
within the drainage basins", and to give early warnings 
on the flood levels of the rivers. The two countries 
also agreed to set up a commission of experts to deal 
with any disputes; and further agreed to refer any 
such dispute to a "Heutral Expert" in case there was a 
difference of opinion between the two.
The Indus Waters Treaty was accompanied by 
bother agreements regarding the replacement works and 
the financial requirements. Although India was required 
under the financial arrangements to provide £62 millions,
7* Ibid., p.9.
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she was not allowed to participate in the decision-making 
that affected the replacement works, ( Figs;below )• 
treaty provided that.in case of request from Pakistan for
■ _ —  /-"I fi s ’ '
the extension ;pf the, interim period the Bank will pay the 
following money to India;
i) w One ‘ Year 
ii) Two Years 
iii) . Three Years
£5?125,000 
£6,406,250 
£9,850,0008
fhe IndusJBasin Development Pund Agreement was 
put into effect on October 1, 1960, and accordingly the 
signatories agreed to make the following contributions;
Grants Australia
Germany 
Ganada 
Hew Zealand 
, j { United Kingdom
Loans U.S.A.;
* ' * : L
.World Bank
6,965,000 Australian Pounds
126.000.000 Marks
22.100.000 Canadian Dollars 
1,000,000 Hew Zealand Pounds
20.860.000 Pounds Sterling
177.000.000 U.S.Dollars
70.000.000 U.S.Dollars
80.000.000 U.S.Dollars 5
Pakistan also agreed to make contributions in 
foreign currency £440,000) and, in Pakistani currency equal 
to £9,850,000. Ihe Indus Waters Ireaty provided broad terms 
for future: cooperation between Pakistan and India, and it 
was hoped that the tv/o countries would sincerely initiate 
concerned efforts=towards a peaceful settlement of their 
disputes, but the hope has yet to materialise.
8*
9.
ibid", p • 16 
ibid ;
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Junagadh and Hanavadar
The accession of Junagadh and Hanavada& to
Pakistan on September 5» 194-7 engendered further bitterness
betwen Pakistan and India, Junagadh was a small state on
the very tip of the Kathiawar peninsula. It had an area
of 3*337 square miles, and a population of approximately
670,000, and more than 80 per cent were Hindus. The state
was contiguous to Pakistan only by sea. a distance of
approximately 300 miles between Karachi and the state.
Legally speaking the ruler was right in taking his
decision to join Pakistan since it was fully in conformity
with the basic principles of the partition, but it was
very much a questionable decision since it clearly
violated the majority/contiguous bases and totally ignored
the interests of the majority. The Indians were equally
wrong to have forcefully occupied the state in violation
of the Instrument of Accession which had already been
exchanged between the State of Pakistan:" On November 1,
the enclaves of Babariawad and Hongrol were taken over by
Indian forces. Manavadar had already been occupied by India
some days earlier. On November ,,20,000 men with not a
viable country and when they have got what1s left we'll
10ensure that it can't be worked economically." Hindus 
preached for "Akhand Bharat" and the Congress had accepted 
partition in anguish and in:anger. They were frustrated in 
their designs of a united India and w#re shocked at having 
failed to rejuvenate the Haurayan or Ashoka Empire. They 
were bitterly disappointed at the non-fulfilment of their
10 Sir Erancis Tucker,While Memoray Serves,London, 
1930, p. 257.
dreams of being a great power of‘ the future: "The 
Pacific is likely to take the place of the Atlantic 
• in the future as a nerve centre of the world. Though 
not directly, a : Pacific state, India will inevitably 
exercise an important influence there. India will also 
develop as thp centre, of economic and political activity 
in the Indian Ocean area, in South East Asia and right 
. up to the Kiddle East. Her position gives an economic 
and strategic importance in a part of the world which is 
going to develop rapp^ly in the future...the small 
national state is doomed. It may survive as a culturally 
autonomous ;area but not as independent political unit.11
These principles seem to be entrenched in the 
foreign policy of India as an,independent state,especially, 
when one reviews her attitude towards smaller neighbouring 
states such as Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim. India seems to 
have nursed the same desighs regarding Pakistan and, 
therefore, has never hesitated totally to reject Pakistani 
policies, and it appears (from previous pages) as if the 
Congress had calculated to this effect immediately before 
the partition and no wonder that only 72 days were earmarked 
for the partition; " I agreed to partition as a last
• 1 , i- .■s ! -
resort, when we should have lost all...Mr. Jinnah did not
want a truncated Pakistan but he had to swallow it. I made
a further condition that in two months* time power should
12 -
be transferred." > Indians, from the beginning, had thought
of subordinating the policies of Pakistan especially in
foreign affairs: "The Commonwealth issue is looming large.
lY. Tfawahar Laf Nehru, The Discovery of India,Bombay,'
1961, pp. 569^70*
12. Quoted in Kewal L. Panjabi,The Indomitable Sardar,
Bombay, 1962, p. 124.
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There has been a fair indication of Patel's policy on 
this subject in the leading article of today's Hindustan 
Times. Ismay drew attention to the relevant extract, 
which runs as follows: If there is a settlement between
the Congress and the League as a result of which the 
Muslim majority areas are allowed to constitute them­
selves into separate sovereign States, we have no doubt 
that Union will not stand in the way of British 
establishing contact with those States. It must be clearly 
understood, however, that the Indian Union will consider 
it a hostile act if there is any attempt by Britain to 
conclude any treaty or alliance involving military or 
political clauses."^ These words clearly indicate that 
the Hindu leadership was bent upon treating Pakistan as 
the secessionist part of "Mother India" which must be 
treated as the Indiansphere of influence. India prided 
herself as the only successor to the British Crown in 
India and has tried hard to realise this claim. Foreign 
observers noted this element of the Indian foreign policy 
at the time of the acceptance of the U.S. military aid by 
Pakistan in 1954- "Every conceivable argument against the 
offer and Pakistan's acceptance of it was adduced, every 
device of organized propandanda applied...But what it all 
amounted to, and at the higher levels of the Indian Foreign 
Office it,can hardly have remained subconscious, was that, 
in the average Hindu heart even now, years after mutually- 
accepted partition, Pakistan as an, independent state had 
no real right to exist; she must not devise a foreign
13« Campbell-Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten,p.72*
I U  2_.
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policy of her own; her destiny was o be an Indian
s\ h
satellite."
The former president of Pakistan has stated 
similar views in his autobiography while discussing the 
essential features of the Indian foreign policy "At the 
back of it all was India’s ambition to absorb Pakistan 
or turn her into a satellite." This is further 
vindicated by India’s ready acceptance of the U.S. and 
Commonwealth military aid (including an "air umbrella") 
in 1962, when she suffered setback in the disputed 
McMahon Line. India was not ashamed to have accepted to 
graciously, the very aid for which she had so ruthlessly 
criticised Pakistan on the pretext that Pakistan had 
brought the cold war and tension in the area. The irony 
of it was that India;had entered into a "Mutual Defence 
Assistance Agreement" with.U.S.A. in 1951- The agreement 
was reached through an exchange of letters between 
Mr. James E. Webb, the Acting'Secretary of State, and 
Mrs. Vijay Lakshmi Pandit, the Indian Ambassador in 
Washington. On March 7? 19519 Mr. Webb wrote "The 
Government of the United States of America understands 
that the Government of India is prepared....to participate 
effectively in arrangements for individual and collective 
self-defence.. .to participate in the defence of the areq. 
of which it is a part, and that it will not undertake any 
act of aggression against any5other s t a t e . T o  this 
Mrs. Pandit replied: " I have,;the honour to inform you
14. Ian Stephens, Pakistan, Aylesbury,1964,pp.267-268
15* United States Treaties and other International
Agreements, Department of State, Washington D.G.
Vol. 2. Part I, 1951» P* 872*
that the- Government of India are in agreement with the
' ‘ • ft ' ' 16
terms, conditions and assurances proposed." Pakistan
entered into the mutual assistance agreement openly,
India satisfied her wishes in a more subtle manner to
further shroud her posture of non-alignment. It would
not be,wrong to suggest here that India took the
initiative in stirring up the. trouble with the Chinese,
"General' Maxwell D. Taylor, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, indicated in a  s e c r e t  Congressional
testimony made public, here today that India might have
17
started the* border fight with Communist China." (
: ■ \ «17A
t. The: Nehru move against the Chinese .in 1962 was
calculated to secure massive military and economic
assistance from all sides; and as a result India reaped a
rich harvest in the shape of western military aid of which .
the emergency aid. alone is reported to have amounted to . Vi.
approximately $.120 millions. But Nehru also succeeded in
creating bigger , gulfs between his countrymen and the
Chinese who had once been acclaimed as brothers (The
Indian slogan: Hlhdi-Ohini Bhai Bhai). In essence his
China, policy failed him and his non-aligned posture,
which had already been described as "alighment with both ii
the super-blocks" and "immoral". G.W. Chaudhury has given -I
a good analysis of Nehru1s ambition In South Asia: "Nehruw
seemed to be sensitive to anything in South Asia of which
he was hot the;,architect. India wants to establish a
1A * ' ' '"'- V '
"sphere ;of;influence" in South Asia." For achieving his •
16. Ibid." p. 874 ' ' ' T* si
17* New .York Times, 16-12-1962.
18. f Chaudhury, G.W. Pakistan Relations with India, ;
London, 1968, p. 4. '/ .
17A. Itswould not be out of,place to suggest here that the ,
;IndiansIwere confident at the time that the Chinese would' i
not retaliate-;; In ’an overwhelming fashion to counter the Indian 
moves in the- Area, . ■
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ambitions to be the inspired and undisputed leader of 
South Asia. Nehru had set his eyes on Pakistan with a 
view either to total reannexation or to reincorporation 
in an Indian dominated confederal structure. "As late as 196$ 
Nehru regarded Pakistan as an area which should be
19reincorporated into an Indian dominated confederation."
In spite of the Indian Foreign Office declaration
’ 1 ' ' A.
that "Pakistan'has come to stay as, viable political and
20  ^economic entity," it is very difficult to envisage a
real change of heart on the part of Hindus and the Indian
hierarchy. Thejvformer president Ayub of Pakistan has
explained the Indian concept of "Akhand Bharat" and
"Bharat Varsha" in the following lines; "The Indian
theoreticians were claiming boundaries from the Oxus
to the Mekong...India was not content with her present
sphere of influence and she knew Pakistan had the will...
to frustrate her....designs. She wanted to browbeat us
into subservience^ All we wanted was to live as equal and
Ms
honourable neighbours, but to that India would never agree.
It was Brahmin.arrogance that forced us to seek a homeland 
of our own where we could order our life according to our 
own thinking and faith...There was the fundamental opposi­
tion between the ideologies of India and Pakistan. The 
whole Indian society was based on class distinction in which
even the shadow of a low-caste man was enough to pollute a
21member of the high caste."
19. Tager, M.ilC. uuiitA f H a
20. The Pakistan Times,Lahore, 27-8-1967* n \
21. Ayub, P.riends not masters, p. 172. ivo.j -
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The Pukhtunistan Issue
In 194*7? when Pakistan succeeded to the 
international-rights and obligations of the Grown in 
India9 she naturally assumed the legality and establi­
shed validity Qf. the Durand Line* But Afghanistan 
considered it an opportune moment to question the 
established frontiers because it was their view that 
Pakistan as a newly emergent state did not automatically 
succeed to the rights of the Grown in India since these, 
the Afghans believed, had lapsed with the transfer of 
powers on August. 15, 194-7* In the wake of her claims 
Afghanistan voted against the admission of Pakistan to 
the United Nations, thus casting the only negative vote*
At the same time the Afghan government demanded.
the creation of Pukhtunistan (Land of the Pathans). The
Pakistan government rejected the idea and pledged to defend
her territorial integrity* She has been fully supported
by the U.E.:and the overwhelming majority of other
countries* Hr* Noel-Baker, the British Secretary of State
for Commonwealth Relations, on dune 30, 194-9 stated: "It
is His Majesty's Government Vs view that Pakistan is in
international law the inheritor of the rights and duties
of the old Government of India*••in these territories,and
22that Durand Line is the international frontier." This 
view was further affirmed by the British Prime Minister on 
March 1, 1950, "In 194-7, Pakistan came into existence as a 
new, sovereign, independent member of the Gommonwealth.
Her Majesty's Government regard her as having, with the full
22* Parliamentary Papersp Commons«194-8-49 Vol.4-66,
p. 14-91-92.
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consent of the overwhelming majority of the Pushtu 
speaking peoples concerned...succeeded to the exercise 
of the powers formerly exercised by the Crown in India 
on the Horth-West, Frontier of the subcontinent® Her 
Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom fully 
support the Government of^Pakistan in maintaining 
their sovereignty over the areas east of the Durand 
Line and in regarding this Line as the international 
frontier with Afghanistan..•
. Phe;validity of the Pakistani claim has also 
been upheld by the S.E.A.P.O. members: "Phe members of 
the Council severally declared that their Governments 
recognised that the sovereignty of Pakistan extends up 
to the Durand Line, the international boundary between
Oh
Pakistan and Afghanistan.” •
H  It
: . HJKHTUNISgAN Fig:28
From the Pakistani point of view the successive 
Afghan governments, have tried at times, to elicit support 
in Baluchistan and North West Frontier Province. Some 
elements in these provinces, who are at odds with Pakistan 
and sympathize with the Afghan claims, clearly draw their 
support from without and as such hope that these two
; ' I ' '
provinces might secede from Pakistan. It is an indication, 
not of the weakness of the scheme, but of the incoherence 
and inconsistency of their case, and that there is no 
viable single definition or definite approach to explain 
7 the extent hr validity of their claim. Some speak of
Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 1999-56,
, Vol. 549, p. 1367.
ICeesings Contemporary Archives, Bristol,
; 1956, p. 14840A
. 23.
V  24.
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^Greater Baluchistan" and others of "Pukhtunistan" and* 
except - in rare cases* they have avoided defining the
F ' :/ '
territories of "Pukhtunistan". It has been defined at 
various times, as a state stretching from Jhelum to the 
oxus, Margalla to the Oxus, N.W.F.P. renamed "Pukhtunistan" 
within Pakistan, a new country comprising both N.W.F.P. and 
Baluchistan, or a greater Afghan state going upto the 
Arabian Sea with the Indus as its eastern border,
"Pustoonistan", an illdefined area which would seem to 
include the Pakistani provinces of the North West Fronter 
(NWPP) and Baluchistan. Afghanistan, with some help from 
dissident Pushtoon tribemen and leaders, argued that this 
vast territory should not form part of Pakistan..• it 
should be recdgnized as the national territory of the 
Pushtoons••.While the Afghans are still unclear on the 
details, the proposedPushtoonistan would in some way be 
united with Afghanistan. This would mean that the new y: v
expanded Afghanistan would have not only a solid Pushtoon 
majority to match her Pushtoon ruling class but also 
direct access .'to the sea (via non«Pushtoon Baluchistan) 
instead of depending on Pakistani (or Soviet) facilities."^ 
To the most vociferous group "Greater Baluchistan" means 
the incorporation of Pakistani Baluchistan, the Jacobabad 
Kashmore areas of Sind, the Dera Ghazi Khan area of the 
Pakistani Punjab, a slice of NWPP, and all of 
Baluchistan*s Pathan majority areas in pockets 
adjoining NWPP. The territory demanded from Pakistan 
constitutes. 3ess than half the area claimed on the map.
25. The World Today, London, January 1974? pp.26-27*
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The remaining area would draw the Afghan territory of
Parah and parts of Helmand Yalley and good part of Iran,
especially the entire length and breadth of Iranian
Baluchistan. Its western boundary would run from Lingeh
on the Gulf ecfet of Turkemenistan (U.S.S.R*) covering
Kerman, Zarind, and Turbat-i-Haideri, and its southern
extremites would encompass approximately a thousand
miles from Lingeh dong the Gulf Coast to to Sonmiani
near Karachi, Pakistan. As stated earlier there is no
precise territorial definition of "Pukhtunistann and
no coherent lines of demarcation. A postage stamp issued
by the Afghanistan Government shows this map covering
the territory of Baluchistan, blotting out its name and
26calling the whole area "Pukhtunistan.1
These inconsistencies do not end with territory.
They extend to arguments, supposedly on ethnic grounds,
advanced in favour of the claims made by Afghanistan on
Pakistan territories. While Mr. Abdul Wali Khan, the
leader of the National Awami Party and his colleagues
vehemently support the idea of four nationalities, the
father of Mr. Abdul Wali Khan (Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan)
has advocated very interesting ideas. Khan Abdul Ghaffar
Khan in his "Pukhtunistan Day" speech in 1967 and in his
autobiography written for him by Mr. Kanwar Bhan Norang,
has stated that all Tajiks, Hazaras, Turkmen, Uzbeks,
haluchis and Pathans, whether they speak Pushto or not,
should in effect forget their separate identities and
call themselves Pukhtuns, living in a state extending
from Amu Darya (OXUS RIYER), to the West as far as Herat^
26. Government of Pakistan,White Paper on Baluchistan.
27° Government of Pakistan,White Paper on Baluchistan.
Major Ethno-Linguistic Groups in the Northern Tier
G-ro up Af ghani s t an
1°
Punjabis
Persians ;1 
Pushtoons 41
Sindhis
Azeris
Urdu Speakers 
Tajiks 22.
2
12.5
9
8
Baluchis 
Hazaras
Uzbeks 
Turkoman
Kurds
Brauhi 
Arabs
Kirghiz _____
To talT Mi ill ons J 16'
0.7
Iran Paki stan
i* f
63.1
66.9
20. 6
2.3
1.7
5.6
2,0
13.1
11.9
7.2
2.4
0.9
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Comment
55
Total 
(millions)
36.6 Educated speakers 
use Urdu
16.6 Shia Muslims.
7.6 Dominant in Afgha­
nis tan s tribal
6,9 Most educated 
use Urdu
5.2 Also in Azerbai’
dzhan,U«S„S,R.
4.2 Official langua
ge of Pakistan
3.5 Linguistically
close to Persian,' 
Sunni,
2.3 Mainly tribal .
2,0 Shia-Persian-
diale ct,Mongolian
1.8 Tribal.Uzbek 3 A
1.4 Tr i bal, Turkmen.-
S c? *D
o  O  #  X L  e
1.3 Tribal.Iraq, 
Syria,Turkey.
0.6 Tribal.Baluch.
0,5 Khuzistan,
0.3 Tribal.Kirghizia,
2.5
Sources Stephen 0ren,The World Today,January 1974?p.2.7,
Table.3*2.
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and to the south as far the Jhelum River® Surprising, 
enough, whereas Ghaffar Khan advocates unityamongst 
different nationalities inhabiting different territories, 
he openly supports the concept of four nationalities 
as advocated by Khan Wali Khan and their right to self- 
determination. (This is construed by the Government of 
Pakistan as preaching secession of W F P  and Baluchistan 
from the federation of Pakistan. The Government, of 
Pakistan believed that Afghanistan with the help Of 
dissidents in M/PP. and Baluchistan was sowing the seeds
% . ‘V* ^
of secession over a wider area and endeavoured to '
attract support and sympathy for secessionists in the 
areas, hoping that the process might engender a process 
of simultaneous secessions and the eventual dismemberment 
of Pakistan. The strategy seemed to have been geared, 
according to. the Pakistani point of view, toxsrards 
concurrent and not consecutive action, so as to establish 
the fall of "dominos” at once rather than in broken 
successions, "Kabul’s position has never been clearly 
stated-, but it :appearsdto be a straightforward 
irrendentist claim tosthe Pathan-inhabited areas of the 
North West Frontier Province and Saluchistan though 
usually cloa&ed in the more respectable guise of a
u
plea for "self"determination for the Pathans.... India 
has not publicly supported Kabul1s position on Pakhtunistan­
as the Pathan .areas of Pakistan are sometimes called -but
Delhi has made it abundantly clear that its sympathies
28lie with Afghanistan."
28. The Times, London, May $ 1974-*
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1 Pukhtuni stan1 Tlae covert Iraq i Involvement 0
It is desirable to observe here that the
Embassy of Iraq played a very undiplomatic role in
Pakistan when large stores of arms were discovered
in Islamabad after the Pakistani authorities had
forced their way into the Embassy “The Pakistan
Government has accused Iraq of being party to an anti-
Pakistan conspiracy following the recovery yesterday
of large stocks of arms and ammunition, mostly of
Soviet origin, from the Iraq Chancellery here. The
Iraq Ambassador, Mr. Hikmat Suleiman, has been
declared persona non grata and the Pakistan Ambassador
in Baghdad has been recalled...What was described as
a veritable arsenal was discovered in the Iraq Embassy.
It included 300 submachine guns and carbines, 40,000
rounds of ammunition, 40 incendiary bombs and equipment
pq
for training in guerilla warfare.w ' According to the
Pakistani point of view the arms were destined for
Baluchistan where dissident tribes were engaged in
sabotage and as such ,f...arms and ammunition imported
by the Iraq Embassy under diplomatic cover were meant
for distribution among elements "within and outside"
Pakistan who sought to subvert the security and
tranquility of the country....The authorities hare have
been concerned for some time about the Iraq-based
movement for Free Baluchistan which, according to
informed sources, sought to establish an independent
state comprising the adjoining Baluchi-inhabited areas
30of Pakistan and Iran."^ A careful analysis would reveal 
that the point of view as propounded by Pakistan should
30. Ihe limes, February 12, 1973®
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only be taken as half-truth, ^here is no denying the 
fact that some of the arms were definitely meant for 
Pakistani Baluchistan but the rest were destined for 
the Iranian Baluchistan, especially the areas of Sistan, 
Kuhiri, Konarak and Ohah Bafcar ( a sprawling military/
naval base), This would seem to be in line with the
were
Iraqi thinking whc/t&^^^gfc^^&moyed with the Iranian
attitude towards the Kurdish problems, and Iraq
openly accused Iran of giving large scale arms and
sanctuary to the Kurdish insorgpnts• The Iraqi arms
were meant to support the idea of “Greater Baluchistan"
and were especially meant to subvert peace and security
in Iranian Baluchistan that naturally involved Pakistan*
This line of thinking is partly shared by the Economists
"The smuggled arms might have been meant to end upon
the hands of guerillas not in Pakistan but in the Arab
emirates of the Gulf, or in Iranian Baluchistan. The
Iraqis have undoubtedly been striving to foment revolution
in the emirates and to make as much trouble as they can
for the Shah. They have financed, and provided guerilla
training and an office in Baghdad for, a Baluchi
31“liberation movement“ in Iran."
The Economist, February 17, 1973
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The hope of Afghanistan succeeding in her designs 
were influenced by Indian propanganda suggesting that 
Pakistan® 8,'life as an independent state was likely to he 
short® The Afghan rulers were convinced that Pakistan was 
a weak state, which could hardly survive the socio­
economic and political strains of the immediate future* 
Therefore, they advanced their claims with the hope of 
reaping a rich harvest after the demise of Pakistan. The 
Afghan government laid claims for an integral part of 
Pakistan,where people had declared their allegiance, in 
overwhelming majority* to the newly born state in a free 
and democratic manner: 11 On 15th August, 194-7? after a 
plebiscite, the Frontier Province, with every sign of 
enthusiasm, bacame a part of Pakistan. And in November 
of the same year this lead was followed by all the tribes 
upto Durand Line (Figs: 3,4. ) and the Chiefs of the Four
Frontier States of Dir, Swat, Chitral and Amb, the former 
, signifying,.their loyalty in open jirgas, the latter by 
means of Instruments of Accession.
Pakistan*s relations with Afghanistan have not 
followed the fiaternal patterns which should have been 
kexpected between the two Muslim neighbours. In fact these 
have been blurred and confused because of the Afghan 
attitude and the outside interference. In December 1955? 
the Soviet Union entered the scene openly by sympathising 
with the Afghan claims of Pakistan’s territory and the 
Pukhtunistan issue, Marshal Bulganin declared: ".*«* We 
think the demands of Afghanistan to give the population 
of Pushtunistan an opportunity of freely expressing their
32* Caroe, Olaf, The Pathans, London, 1965? p. 4-35•
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will are justified and well grounded.11 This statement 
apparently indicated the Soviet displeasure at the 
Pakistani membership of the U.S. sponsored military pacts. 
Again in March 1960, the Soviet Union repeated her support 
of the Afghan claims on Pakistan territory. The Government 
and people of Pakistan resented the Russian interference 
in the internal affairs and declared in unequivocal terms 
the inmoability of the territories of Pakistan. The 
Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Manzoor Qadir, stated 
that it was "regrettable that the Soviet Union deemed it 
fit to interfere in this country1s internal affairs."^
He further challenged the validity of the Pukhtunistan 
issue and invited Afghanistan to hold referendum on her 
side of the Durand Line, "It is reasonable to assume that 
Pakhtoons (Pathans) whether they live in Pakistan oi? 
Afghanistan, wknt to be together and under the same flag. 
That flag can be either the flag of Pakistan or of 
Afghanistan*...Since a referendum has already been held 
among the Pakhtoons of Pakistan, who by overwhelming 
majority decided to be in Pakistan, it is only logical 
that we should now ask the Pakhtoons in Afghanistan what 
their wishes are,.,"^ The Afghans have yet to accept 
this invitation®
The Russians had hopjk of gaining concessions in 
the area which had become an American sphere of influence 
after the British withdrawl. But the immediate reason for 
the Soviet support in 1960$ of the Afghan claim, was the
33. Ibid,., p. 14654
34. Ibid, , p.; 17323
33« Ibid*. p. 17321*
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shooting down of the American spy plane U2 over Sverdlovsk, 
about 1100 miles inside the Russian territory® The plane 
had apparently flown from Peshawar in the noi'th west of 
West Pakistan, and was said to have landing facilities®
(One cannot but strongly disagi’ee with the policy of the 
then government of Pakistan who had allowed the flight®)
It may not be wrong to suggest that the Russians had no 
other immediate objectives in,the region where they must 
seek peace in their long range interests® This point is 
clearly vindicated by the policy which is being pursued 
by the present Russian leaders who have endeavoured to 
placate the parties in the area. The Tashkent Agreement 
signed byetween Pakistan and India on January 10, 1966, under 
the aegis of the, Soviet Union is a case in point. The 
recent plans,of organising some kind of collective security 
as propounded by Hr. Brezhnev is another very important 
element in the geopolitical developments of the region, and 
a pointer to the vested interests of the Soviet Union.
The attitude of the successive Afghan governments 
has caused innumerable hardships to the people of this 
landlocked country, and has at - times, jeopardized
the peace and tranquility of the region. The various 
unfriendly moves„, of Afghanistan eventually resulted in 
tou<jh Pakistani retaliation in the Bajaur area ( Fig:3,4. ) 
of the North Western Frontier after the Afghans had 
committed repeated'raids. Pakistan also closed the 
Torkham border, thus denying the Afghans access to their 
traditional and most natural transit route, which had been 
extensively used., In fact as much as 80 per cent of the 
Afghan trade ( Ffgssbelow) relied upon this route.
Table.3.3.
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Sources Lloyds Ban]?: Ltd* " Afghanistan ” Economic
KeportyLondon*1972°
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The relations between the two countries were 
normalised as a result of the efforts of Mohammad Reza 
Behaiavi, the Shahinshah of Persia, The Torkham route 
was reopened on July 20, 1963? and the Afghan trade was 
allowed to operate once again, Portunately for both the
■ i t r 
• 5U
countries the relations were considerably improved after
the exift of Prime Minister Daud Khan? a cousin of the
King, from the Afghan scene, A transit trade agreement
was signed on March 9? 19^4, and since then relations
tended to be quite cordian in spite of occasional qualms
in Afghanistan, which merely reflected the internal
situation of that country.
The ReasSertion of the1 Afghan Claim.
The couprd -etat in Afghanistan and the 
installation of the Baud Regime in Afghanistan has made 
things very difficult for Pakistan? especially since 
Prod.dent DaUd singled out Pakistan as the only country
with whom Afghanistan had territorial dispute. To this
i -'
effect the Afghan Government has been sympathetic towards 
the dissident groups in Baluchistan and NWPP, in an 
effort to influence Pakistani domestic policies in these 
provinces with the hope that the National Awami Party 
supported by the Jameet-Ulema-e-Islam headed by Mufti 
Mahmood would be|encouraged to seek more militant solution 
to the political problems in NWPP and Baluchistan and as 
such force the hand of Pakistan, Pakistan’s reaction to - 
such soliciting,from Afghanistan has been moderate to say 
the-1 east, but the situation might get out of hand if 
Afghanistan did.not stop in supporting the dissdents in 
Baluchistan and NWPP, Pakistan does not necessarily have 
to take military action? because of her economic
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preponderance over Afghanistan, a landlocked country, 
whose 80 per cent of the trade is conducted through 
Karachi. Pakistan has and would, if need be, take 
economic measures against Afghanistan and deny her 
access to Karachi, which according to the latest
agreement would be considered aggression against 
Afghanistana
The importance of the north-western entry 
where the mountain core of Asia narrows to approximately 
250 miles between Oxus and Indus and the Hindu Kush 
has practicable passes through which both the religions 
zealots and soldiers have travelled,, However, the 
first Muslim landing on the subcontinent was in the 
Mekran Coast when Mohammad Bin Qasim landed in Bind in 
?i1» Although during this day and age the Chinese 
domination of d?ibet has revitalized a long - dormant 
frontier, the Northwest remains the major geostrategic 
area which would increasingly be under pressure from 
the interested parties« "She Frontier" of the old Indian 
Empire was simply on the northwest and more specifically 
with Afghanistan; all of this has been inherited by 
Pakistan® !Phe boundary with Iran has posed no problems, 
but an extension of Soviet influence into the earstwhile 
British/U,S# sphere of influence in Southern Iran would 
pose serious problems, especially if andwhen the Soviet 
Union embarked upon a policy to project and demonstrate 
her interests as a "continental and oceanic Superpower"* 
Pakistani Baluchistan marches along Southern Afghanistan
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and Southern Iran in open to tribal movement across the 
border and as such open to subversion; and an effective 
control of the Quetta-Peshawar-Kabul-Kandahar quadri­
lateral could only be effected by one single political 
administration, and therefore, an open temptation to 
the parties concerned* This frontier is, therefore, very 
much alive and a potential zone of hostility*
Financial hardships and the preoccupation with 
the Indian and Kashmir borders have in a sense added to 
Pakistan's difficulties in dealing with the thorny and 
complex problems of this region, especially in Baluchistan. 
But a concerted effort is being made to develop the socio­
economic potentials of this area, and the discovery of 
iron ore and copper deposits has further stx^engthened 
the possibilities of greater economic activity in the 
region® The Government of Pakistan is actively working 
to extend the supply of Sui Gas for domestic and economic 
use in Baluchistan which had been denied to the province. 
Moreover, efforts have been made to supply fresh water in 
the area and as such another requirement of the province 
seems to have been provided for. The dismantling of the 
Sardari Nizam in the area would go a long way in alleviating 
the socio-economic plight of the people in Baluchistan and 
substantially reduce the international fettds and rivalries 
which is symptomatic to the basic ills of the province* The 
'Pakistan economic cooperation is bound to strengthen the 
economic fibre of the region andlas such gradually eliminate 
poverty and backward looking socio-economic structure.
The Pukhtunistan issue backed by Afghanistan, 
the Soviet-American rivalry and the intertibal fettids in the
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region may very well play into the hands of the Soviet 
Union, who would hesitate very little in capitalising the 
situation to her advantage, and embark on adventurous move 
in this geostrategic borderland in her quest for the 
warm waters of the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean®
Pakistan's Indian Ocean interests are less direct and 
tangible: although she has important trading links with 
South-West Asia. Islamic ideology and economic ties are 
the real bond*
Pakistan and the Arabs.
The Arab countries have generally been sympathetic 
and friendly towards Pakistan, and her relations with Saudi 
Arabia and Jordan have been particularly good. Pakistan has al­
ways supported the Arabs especially with regard to Palestine. 
However these relations have been clouded and marred since 
Pakistan joined the Baghdad Pact on September 2$, 1955?
because the Arab countries especially Egypt considered the
o
Pact contrary to their interests, "Egypt was oppjsed to 
joining military alliances sponsored by the west which were 
contrary to her interests, and was pursuing a policy of 
neutrality between world blocks ...what was good for Pakistan 
was not necessarily good for Egypt, and that both countries 
had their own problems which necessitated a different 
approach to various p r o b l e m s . T h e  Arabs criticised the 
Baghdad Pact as a "western stooge" designed to disrupt and 
divide the Arab World® These fears may not have been totally 
unfounded since Pakistan's attitude, as a member of the Pact, 
during the Suez Crisis in 1956, was confused and illogical; 
and it would not be wrong to suggest that considerable damage r
56* Keesings Contemporary Archives, Bristol, 1956,
p® 14160
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was done to Pakistan's image in the Arab World by the
statement of her Prime Minister, Mr* Suhrawardy, on 23rd
November, 1956* "The Suez Canal must be cleared as soon
as possible and the U*N* must see to it that all
hindrances and obstructions are removed* We are beginning
to feel the results of its closure, and our economy will
be seriously disturbed if the Ganal is not cleared soon®
Our entire economic policy may well have to be reorientated
to meet the situation® Indeed, there are many countries
who, with us, wonder what requirements of military strategy
or tactics necessitated the sinking of so many ships in the
Canal* thereby adversely affecting the lifeline of so many
countries who depend upon it for their trade and their
37essential supplies. President Nasser viewed this as anti- 
%ypt and anti Arab, and rejected Pakistan's earlier offer 
of a contingent for the United Nations Emergency Forces*
The Arabs were led to belive that Pakistan could 
not be a genuine friend of the Arabs so long as she remained 
a partner of both Britain and Prance, who had committed 
aggression against Egypt in collusion with Israel. Pakistan 
managed to salvage some of her lost prestige when Turkey 
announced on November 29, 1956, that the had recalled her 
minister Mr. Istinyeli from Israel "Until the Palestine 
question has been finally settled with justice. This move 
was reported to have been successfully Initiated by Pakistan 
intended to recover her own position and to strengthen the 
Baghdad Pact*
37* Ibid., p. 15231
38. Ibid.
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On July 14, 1958? the military coup led by 
General Abdul Karim Qassem ousted Premier Nuri-as-Saeed 
and his pro^western government in Iraq, and consequently 
on March 24, 1959? decided to withdraw from the Baghdad 
Eact. The withdrawal of Iraq changed the whole complexion 
of the western oriented defensive arrangements along the 
southern periphery of the Soviet Union since its primary 
objectives of drawing the Arabs, with their mineral 
wealth and strategic position, into the western fold were 
largely alienated; and the plans to contain the possible 
“communist subversion” in the area seemed to have backfired.. 
The validity of this argument is established since the 
three regional members of the Pact (Pakistan, Iran and 
Turkey) have evolved an understandable equation with the 
Soviet Union, and have apparently succeeded in defusing 
the tension in the area.
The Military Revolution (October 27? 1958) in 
Pakistan was instrumental in changing her attitude towards 
the defensive pacts, and she was further helped by the 
Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, which had labelled 
these military pacts as “Pactitis". As a result a new 
relationship was initiated between Pakistan and Egypt. The 
visit of President Ayub to Egypt in 1960, considerably 
helped to remove the unfortunate misunderstandings between 
the two countries, and the relations have been improving 
ever since.
toother irritant between Pakistan and the Arabs 
led by Egypt, was the existence of very friendly thes between
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Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. The two Arab states had basic 
ideological differences, Saudi Arabia leading the 
conservatives and Egypt the progressives. In this delicate 
situation Pakistan had a limited room to manoeuvre betwen 
the two feuding factions. Saudi Arabia always supported 
Pakistan in her endeavours to win the Kashmiris their 
right to self-determination, but Egypt on the other hand 
followed a neutralist policy; and cultivated very friendly 
relations with India. Egypt objected to the supply of 
Pakistani arms to Saudi Arabia, because some of these had 
found their way to the Yemini Civil Wax*, in which Egypt 
and Saudi Arabia were backing the progressives and conser­
vatives respectively. Fortunately this issue has come to 
a happy end since King Eaisal and President Nasser reached 
agreement in 1967? and ceased hostilities.
Consistent with her policy, Pakistan has 
continued to establish closer relations with the Arabs®
She signed the Defence Training Agreement with Saudi 
Arabia on August 7? 1967? under which Pakistan agreed 
to render technical advice to the Saudi armed forces, 
and provide training facilities. Relations between Pakistan 
and Jordan have been very friendly, and she has extended 
every possible moral and material help to the Kingdom.
The Islamic Conference at Rabat in 1969? proved 
that Pakistan enjoyed the status of a friend in the Arab 
world in spite of the Indian overtures towards the Arabs 
to alienate pro-Pakistani feelings, 11 India's foreign policy
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suffered a humiliating setback today as a consequence of
the reports that the Arab world had sided with Pakistan and
had excluded India from the Islamic summit conference in
■59Rabat on the A1 Aqsa Mosque, fire.1
Pakistan's relations with Arab countries have 
been improving considerably since the Indo-»Pakistan crisis
of 1971® These friendly relations have assumed greater
*
significance, 'since the Arab***Israeli war of October 1973* 
and the consequent use of the oil boycott of the West by 
the Arabs and the dramatic rise in oil prices* Pakistan 
imports approximately 90 percent l©jf the oil from the 
Persian Gulf area including Iran; and the prohibitive 
rise in oil prices have adversely affected Pakistan's 
balance of payment situation® She cannot meet these 
requirement on her own and in addition she is finding it 
difficult to finance her development programme since the 
rising oil and commodity prices resulted in the exaggerated 
worldwide inflation® During 1974-/75 Pakistan received 
$450 millions from Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf
Sheikhdoms® These countries have promised Pakistan with 
further financial assistance and there have been reports 
in the press that the Arab countries were helping Pakistan,
* There has been a marked shift in the Egyptian
policy,especially since President Anwar Sadaat 
assumed power in 197°* There has been a gradual 
shift towards Islamic Brotherhood and the old 
Wasserite slogan of "Arab first,Arab second and 
Egyptian Third"has been replaced by Muslims Pirst, 
Egyptians second and Arabs Third®
* *
39- The Times,London,26-9-69.
•' * i
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to "buy badly needed armaments since her major source of 
supply (U.&A.) had not given a positive x^esponse to repeated 
Pakistan requests for lifting the arms embargo which was 
imposed after the 1965 Indo-Pakistan hostilities. Pakistan 
has tried in vain to remind the United States her treaty 
obligations especially under the Central Treaty Organization.
The Second Islamic Conference which was held at 
■^ahore provided Pakistan with a splended opportunity to 
cement her close relations with the countries of West Asia 
and she seems to have succeeded in her endeavours to forge 
closer collaborations with the World of Islam.
One' minors disadvantage of sponsoring the Second 
^slamic Summit lias been the lukewarmBelations between Iran 
and Pakistan. It is believed that the Iranian Ruler wanted 
Pakistan to ignore Iafebya and withdraw her invitation to 
Colonel Qaddafi, the Libyan leader. But Pakistan refused to 
oblige and as a result the Shahinshah declined the request 
to attend the eonfex^ence personally. Ever since the 
relations between Pakistan and Iran have remained somewhat 
cool* Moreover the Pakistani oreBtures toward the Arabs, 
especially the Persian Gulf States, have been suspect in 
the Ix^anian eyes, because Iran considers these States and 
the Persian Gulf as her sphere of influence* Prom a close 
study of Pakistan*s foreign policy of recent months it can 
be safely deduced that Pakistan intends to seek closer 
relations with the Arabs and at the same time assure Iran 
that her intentions are friendly* This has been the main 
purpose behind Pakistani Prime Minister Mr. Bhutto *s personal 
exchanges and visits to Iran* It should further be stressed
that Iran cannot feel safe from all the sides, especially
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when she faces difficulties in the Persian Gulf,and an air of 
mutual distrust prevails with the Soviet Union in spite of the 
increased cooperation in the socio-economic fields,Pakistan is 
trying very hard to keep the delicate balance between her 
increasing relations with the Arabs and Iran,but this balancing 
act could come under severe strains if Iran adopted an adventurous 
policy in the Persian Gulf; or if Iran endeavoured to woe India 
over and above Pakistan's interests.
Pakistan's relations with Iran have been very 
good and both the countries have refrained from interfering in 
the internal affairs of each other,and have shown a. good deal of 
understanding in matters of foreign affairs.Pakistan and Iran are 
members of the Central Treaty Organisation(Baghdad Pact) along 
with Turkey,TJ.K. and U 0S.A.(U.S.A. is not a full member).Both 
Pakistan and Iran have gained considerably in the socio-economic 
fields.The western participants have helped the three Muslim 
members in developing transportation and communications. A micro-' 
wave telecommunications network has been completed linking 
Ankara,,Tehran and Karachi(Fig: 2.?.The system when stepped up to 
full capacity, would provide as many as 600 simultaneous 
telephone connections or more than 14,000 teletype circuits,or a
/c -X-
combination of the two,bringing Pakistan,Iran and Turkey closer 
It should be noted here that Pakistan became very much disenchan­
ted with the Central Treaty Organisation immediately after the 
Indo-Pakistan war of 1965,mainly ^ue 1° H ie lack of support from 
U.K. and U.S.A.However,Pakistan has taken a much more positive 
part since the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971?and Pakistan actively 
participated in the naval exercises in the Arabian Sea in 1974*
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together. In addition, the CENTO members have started 
work on an all weather road and rail link between the 
three Asian members. This would supplement the already 
existing rail and road link between Zahidan (the main 
Iranian town bordering Pakistani Baluchistan) Quetta 
and Karachi, thus facilitating their mxitual cooperation®
The Regional Cooperation for Development( R.C.D.),
Pakistan, Iraniand^ tHir]Iey~bo:‘ganised tEeTTtegional
Cooperation for Development, on Jply 3-4-, 1964, a group
“parallel to but outside CENTO"• This was intended to
promote industrial, cultural and socio-economic cooperation
between the three countries. The member countries have
already reached a number of agreements in promoting the
development of the organisation® These include a Regional
Cultural Institute, a Tripartite Shipping Conference, a
Joint Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and an R.C.D,
commercial bakk* Pakistan, Iran and Turkey have already
agreed on Joint industrial ventures, and among the products
to be produced exclusively in Pakistan are Kraft paper,
textile machinery, diesel engines, electical equipment,
aluminixim sheets, machine tools, jmlyester fibres and wires
and cables® A Joint Iran-Pakistan oil company is to be set
up and under the plan "Iran would place a newly discovered
oilfield at Pakistan*s disposal in return for guarantees
that Pakistan would consider Iranian oil as a "domestic"
product®..Iran and Pakistan®..hope to reduce-or even
eliminate-their dependence on the western countries through
a Joint venture in exploiting and marketing oil.®.The oil
field is probably in Baluchistan, the desert province
bordering Pakistan, where surveys have been made with very
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■.4*0promising results*1'
The member countries agreed to abolish visas for 
tourists at the first meeting of the Ministerial Council 
held in October 1964-. The conception of mutual understanding 
and cooperation between the three Muslim neighbours has 
ushered a new era of political stability into the region. 
Bearing in mind their enshrined objectives the R.C.D. 
members have kept the organisations' doors ajar for other 
countries of the West and Southern Asia and also those of 
South East Asia irrespective of their political alignments. 
Pakistan is reported to have sounded Afghanistan, Saudi 
Arabia and Indonesia about participation as equal members 
in achieving the ends of the organization, in the collective 
interests of their peoples; but their response has been
rather lukewarm because of their political conpulsions.
The Impact of Iranian Economic Resurgence*
Iranian policy has undergone change since Iran
discovered her economic power which geology has bestowed 
upon her,and the change in Iranian attitude has special 
significance for ^akistan who is already being pressed hard 
by India, Afghanistan and by proxy the .Soviet Union. During 
the 1974 war Iran urgently warned India of the consequences 
if she sought to occupy West Pakistan. Reflecting their fear 
of a further disintegration of Pakistan, whether due to 
external subversion or internal fragility, Iran moved 
quickly to intensify her ties with Pakistan in the wake of 
1971 crisis. The Shah visited Pakistan on 8 January 1972, 
and the Shah paid another visit on 16-18 January 1973* Iran 
reacted sharply to the Baluchi insurgency in Baluchistan 
and cooperated militarily with Pakistan and issued strong
4*0. The Times,London,January 26, 1970.
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warnings* In April 1973 "both Iran's Prime Minister’
Hoveyda, and her Ambassador in Pakistan Mr* Zelli,
affirmed the importance attached by Iran to Pakistan's
4-1
territorial integrity* During President Bhutto's
visit to Iran the following month the Shah warned that
Iran would not remain indifferent to, or oblivious of,
4  2
any separatist movement in Pakistan*
Iran was totally dismayed at the event in East 
^akistan in 1971 and is reported to have voiced 
strong opposition to military action there, but this did 
not detract/ ^rafrom viewing the fact that India invaded 
and dismembered Pakistan, and considered it a very 
dangerous precedent, and which convinced Iran that she 
had to rely on herself alone andso should other regional 
states*
A  chain of events made Iran to come to that 
conclusion, first the Iranian point of view that America 
could not act, with any effectiveness, as the world's 
policeman, second, the withdrawal of British forces from 
the East of Sue 2 5, third the dismemberment of Pakistan 
and finally the inherent dangers of external and internal 
subversion in the Persian Gulf and ^aluchistan*
It is generally felt in America that the Soviet
Union seeks to cause trouble in the area -using Iraq as her
chosen client and, instrument* It is also reported, but
strongly denied by both the Russian and Iraqis, that Russia
has a sprawling naval facility at Umm Qasr in Iraq and
maintains an enlarged and active Indian ocean fleet* As
such the Soviet Union seems to go for the jugular vein, 
and the Persian Gulf is the oil jugular for America, the
W^SjB^TS^erna^ETocSITWee'kly edi’Uon)772T"SpHT719? 3.
42 Ibid, 19 May 1973-
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West and ^apan. Iran is keenly aware of this fact and 
as such to dissuade the Russians from any adventurous 
move, signed a 1600 million contract to supply much 
needed natural gas to the Soviet Union*
To counter any Soviet sponsored subversive move
and to protect their independence and territorial integrity
the littoral states in the Persian Gulf have spent a good
deal of their petrodollar on the large scale purchase of
arms, and an arms race is in Pu.ll swing all over the gulf®
million
Saudi Arabia has signed contracts worth $600/with the 
British for the supply of air defence equipment, and is 
also taking delivery of 50 E*3Efs and $ 330 million worth 
of Prench tanks® The Saudi defence bill amounts to one 
billion dolldars anntially* Abu Dhabi has ordered a 
squadron of Hawker Hunters and Twelve Mirages, and Oman 
spends more than half of her total oil revenues on fighting 
the insurgent in Dhafar, where Iranian troops are also 
engaged*Kuwait and United Arab Emirates are also spending 
millions of dollars on armaments.
It is estimated that by 1980, America, the World's 
largest oil consumer, will be buying approximately 3»8 
billion barrels every year (compared with 2.2 billion barrels 
in 1972)9 and other industrial nations will be increasing 
their oil consumption and as such higher oil imports. The 
Persian Gulf is the only oil rich region which can meet 
these requirements, and yet the lifeline that connects the 
Gulf to the world- the route through the strait of Hunmuz, 
seems very precarious, and can easily be sabotaged by an 
unfriendly action, and a line of oil tankers can be
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effectively put out &f> action* American opticas would 
severely be limited so long as she continued to support
Israel against the collective Arab World, hence the
policeman
need for an alternative/po&im&n and the ready appearance 
of Iran for such a role in the Gulf is an understandable 
phenomenon, Iran's economy is improving rapidly and the 
Shah seems to be a strong, dependable and a willing ally. 
Iran’s military hardware and muscles seem to guarantee 
the free flow of oil to the industrailised world. This 
in turn would greatly depend on haw Saudi Arabia and the 
other littoral states react to such ambitions, and as to 
how the Soviet Union views the Iranian intentions and ■ 
interests in the region.
Pakistan's wooing of the Arab West has been of 
some concern to- Iran, Since the Arab-Israeli war of 
October 1975? Pakistan has intensified her contacts with 
the Arabs, and President Bhutto organised and hosted a 
large gathering of Islamic Heads of States in Lahore in 
February 1974-, where the status of Jerusalum and the 
Arab-Israeli question figured prominently. The conference 
was a clear indication that Pakistan intends to pursue her 
contacts with the Arab S t a t e s . ^  In particular Pakistan's 
relations with Libya have annoyed the ruler of Iran, 
especially the extension of Muammar Qaddafi's stay after 
the Islamic Summit in Lahore. However, Pakistan and Libya 
have much in common, apart from the religious ties, each 
has what other needst Pakistan has an abundance of human 
resources and negligible hard curency, while Libya is
43• The Times, 21,27 February, 197^*
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wealthy from oil revenues and deficit in trained personnel.However,,
if Iran continued to distrust some of the Arab States,and latent,
and occasionally open,rivalry continues to exist between Iran and
some of the Gulf States,the Iranians are likely to frown on any
entente between Pakistan and the States of the Persian Gulf.Although
Pakistan’s cultivation of the Arabs both in the Gulf and to the
west should not necessarily damage her close relations with Iran," •
insofar as this leads to dilution of Pakistani support for Iranian
the
interests in the region,it may be expected to diminish/Shah’s 
enthusiasm for ties between Iran and Pakistan.
However,Iran is not/GGnvincedthat the region’s stability 
will be enhanced by a, weak and dependant Pakistan and as such Iran 
tried,for a time to bolster Pakistan’s defence needs,which the 
Indians totally disagreed with,It seems highly unlikely that Iran 
lias accepted the rationale that India required an overwhelming 
margin of superiority over Pakistan as a contingency against a two­
pronged war i.e. from Pakistan and China.In addition,Iran still 
deeply distrusts India’s intentions in providing trained personnel ;' 
to Baghdad. .\
There have been widespread reports that Pakistani pilots
and military personnel have recently begun to replace Egyptians in 
44
Libya and that these military advisers have been authorised to fly - 
combat missions in the Libyan air space to counter foreign intrusion 
ii tile r§p8rtb are accurate, then this development would be logical 
mi If tarlly, f or bo tTTTakTsYaii^^^'usTs"lmiTar'’“l^licrsriTcTaFIT
4 4.The Guard.ian,LoncL on,19-2-1974.
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Moreover,since the Islamic Summit at Lahore, Libya and Pakistan
have established a joint ministerial commission which has already
held its sessions at Tripoli and Islamabad respectively.According
to the deliberations of the ministerial commission agreement has
been reached to establish a joint bank,a shipping company, an
Islamic centre and a publishing house.The two governments have
also agreed to facilitate the transfer of capital and a mutual
exchange of commercial and technical knowhow.Libya has also
agreed to finance the installation of a fertiliser plant,sugar
plant,cement plant,paper and textile mills in Pakistan.This
cooperation between Libya and. Pakistan in the social,economic
and. political fields is bound, to benefit the peoples of the two
countries and strengthen Pakistan's close ties with West Asia and.
help to neutralise India's projected preponderance in the region.
As stated earlier Iran Is not convinced as yet as to the real
purpose of Indian links with Iraq,and has been worried about the
larger strategic Implications of close ,11... politico-military
relations between India,Iraq and the Soviet Union,So entangled
had the issues of relations between Iran and Iraq and India and ;:
Pakistan become that mutual anxiety gave way to mutual recrimi— ' 
"46nations.
Recognising the importance of stressing the Islamic
dimensions in Pakistan's external relations,Mr.Bhutto undertook
an extended whirlwind trip.of the Islamic Middle East from May28
to June 10 1972,Since then Pakistan has been successful in culti-v
ating the Gulf Sheikhdoms,by emphasizing the common Muslim heri-"
tage,and by providing trained personnel,As a result, Pakistan
has had a considerable success, in consolidating her commercial,
political and military relations with West Asia,
Another important development has taken place in the context
of Middle East and the Pakistani interests in the region. 
46.Kayhan International,Tehran(Weekly Edition)28-7-1973.
Libya and (Turkey seem to be drawing nearer to each 
other since the Turkish invasion of Cyprus* Both the 
coimtries have agreed to a number of joint industrial 
projects and to strengthen socio-economic and cultural 
relations®" Turkey and Libya signed wide-ranging agree­
ments in Ankara that will bring Turkey three million 
tons of Libyan crude oil this year and initiate joint
military and economic projects between the two Moslem 
ixn
countries*” ( Turkey has declared her support for
the first time Remanded the complete withdrawal of
Israeli forces from the occupied Arab territories* Libya
in turn has fully supported the lurkish position on Cyprus*
This alignment could be of immense significance both to
Libya and Pakistan* Libya has a large number of Pakistanis
working in the country including military personnel, and
according to the Jang International, Turkey has agreed to 
4-8
supply about six hundred thousand labourers, doctors, 
engineers etc* Pakistan and Turkey have no points of 
dissension and-both have been cooperating in a number of 
fields since 1954-s and both are engaged in bilateral and 
multilateral elegence and economic arrangements* The 
increased Turkish friendship with Libya might ease the 
mind of Iran vis-a-vis Pakistan’s growing cooperation with 
Libya and as such remove the clouds of suspicion which 
might be hanging over Iran-Pakistan relations*
4-7* The Daily Telegraph, January 6, 1975®
4-8® The Jang International, London, January 9? 1975*
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Pakistan's Delations with the United States
The emergence of Pakistan warranted adequate 
economic and defence requirements to withstand the 
imperatives of independence* She, therefore, looked 
for external assistance to build up the social overheads 
and provide initial outlay; to this the United States 
responded generously® The foundations of friendly 
relations between the two countries were laid by 
Liaquat Ali Phan, the first Prime Minister of Pakistan, 
dixring his three and a half weeks state visit to the 
United States in 1950® These relations were further 
cemented in 1954* when the two entered into the Mutual 
Defence Assistance Agreement under which the U.S.A. 
agreed to supply Pakistan with military assistance to 
maintain her territorial integrity and political 
independence* Pakistan and the United States also 
signed the Manila Pact in 1954*, which established 
the South East Asia Treaty Organisation; and the Baghdad 
Pact (Central Treaty Organisation) in 1955* These 
relations were further consolidated with the signing 
of the bilateral. Agreement of Cooperation in 1959, 
which was designed to reinforce the defensive role of 
CENTO.
TheU.S. extended enormous economic assistance 
to Pakistan in the shape of grants, loans and gifts, 
which reached the pinnacle during the financial year 
1965, amounting to $ 4-11,617,000; and the total U.S. 
economic assistance to Pakistan between the financial 
years 1952-1965 amounted to $ 5 , 1 1 3  millions.49®
7j^7'™"^"T^es^fTg{r£Us'1Tiave^eeh™UakUh^fWff”"BrFatrhtTc al
Pact Book" prepared by U.S.A.I.D. Pakistan,June 1966,
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The Effects of the Sino-Indian Border Conflict:1962,
The relations between the two countries took a sharp turn
in September-October 1962, when the United States supplied
India with massive military aid as a result of the Sino™
Indian conflict along the UEFA borders and the Ladakh™Aksai
Ohin areas. Pakistan T,a friend of immediacy and constancy"
was deeply disturbed and felt ignored; a relationship which
had been developed after a good deal of hardwork during
the fifties was losing respect. The United States had agreed
that Pakistan would be informed and consultedjLefore any
such assistance was extended to India "the assurance given
by President Kennedy to me that Pakistan would be consulted
before any decision was taken on the question of giving arms 
50
to India."^ More important still, Pakistan argued that
these arms would be used against hex* rather than China;
a point which was vindicated in September 1965» when India
crossed the international boundary in the Lahore sector,
threatening the very existence of Pakistan. The United
States had publicly assured Pakistan that "The Government
of the United States...has similarly assured the Government
of Pakistan that if our assistance to India should be
misused and directed against another in aggression, the
United States would undertake immediately...appropriate
is
action both within and without the United Nations/thwart
51such aggression."^ These assurances public and private 
were of no consequence as far as India was concerned since 
she used these weapons against Pakistan. During the un­
declared war of September 1965, between Pakistan and India, 
the United States assumed a neutral position and immediately 
stopped the military aid to both the belligerents. Pakistan.
50. Eyb^Tp^cTtT^T^WJT ” —  —  _
51. State Department Release, 17*11.1962.
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vehemently resented the American policy of "equal
treatment" since she was aligned with the United States
through various pacts. The Americans argued that they
were under obligations to help Pakistan only in the case
of communist aggression® This argument may be accepted
as half-truth since there is such a stipulation in the
Manila Treaty of 1954, as the "understanding" of U^S.A.
"The United States in executing the present Treaty does
so with the understanding of its recognition of the
effect of aggression and armed attack®•.apply only to
52communist aggression®..""^ But no such reservations 
can be detected in the American commitments under the 
bilateral Agreement of Cooperation 1959* "•••the members.** 
affirmed their determination to maintain their collective 
security and to resist aggression direct or indirect..*
The U.S. Government, in accordance with the Mutual 
Security Act of 1954.•.reaffirms that it will continue 
to furnish....military and economic assistance as may be 
mutually agreed upon...in order to assist..®.in the 
preservation of its national independence and integrity 
and in the effective formation of its economic development. ^
American policy towards Pakistan may be described 
as a curious mixture of sympathies and antipathies. She 
cultivated extremely friendly relations with Pakistan 
during the fifties which resulted in the complete political 
identification of Pakistan with the west; and virtually 
alienated Pakistan from the Soviet Union® With the thaw 
setting in the U.S.-Soviet relations, the enunciation of
52. Story of Seato, Seato Publications7jfeagk&k,p.44«
53® Treaties and Alliances of the World,Keesings,
Bristol, 1968, p* 140.
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the principles of co-existence by Khruschev and the
exchange of Sino-Soviet polemics, America largely
over-looked Pakistan’s friendly overtures towards the
Soviet Union* But Pakistan’s "courtship" with China
seemed to have been rebuffed by the Americans, who
communicated strong displeasure in 1963* when Pakistan
signed the Boundary Agreement with China. The relations
between Pakistan and China have,,remained suspect in the
American eyes, and the American policy seems to have
been hardened on this question by the Indian propanganda
of "Sino-Pakistan collusion". The relations between the
United States and Pakistan have neverbeen the same
though a marked improvement has been noticeable since
54the inauguration of the Nixon Administration*
S o -Iranian Understanding.
The American policy is very much linked with
her investment and oil interests in the Middle East and
this region has gained further eminence as a result of
the Arab-Israel war of October 1973? and the Arab oil
embargo. There have been suggestions in the various
Western quarters that America should take military action
against the Arabs, especially the Persian Gulf States
and occupy the oil fields. Direct intervention seems out
of question, for the time being at least® This appears to
be a very tempting proposition but frought with dangers
and such an action might lead to global conflagration
because the Soviet Union might be tempted to protect her
interests in the region, where she is so heavily committed.
34® During the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war President Nixon
showed a marked till towards Pakistan and remainded 
India of U.S.A. treaty obligations towards Pakistan,
and this seemed to have warded off larger Indian 
invasion of West Pakistan®
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Since December 197^$ Pakistan has gradually 
tilted towards the Arab world especially the Persian 
Gulf states and Libya* Phis has largely annoyed the 
Iranians especially the Shahinshah who considers this 
area as one of his "spheres of influence0" Phe Iranian 
policy has tended to be adventures and aggressive in 
the area since the Iranians occupied the tiny islands 
(the Punches) in the Persian Gulf and agreed to help 
militarily the Sultan of Muscat and Oman against the 
insurgents (the Front for the Liberation of the 
occupied Arab Gulf) "Iranian Forces are still fighting 
alongside Omani forces in the south of the Sultanate«•«
A military communique this week reported that nine 
Iranians were killed and one was missing after an 
ambUsh in the southwestern mountains* where Governmentv f
forces launched a new campaign against Leftist guerillas 
on December 2**®* Phe communique was not only the first 
to reveal the Iranians continued presence in southern 
Dhofar, it was also the first time the army had ever 
mentioned Iranians in a public statement since a "task 
force" was sent in at the request of Sultan Qpboos Bin
Said,, the ruler, about two years ago«,M^  Phe Iranians
also
have/been actively mending the fences with India and a 
number of Joint projects are underway®
Phe Iranian posture towards the subcontinent 
eminently suits the American and Soviet thinking, which 
is geered to keeping Pakistan very much involved in the 
subcontinental matters and political developments have
95* The Financial Pimes, 13~12~197Z^
Phe Guardian, London, 13 December, 197^ *®
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shorn that this policy has met with success. Pakistan and
India agreed in Novembex^ 197^ to x^enew trade links which
were severed in 1965* and the postal and communication
links had already been established® The Americans do not
want Pakistan, to be linked with the Persian G-ulf or the
Middle East and they want to see India, Pakistan and
Bangladesh as one economic unit obviously under the
Indian preponderanceo Precisely for these reasons the
Americans for quite some time refused to restart the
supply of armaments to Pakistan which were suspended after
the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965* There is a general.
understanding amongst the American leadership that Pakistan's
close relationship with the Arabs might draw her out of
her sphere of influence and that could jeopardize her
political standing in the area. The Iranians are bei^g
armed to the teeth and they have increasingly been supplied
with sophisticated weapons, and the Iranians believe that
they would emerge as the most powerful nation in the rqgion,
and possibly serve U.S. interests. However, there seemed- to
be a contradiction in the Iranian policy towards the Arabs
\Were„
in the sense that they/' directly concerned and involved
with the Kurdish movement in the northeast of Iraq, which
was
/struggling hard to win some kind of independence from
56. These restrictions have now been lifted both
against India and Pakistan. But it should be 
stressed here that America did not lift the 
arms ban on Pakistan to bolster Pakistan's 
defence capabilities but to support American 
geopolitical interests in the area, especially 
with regard to the oil rich Persian Gulf, and 
Pakistan enjoys a very desirable geostrategic 
location to that effect®
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Iraq, and on the other hand Iran wishedt to align herself
with the Arabs, “The Shah of Iran said in an interview
published today that another Arab-Israeli war would
involve all Moslem countries and not just the Arab
S t a t e s®Certainly it will be our war this time® Hone
of us has a choice11® We will never accept any change
57in the identity of Jerusalem*""^
This policy would have to be further stream- 
lined if Iran has any idea of establishing closer links 
with the Arab World as such® In this field Iran would 
have to reconcile with the Pakistani efforts in develop- 
ing close socio-economic, political and military links 
with the Arabs, especially in the Persian Gulf® Pakistan 
has already signed agreements with United Arab Emirates,
Saudi Arabia and Libya and as such joint ministerial 
boards have been set up to coordinate socio-economic and 
cultural development® Such cooperation already existed 
between Iran and Pakistan and some joint ventures are 
either under study ox* are being implemented® The Regional 
Cooperation for Development has provided both Iran and 
Pakistan to coordinate policies in various fields but the 
progress has really been slow and the cooperation has not 
been on the desirable scale® This is especially true of 
Pakistan-Iran cooperation with Turkey, the third member of 
R*C0D« The Turkish trade with Iran and Pakistan amounts to
The Financial Times, 13-12-1974-®
"Iran is to close its northern borders to Kurdish 
rebels from Iraq, ending a long-standing over the 
path of an international boundary line through a 
river estuary on the Arabian Gulf® Iraq has agreed 
in principle to make concessions on its territorial 
claims in the Shattal-Arab estuary, which provides a 
river access to the Iranians* largest refinery at 
Abadan,in return for closing of all the borders to 
“infiltration of a subversive character”!??.
5'?. The Times,London, 7“5“75°
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one percent of her total foreign trade^ The total imports 
from Iran and Pakistan during the first nine months of 
1974- amounted to 0*11 per cent of total Turkish imports, 
and the total amount of exports to Pakistan and Iran
during this period were to the tune of 0 * 9 8  per cent of
59
the total Turkish exports. y This is a clearcut xndication 
that mutual trade amongst the E.G.D. countries is very 
negligible, in spite of the fact that the member countries 
could benefit tremendously during this high inflation 
period which was specially caused by the soaring oil prices* 
This would eminently suit Pakistan because the mutual trade 
and trade concessions would benefit the member countries in 
the sense that new market would have been discovered closer 
at home, and the damaging effects of inflation and highly 
exaggerated oil prices would be effectively met. Cooperation 
between Turkey, Iran and Pakistan could have been based on 
the principles of regional economic community but such 
coordination does not seem to meet the growing demands of 
increasing Iranian interests in the Indian Ocean area. Iran 
vfci^ualises greater interests and her ambitions have grown 
considerably since the flow of petrodollai*, and she 
envisages herself as “big power” in the geopolitical 
complexion of the region. She seems to be interested in 
controlling lines of communications and transportations 
between the Nile and the Straits of Malacca and beyond,and 
P a k i s t a n i  growing friendship and involvement with the
i . f
Arabs, especially in the Persian Gulf seems to lay batfe at 
the roots ,of expansionist designs of Iran and her posture 
of aggrandisement®
59® These figures are taken from "The dang
International, London, 11-12-1974-.
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Ihe Americans have tended to support the Iranian 
designs and as such she has been supplied with the ever 
increasing quantity of sophisticated weapons® In spite of 
the widely publicised pro-Pakistan "tilt" during the 
Pakistan-India crisis of 1971* it seems that America would 
not help Pakistan to such a position where she could 
effectively challenge the Indian preponderance, although 
the American policy would tend to support the continued 
territorial integrity and political independence of 
Pakistan® America would increasingly endeavour to improve 
her relations with India and her policy would be geared 
towards establishing a politico^economic structure under 
which a weak but defensible Pakistan would be allowed to 
exist, and Indian hegemony would prevail® Unfortunately 
for Pakistan, this also seems to suit the Soviet cyclical 
realism and the close Soviet cooperation with India, and, 
for the time being, increasing accommodation and detente 
with the United States seems to have established a common 
interest under which Pakistan could not be allowed to 
challenge the Indian position and as such the Soviet- 
American cooperation® Phis tripartite understanding and 
cooperation also eminently suits the growing Iranian interests 
in the region® But the situation would not appear so 
desparate for Pakistan so long as she succeeded in unifying 
the forces at home and she possessed the kind of technical 
knowhow the Arabs want and with the help of the Arab 
petrodollar she could effectively neutralise the tri­
partite or quadripartite stranglehold on Pakistan's foreign 
policy options; and in this the Chinese reactions might 
hold the key to Pakistan's survival as an independent and 
sovereign state. It is important to observe here that
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China * s policy towards Pakistan, for the last five years
t*
has been to deduce her support for Pakistan1s independence 
and state sovereignty", this was ambiguous in relation to 
East Pakistan, although it certainly represented a firm 
commitment to the survival of the nucleus of Pakistan in 
the West, and this position of course defined very precisely 
the character of the Chinese Stake in Pakistan^ deeply 
committed to the maintenance of a strong and independent
p
West akistan* What Pakistan required of China and the 
United States was a firm commitment to the "national unity 
and territorial integrity" of Pakistan *=* a formula which 
implied the defence of Pakistan and as such of East Pakistan 
against the possibilities of invasion from India* In the 
event both China and America decided not to adopt such a 
a policy and their commitments towards Pakistan remained 
dubious® The U«S« Government probably shared the Pakistani 
assessment that the Soviet Union posed the gr&atest threat 
to the peace of Asia, which partially accounts for the 
American "tilt" in favour of Pakistan during the Indo- 
Paid.stan war of 1971? and President Nixon was quick enough 
to remind Mrs* Ghandi that the United States had treaty 
obligations towards Pakistan* Thus, although it is at the 
moment fanciful and simplistic to envisage a Washington- 
Tehran-Isiamabad-Peking axis in South Asia, these four 
States do have some convergent interests in containing a 
soyiet advance into, or hegemony in, the Indo-Pakist an 
subcontinent*
The refusal of Pakistan to participate in Soviet 
schemes for "collective security" and regional cooperation
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in the subcontinent have so far prevented Russia-.;from 
deepening her influence ibn India, and by engaging India in 
regional preoccupations Pakistan’s hostility also reduces 
India’s capacity to support the Soviet Union in its rivalry 
with China* If Pakistan were to agree to come to the "good 
neighbourly" terms with India which the Soviet Union has 
been impressing upon her for more than a decade, India’s 
regional preponderance would have been decisively confirmed 
and it would be much able to compete for regional influence 
with China, especially in the Himalayai States including the 
Ghinese Tibet, and as such India would be able to command a 
position of strength and. respect in the area with or without 
the help from the Soviet Union® The recent exchanges between 
India and America and a genuine desire of the parties 
concerned to settle their differences amicably, have not 
been viewed with favour either in Islamabad or in Peking® 
Such endeavours on part of the United States are bound to 
put heavy strains on the fickle minded Sino-American 
understanding, and as such further enhance the Soviet 
position in Asia, especially in the subcontinent#
Pakistan and the Soviet Union®
Pakistan’s relations with her mighty neighbour 
Russia were bedevilled by ^her membership of the Western 
sponsored military pacts® The Soviet Union very severely 
criticised and resented Pakistan’s participation in these 
pacts, and went as far as to question the very existence 
of Pakistan® Mr® Khnusehev the First Secretary of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union on December 10, 1955, 
at Srinagar, Kashmir, stated: "It made us very sad when
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imperialistic powers succeeded in bringing about the
division of India into two parts..®we are absolutely
convinced that, when passions have calmed down and
people realise the significance of such an artificial
division of India, they will regret it... The present
Government of Pakistan openly profess its close ties
with American monopolistic circles* They were among
the first to initiate the notorious Baghdad Pact® We
do not like the Baghdad ^act at all, but we are patient
and confident that it will burst like a soap-bubble®*
we should very much like to have®*.*friendly relations
with Pakistan, and it is no fault of ours if such
60
relations have not developed." The Baghdad Pact 
(Central Treaty Organisation) was essentially
a defensive arrangement of non-aggressive nature 
designed to forestall any internal subversion or external 
aggression, especially from the Soviet Union,” West 
Pakistan lies in the middle of the "Grush Zone", or 
"rtfealand" which extends from Finland*. » to Manch*ta?ia,
It also lies at the junction of the Russian, Chinese 
and Indian (previously British) spheres of influence® 
Excepting India®..and China.•.Pakistan is the most 
populous state on the rimland...any Russian plans to 
expand on the Western flanks were stemmed by the Worth 
Atlantic Treaty Organization. The chain of American 
bases and garrisons from the Atlantic to the Philippine 
Islands similarly blocked the threat of expansion by 
Russia or its ally China into the sphere of the Pacific
60® ICeesings, op. cit®, p® 14604
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Ocean.*. only the southern flank by its physical and 
political fragmentation indicated a number of loopholes 
vulnerable from the interior...the Straits of the 
Dard&nells and the Bosphorous, the Persian Gulf, and
These defensive, arrangements, bilateral or multilateral,
were specifically designed to consolidate these weak
geostrategic points• The Pakistan participation in the
scheme of "the Capitalistic encirclement" of the Soviet
Union has not been viewed with kindness by the Kremlin
even after 20 years ofthe existence of these pacts,"They
may not be hurting us, but they give us no pleasure 
62either." The pro-western stance of Pakistan proved 
vei'y expensive for her since the Soviet Union ignored 
Pakistan*s geopolitical compulsions, in supporting 
Afghanistan (over Pakhtunistan) and India, (over Kashmir 
and East Pakistan), with whom Pakistan had territorial 
frictions and politico-ideological differences. The 
acceptance of the "gospel of coexistence" by the United 
States and the Soviet Union ushered a new era of relative 
understanding between Pakistan and Russia 5 and as a 
result the two countries signed the oil exploration 
agreement in October 1961, under which the Soviet Union 
advanced a loan of $ 3 ?0 0 0 , 0 0 0  for a period of 1 2  years, 
at per cent interest. The loan was to be utilized for 
the purchase of machinery for oil exploration by Pakistan, 
and in addition the Soviet Union agreed to utilize the 
repayments for the purchase of textile/farm products from 
Pakistan. The relations between the two countries remained 
cordial for some time, thereafter. The Pakistan™India
war of 1963, provided the Soviet Union with a good
the Indus .Lowlands which connect them to Central Asia
61
62 Khan, op. cit., p. 171 
opportunity to exert her influence on the two neighbours , 
which resulted in the signing of the Tashkent Declaration 
in January 1966, "Mr, Kosygin expressed the Soviet 
Governments’ profound satisfaction” that the President of 
Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India were meeting ih 
Tashkent "in order to establish direct contact with a view 
to improving relations and eliminating the conflict 
between India and Pakistan®«.We regard this.®*a turning- 
point in the relations between India and Pakistan®®® to 
strengthen friendship between India and the Soviet Union, 
between India and Pakistan, and between Pakistan and the 
Soviet Union®
it is advisable to study in some/interes'ts of 'the Soviet 
Union in this area® The international frontiers of the 
Soviet Union in Asia extend for 8,000 miles, and straddle 
across South-West Asia, and the Par East® Since 1938 the 
Soviet acquisitions in Asia total about 80,000 square_ . 
miles and include Tannu Tuva, South Sakhalin, the M'euiii-n 
Islands and Port Arthur® The Soviet boundaries in Asia 
have been relatively calm and stable as compared with her 
European boundaries® These frontiers might give a nation 
of separation but they mostly lie in country remarkable for 
its scanty settlement, lofty mountains, and high arid 
plateaii - international tension at points, at times has 
been considerable e*g®, Ussuri River (DamansSay Islands)® 
However, it should not be assumed that, because the Soviet 
boundaries in Asia have changed very little therefore the 
Soviet position on her Asiatic marches has not been
^or a better understanding of the Soviet p<psit/on
de tallJthe geopolitical
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strengthened by other means. The pattern of Soviet satellite 
states in European U.S.S.R. is seemed to have been repeated 
in Asiatic U.S.S.R., and the Soviet foreign policy has been, 
and remains very active. The success of this policy has 
mainly been due to (a) .the multi-national character of bhe 
Soviet Union and (b) the methodical application of Western . 
technology to Soviet Middle Asia and Southern Siberia*
Asiatic U.S.S.R. borders on Turkey, Iran and 
Afghanistan (Pakistan and U.S.S.R. have no common borders). 
The Soviet policy towards Turkey embodies elements of 
hostility, and she is considered as a stumbling block in 
the path of Soviet approaches to the Mediterranean, and a 
possible enemy base. Iran also poses the same problems to 
the Soviet geostrategic interests in the ax*ea since it is 
interposed between the U.S.S.R. and the Indian Ocean by way 
of the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea. The Soviet Union borders 
Iran both in South and in Central Asia, and shares
with it the ®jtvigation of the Caspian Sea. Iran has 
survived as a buffer state, in spite of her weak defences, 
merely because of the fact that this situation suited both 
the Soviet Union and British interests in the area and 
moreover, this constituted a mao*or element in the Soviet 
concept of cynical relaism as against the Marxian Utopian 
precepts® To safeguard their special interests in the area 
both the Soviet Union and Britain carved their respective 
“spheres of influence” and in 194-1. the two powers occupied 
their respective zones when German intervention in Iran was 
threatened. In fact, Iran served as a good supply route to 
the Soviet Union during the Second World War and the Allied 
Powers very effectively used this route to fight the German 
forces which had penetrated the Soviet heartland. At the
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end of the war the Soviet Union was very reluctant to 
vacate the occupied zone in northern Iran by the agreed 
date of March 2, 194-6, because she had her eyes set on 
the oil wealth of Iran® Moreover, the Soviet zone also 
included the Iranian Azerbaijan which adjoins the 
Azerbaidzhan S 0S eR ® , both these regions are mainly 
inhabited by Azerbaijan Turks. Tabriz the Capital of 
Iranian Azerbaijan is an important centre geostrategically 
and commands roads into Turkey and Iraq and is linked by 
a line to Jolfa© Tabriz is also a vital link in the Cento 
communications complex.
During her occupation of the northern Iranian 
zone the Soviet Union engineered to set up a separatist 
regime led by the Iranian Tudeh Party in Azerbaijan so as 
to win some oil concessions and the presence of the Soviet 
troops was used as an ineffective weapon in her adventurous 
foreign policy® These manoeuvres failed to materialise;
Soviet troops were withdrawn, the puppet regime was 
overthrown and the Tudeh Party was banned®
The Soviet Union has tried to establish more 
cordiatt relations with Iran, in spite of Iranian p ar t i c ip at i on 
in the Central Treaty Organisation; and this endeavour seems 
to have met with some success though the basic suspicions 
have not been removed and the atmosphere of mutual distrust 
still prevails®
Three of the Soviet Central Asian republics e.g., 
Turkmen, Uzbek and Tadzhik adjoin Afghanistan, which, as a 
semi independent state, acquired international prominence
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only with the steady advance and railway-building of Russian 
in Central Asia in the late 19th c-entury. This landlocked 
country of rugged m ountains and semi-desert plains, the 
population of which comprises many ethnic elements, might 
well have passed under Russian rule but for the fact of 
its geostrategic position commanding the. chief landlord 
approach to the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent® Although 
railways reach the frontiers of Afghanistan at Kushka and 
Termez on the Soviet side and at Landikotal and Chamman 
in the Rhyber and Bolan Passes on the Pakistani side, 
Afghanistan still lacks a comprehensive system of railways® 
Although communications in the past have been difficult, 
yet about 7 0 0 0 miles of good primary and secondary roads 
now exist, of which about 1300 are paved, and motor 
transport is rapidly becoming the chief method of transport 
in place of ponies and camels® A turneS. though the Hindu 
Kush has opened a short route to the Uzbek S.S.R® and the 
,frans-S0;spian Railway system. There are no railways ih 
railways in Afghanistan itself but air links exist and there 
are airports at Kabul, Kandahar, Jalalabad and Herat and 
several other places. Since there are no ports, the usual 
port for consignments destined for Afghanistan is Karachi, 
Pakistan® The historic highways leading, via Herat, Kabul 
and Kandahar, to the gateways of the Indo-Pakistan sub­
continent still possess their geostratetic significance®
The British Forward Policy of the 19th Geatury
sought to create a friendly and a viable Afghan buffer
state to stem the Russian encroachments in the region and
as such in 1893 the Durand Line was agreed upon as the line
of demarcation, and Russia accepted this region as the 
"British Sphere of Influence®"
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A  close study of the north western frontier of
Pakistan would clearly establish that its significance lies
in the fact that it contains the important Khyber, Kurram,
Tochi, Gomal and Bolan Passes (Peshawar, Bannu and Quetta
have served as effective and useful military encampments
for the defence of these geostrategic points), and these
passes provide the only viable overland link between
Pakistan and the rest of Asia* Almost all past invasions
of the Indus Valley and the plains of India beyond have
come through these passes; the geostrategic points the
defence of which now devolves on Pakistan* To the east of
Indus there is no physical barrier of any significance to
check the advance of the invading armies until the Burmese
frontier is reachedQ The central and defence of these passes
the
is, therefore, of absolute importance to\security of Pakistan.*
Even more important than these frontiers passes of * 
Paki stan e&ia the passes of the Hindu Kush in Afghanistan 
and as such the Hindu Kush is a much stronger proposition 
and an effective barrier against any hostile force from the 
north than are the frontier foothills of the Pak-Afghan 
border. The undemarc at e d frontier between Afghanistan and 
the Soviet Union in the Wakhan region does not pose much 
problem simply because of the mountainous and difficult 
terrain of the forbidding Pamirs and the lofty Hindu Kush* 
However, the control of the passes in the Hindu Kush range 
can give a hostile power a strong offensive advantage (this 
point has clearly been vindicated by the Chinese offensive 
in the North East Frontier Agency in 1962). Therefore, it has 
been the aim of both the defenders and invaders of the 
subcontinent to control the Hindu Kush and as such the routes
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which connect Afghanistan with the Soviet Union or Central1 
Asia on the one hand and with Pakistan on the other®
Invariably all the invaders who came from across 
the Durand Line in the past have strengthened their hold 
upon the Hindu Kush as a corollary to an attack upon the 
subcontinent® Invaders like Alexander the Great, Kinishka, 
Mahmud of Ghazna, Mohammad Ghauri, Babur, Hadir Shah, and 
Ahmad Shah Durani all marched into India from their 
military bases in Afghanistan® Many of these invaders and 
their successors were able to establish large empires in 
India and were able to check effectively the fresh waves of 
invasions from Central or Western Asia® Ai\ times a strong and
unified India was able to reverse the normal pattern of
k
invasions® The Indian Pmperor Ast>k (250 B eC.), for instance, 
was able to consolidate India under his rule, and pushed 
the frontiers of his empire over the Hindu Kush to protect 
the Western approaches to his empire and to provide it with 
more stable a frontier than the Indus• The Moghuls also 
carx’ied out extended struggle to retain their hold and 
control of Afghanistan, especially the impox^tant foci of 
routes as Herat, Kabul and Kandahar® The duration of the 
empires of India largely depended in the past upon the 
control of the Hindu Kush and the loss of t hi C o n t r o l  
invariable encouraged fresh waves of irruptions from Central 
or Western Asia® The region of the Hindu Kush, or modern 
Afghanistan, throughout history has been a region of 
transition through which central and south Asia were united® 
Before the emergence as a separate state in the middle of 
the eighteenth century, it formed part of a central Asian, 
a western Asian, or Indian empire® Its emergence as a separate
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state did not change its strategic location or its role as 
a transitional region® During the nineteenth century its 
existence was as much dependent upon political events in 
Central Asia and the subcontinent as it had been in the past®
The British, who had united the whole of India 
under their control, were twice in Central of the Hindu 
Kush during the nineteenth century, but political 
expediency ratherm than lack of power made them accept the 
present north stern frontier of Pakistan as the valid 
frontier between Afghanistan and British India* Russian 
expansion in Central Asia was one of the main factors which 
determined the British Poi*ward Policy in the area. To avoid 
a direct clash both the Csarist Russia and British India 
recognised the necessity of a neutral territory between 
their two empires and as such the Anglo-Russian Convention 
(St. B eterstierg) of 1907 accepted the buffer status of 
Afghanistan, and it would not be out of place to state here . 
that until 1919 Britain handled foreign affairs of 
Afghanistan, and after the partition of the subcontinent in 
1947 the defence of the north-western marches became the 
primary concern of Bakistan. In spite of the fact that the 
Pakistan-Soviet territories are only 25 miles apart in this 
area, their proximity holds no geostrategic significance 
in this case. But this argument may not hold in the case of 
Soviet Tadzhikistan, Kirghizia and K azafyldLstan bordering 
Chinese Sinkiang (Aksai Chin) which in turn borders 
Pakistani held Kashmir and controls the new all weather 
road (the old silk route), linking China and Pakistan.
Soviet troop movements have been reported and tension remains 
in the area, which looks potentially ominous, because this
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important Chinese region is very much open to the Soviet 
politico-economic penetration since the area is Soviet 
oriented geopolitically.
The Soviet Union in its embr-fyonic days did not 
lack space; now in its strength it enjoys a spacious lebens 
iraum such as the expansionist Hitler only dreamed of 
The aggrandizement of the U.S.S.R», achieved by diplomacy 
and by force? can in some areas look justifiable in -terms 
of history and ethnography? although in others it amounts 
to an arbitrary decision of the victor» During the initial 
period the Soviet Union was territorially curtailed Russia, 
confined by the cordon sanitaire of a suspicious and 
hostile world; and as such the consolidation of the 
Repalution at home took precedence. The result of such 
a policy and the aftermath of world war II have greatly 
been exploited, and the Soviet Union has recovered its 
"Western Lands" and gained much else both in Europe and in 
Asia. The new frontier zones of the Soviet Union character­
ized by their breadth provide the thresholds to further 
Soviet adventures.
It ought to be emphasized here that the Soviet
Interests in this borderland have not diminished, and in
fact, since the Tashkent Declaration of January 1966, these
interests have manifestly increased. These interests have
ways 9
been projected in a variety of/ ' and the first link in 
the chain of policy manoeuvres the idea of the so called 
Brezhnevas "collective security" was floated. Pakistan had 
no hesitation in rejecting the idea because she viewed it 
as an anti-China campaign, and as a friend of the Chinese 
Pakistan could not possibly enter into such an arrangement®
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In fact Pakistan expressed the 'view that it was an'Iii&o- 
Soviet endeavour to dominate the area and to impose the 
Brezhnev's concept of "limited'sovereignty" on the States 
of South and South East Asia. The Russian invasion of ;
Czechoslovakia had manifestly demonstrated; the ruthlessness v"; f 
with which such a concept had"been imposed? and in Pakistani 1; 
opinion this procedure could" as effectively be employed in 
South Asia.
The Indo-Soviet, "Treaty of Peace? Priendship and 
Cooperation" was the Second most important link in the chain/ 
and it fufther demonstrated the Soviet interests in the area,; 
"Russia will back India with force if necessary in the event 
of Wax* with Pakistan under a 20- year treaty, signed in Hew 
Delhi yesterday, that put India firmly in the Russian camp 
after years of non-alignment. . .If India were attacked, t 
there would be immediate: consultation with the Russians ■ 
to remove the threat and "to take appropriate effective 
measures" to counter It. Clearly, then, in the eyenfcbf an
fiH
Indo-Pakistan war, Russia might wage war on Pakistan® .•"
The Treaty was signed in a very hurried manner, "After several‘ 
blunt statements by...Pakistan threatening to go to war with 
India, Delhi sent the former Ambassador Mr. Dhar back to 
Moscow. Mr. GromykD forthwith flew to Delhi and signed the; . 
treaty within a few hours." • Article 9 of the Treaty 1
stipulates,"o.o.In the event of either party being subjected 
to attack or threat thereof, the High Contracting Parties. j*
shall immediately enter into mutual consultations with a ;
view to eliminate this threat and taking appropriate effective,.
' *' 6cmeasures to ensure the- peace and security of their countries *"
(Pk! ” The^3aiiy Tel e graph, Angus t 10 I
65 <3 Ibid«'
66. Keesings Contemporary Archives ;pe 24-773®
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Immediately after the entry of Indian forces in East 
Pakistan hoth Russia and India had made direct contact 
with each other, and as soon as the Indian forces were 
engaged into war on 3rd December 197^» in West Pakistan,
India despatched Mr. D.P.Dhar to Moscow and Bussia sent 
a senior representative (Mr. Kuznetsov) to Delhi to 
coordinate action against Pakistan during the Indo-Paid.stan 
war of 1971® These two diplomats remained at their respective 
posts during the whole duration of the war. ThijyWas an active 
Russian participation in coordinating her anti-Pakistan 
policy with India. The Western press had already forecast 
this policy. The Guardian correspondent Inder Malhotra
IT
wrote, India and the Soviet Union today signed a treaty 
of peace, friendship), and cooperation" under which Russia 
has virtually underwritten Indian defence in the event of 
an attack by Pakistan with or without connivance, support, 
or encouragement by China. The contents of the Treaty 
also shed light on the Indian concept of non-alignment and 
foreign observers were of the view that "Taking the world 
by surprise, India today discorded her policy of non- 
alignment and entered into a formal alliance with the Soviet 
Union6" Howeyer, India rejected these interpretations
and firmly stated her position to the contrary,"Mrs.Gahdhi 
similarly emphasized on August 9 that the Indo-Soviet 
treaty did not represent a reversal of India's policy of 
non-alignment. y These denials and firm rejections by India 
that she had entered into a formal defence alliance with
the Soviet Union were not taken seriously by Pakistan, and
677'” ~™7Dhe''"GlIsQ^  ^ —  ' —  —
68. The TiMes, August 10, 197%
69® Keesings Contemporary Archives p6 24773®
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the Indo-^akistan war of 1971 substantiated Pakistani 
point of view.
The Soviet Union has tried to mend her relations 
with Pakistan ever since the events of East Pakistan and 
the Indo-Pakistan war of 197*1 ® Pakistan has also shown some 
willingness to reciprocate the Soviet overtures of goodwill 
and as a result the Soviet Union has been cooperating with 
Pakistan in social,cultural, geological and economic fields®
•4 a
The Russians have already pledged £ 114 millions for the 
Karachi Steel Mill(The present estimates are very much 
greater £325 million) and has helped to train the personnel® 
Mr® Bhutto is said to have succeeded in persuading the 
Russian leaders, during his official visit to Moscow in 
November 1972, to impress upon Afghanistan to desist from 
helping the dissidents in Baluchistan and N.W.F.P. These 
pledges and understandings must be viewed with a degree of 
scepticism since the Soviet Union as a “continental" 
and "oceanic superpoitfer" is bound to avail of any opportunity 
which might strengthen her hold in South Asia and her eyes 
are specially trained on the south-west coast of Pakistan. 
This would be of greater temptation to the Soviet Union 
in the event of further dismemberment of Pakistan, "Russia1s 
plans to isolate Pakistan continue to prosper® As a result 
of her alliances with Iraq and India she is both increasing 
her pressure on the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean and 
also tightening the encirclement of China® It was the fact 
with India in 197^ that gave Mrs. Gandhi the green line to 
intervene in East Pakistan...Pakistan was cut down to half 
its former size, and pro-Indian, pro-Russian Bangladesh 
was created.....Mr. Bhuttors problems in residual 
Pakistan have been exacdrbated by subversion from Afghanistan
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with full Russian support. The aim here was the familiar 
one of trying to detach much of the North-West frontier 
Province and Baluchistan to form a separate state of 
Pakhtoonistan ..., This is the Background against which 
America, after much heart-searching , decided to lift
70
the 10 year old embargo on arms for both Pakistan and India....1'
The failure of Pakistan to secure 
some permanent benefits in the field of external relations 
may be ascribed to a number of very important reasons,for 
example, the short-sightedness of the foreign policy makers 
of Pakistan especially in the context of India and the 
" Superpowers ", The leadership in Pakistan always believed , 
and this was presented as a major feature of her foreign 
policy, that Pakistani allies,especially the United States 
of America would come to her assistance in case of war against 
India.The policy makers also emphasized that such aid would 
materialise in the shape of moral,diplomatic and military 
support for the Government and people of Pakistan.
70, The Daily Telegraph,London,February 2,1975.
The United States and its allies in SEATO/CENTO,however,were 
very reluctant to make any such commitment in spite of their 
treaty obligations to Pakistan.The United States was very correct 
to ignore Pakistan’s request for help,under the Manila Treaty 
of 1954,during the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965*According to the 
Americans such a help could only be given in case of communist 
subversion and aggression,and not against India.The Manila Treaty 
is clearly on the side of the Americans on this point,however, 
the United States was under obligations to come to Pakistan’s 
aid under the Cento and the 1959 Pak-American bilateral defence 
Agreement of 1959.The fact is the United States openly denied 
that it had any such obligations,and furthermore,pursued a policy 
of even-handedness which meant more harm^ to Pakistan than India 
since India's friends,the Soviet Union in particular,continued 
to give military assistance to India during the 1965 war.
For a number of reasons the Johnson adminis­
tration ,during the 1965 crisis,was not very friendly towards 
Pakistan in spite of their treaty relations. First? the Sino-Indian 
border dispute of 1962 ,and the Pakistani protests against a 
unilateral supply of arms to India without prior consultations 
with Pakistan.Secondly the open American involvement in Vietnam, 
and the bombing of North Vietnam under the pretext of the Gulf 
of Tonkin incident;and the lack of support from Pakistan towards 
the American policy in Indo-China.Thirdly the Sino-Pakistan 
Boundary Agreement of March 1963.This did not please the Johnson
Administration,since the President was personally hostile to
a
China because of its support for North Vietnam;and as/result the 
Americans denied B&feisten any military assistance to Pakistan.
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Again the Americans refused to give any military 
assistance to Pakistan during the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971, 
and in fact , suspended Pakistan's economic aid during the 
crisis m  East Pakistan ( Phis aid was not i^sumed till late in
1972 ).
During the 1971 war against India,Pakistan requested
help from the United States within the provisions of the
bilateral defensive arrangements.This was announced by an
official spokesman in Rawalpindi on December 11,1971, that
Pakistan had invoked its " understanding " with friendly
nations to come to its assistance.The statement was an obvious
refernce to the bilateral defence agreement of 1959 between
Pakistan and the United States,which stated in its preamble
that " the Government of the United States regards as vital
to its national interest and world peace the preservation of the
independence and integrity of Pakistan," and lays down that
" in the ease of aggression against Pakistan the U.S.Government
...will take appropriate action,including the use of armed forces
71as may be mutually agreed upon,"' In Washington,however, the
State Department denied on December 14,1971,that under the 1959
agreement the U.S.A. was obliged to come to the aid of Pakistan,
and emphasized that it had been made clear to Pakistan on
numerous occasions that the commitment would become operative
72only in the case of communist aggression.
The reason for such a denial was very simple. The
71. See Keesings Contemporary Archives,p.16748a .
72. ibid. p.25071.
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Americans were not prepared to militarily side with Pakistan 
against India,which according to the American point of view, 
it seems,held greater geopolitical importance and could prove 
an effective bulwark against Eommunist China.The American were 
not prepared to alienate the Indian public opinion which they 
valued very highly.This situation was never really fathomed by 
the Pakistani policy makers who repeatedly gave a totally 
distorted picture to their countrymen.The Pakistanis as such 
were made to believe that the American military support was 
guaranteed as a result of her membership of the military pacts.
Such an umderstanding,in Pakistan,completely ignored 
the inherent contradictions and the paradoxical nature of the 
interests of the participants within the framework of SEATO and 
CENTO.Apparently Pakistan joined these defensive arrangements to 
safeguard her' territorial integrity and political independence, 
specifically against a possible Indian military action. Iran 
joined CENTO to protect her interests against communist sub­
version or aggression.Turkey joined the Pact to safeguard her 
territories against a possible Soviet incursion.The Americans 
were clearly interested in the containment of the communist 
expansion in the region.Pakistan faced a similar situation 
in SEATO and found the same contradictions ,and in fact,had very 
little in Common with Newifealand,Australia,Philippines,Thailand 
and Prance. These sts^bs were only interested in safeguarding 
their territorial integrity and political independence against 
communist subversion or aggression.The United Kingdom had aleady 
started to pursue a policy of withdrawl from the East of Suez, 
and moreover,it enjoyed very close cultural and economic ties 
with India ,and was not prepared to jeopardise its economic
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investment simply to please Pakistan. Prance had learnt her
lesson after the Dien Bien Phu debacle and decided to minimise .
her activities within the framework of the Manila Pact of 1954.
These were some of the inherent contradictions which the leader-
that
ship in Pakistan had failed to appreciate ,an<^ / the
Manila Pact had practically no value for Pakistan.
Pakistan’s failure to attract support from 
the Soviet union in her disputes with India was due to (a). 
Pakistan’s membership of the western sponsored military pacts,
4bf) Pakistan’s increasing friendship with China and the deepening 
Sino-Soviet rift,(c) Pakistan’s refusal to join the n Collective 
Security System " as propounded by Mr.Breshnev in 1969,and (d) 
the growing Indo-Soviet relations especially since the signing 
of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace,Friendship and Cooperation 
of August 9,1971.
People’s Republic of China gave Pakistan 
moral and material help against India in 1965,however,this was 
severely limited during the East Pakistan crisis and the war 
with India in 1971,because China apparently did no wish to openly 
and militarily side with Pakistan since the Chinese leadership 
considered the movement in East Pakistan as a national liberation 
movement against a military dictatorship;and also because of the 
massive concentration of the Soviet forces along China’s north­
western borders,and the Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971.China,however, 
emphasized its interest in preserving the n state sovereignty 
and national independence of Pakistan ” which practically meant 
that China had,in fact,reconciled with the idea of a dismembered 
Pakistan,in view of the situation prevailing in E&tet Pakistan, 
and the consequent military intervention by India.
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With regard to Pakistan’s troubled relations with 
Afghanistan it is important to emphasize here that her terri­
torial disputes along the Durand line are mainly due to the fact 
that the North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan are stric­
tly speaking a border zone ( The presence of Azad Illaqa or the 
unadministered tribal belt in the area is a good example ) where • 
the territorial limits must be clarified,defined,
delineated,demarcated and effectively consolidated so as to bring 
some stability in the area.The Pak-Iran Boundary Agreement of 
1958 ( implemented on 6-2-1959 and the final protocol exchanged 
on 31-8-1960 ),is a case in point.
These are some of the Obvious examples where Pakistan’s 
external relations have singularly failed to achieve their ends', 
and as a result of which Pakistan found itself totally helpless,, 
at home and abroad,and was allowed to be dismembered in 1971#
CHAPTER #
External Relations of Pakistan : The Alignment Period*
The emergence of Pakistan as an independent sovereign 
state with physically separated areas presented her with 
enormous economic, political and security problems. To 
ensure her socio-economic development and safeguard her 
territorial integrity Pakistan opted to align herself with 
the West and some of the Asian countries e.g. Turkey, Iran, 
Iraq, Thailand and Philippines. These groupings projected 
the divergent requirements of the participants in the 
context of international relations and the prevalent power 
politics. The West spearheaded by the United States of 
America was primarily concerned with the containment of 
the rising tide of communist influence and its threatened 
inroads amongst the emerging nations of the world 
especially in Asia and Africa* The West endeavoured to 
extend friendly co-operation and assistance in the economic, 
defence, cultural, social and technical fields and offered 
security and protection, in the guise of multilateral and 
bilaterial treaties, against communist threat and subversion. 
The newly emergent nations on the periphery of the Soviet 
Union and the People*s Republic of China were considered 
suitable and effective points of deterrence against 
communist infilteration or subversion.
The United States of America and her allies held 
the view that by injecting massive economic aid coupled 
with security guarantees the communist advance in South 
and Southeast Asia could effectively be stemmed and the
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"Dominos” consolidated* Pakistan was identified as one 
of the prospective participants whose economic hase and 
defensive potentials required to he strengthened* From 
the western point of view Pakistan with her Islamic 
ideology and zeal looked an ideal candidate in the western 
scheme of global interests and strategy aimed at curtailing 
the communist advance, and precisely for this reason 
Pakistan was invited to join the anti-communist alliances. 
However, the reason for Pakistan's participation in the 
military pacts with the West was not dictated by her 
hatred or contempt for communist ideology or actions but by 
the instinct for survival and self-preservation in particular 
against possible Indian action aimed at undoing the 
partition11... there were several important parties and 
personages in India who had made it very plain that they 
will unite Pakistan and India and undo partition... India, 
for some reason, which it considered to be justifiable, 
massed her troops on the borders of Pakistan in March 1950, 
poised for attack... again in July 1951 India considered it 
necessary... to mass its troops on our borders...to overawe
A
us and to invade us” • Mr. Z.A. Bhutto, told the Pakistan 
National Assembly;"The main driving force behind a 
nation's foreign policy is its urge to maintain its 
independence and territorial integrity...to preserve its
p
distinct ideological personality.”
The important clash of ideas within the multilateral
defence alliances has very clearly manifested the
paradoxical attitudes of the participants and their
T; Pakistan's Prime Minister H.'SVS'uhr aw&r dy,Dawn.,
February 23, 1957.
2* BHUTTO, Z.A. Foreign Policy of Pakistan,Karachi
1964, p.2?
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divergent interest sphere were sharp and divergent views among
the.signatories of the South. East Asia Treaty Organisation and
the Manila, Treaty of 1954 was a vivid example.Whereas Pakistan
considered the provisions of the Treaty to he effectively
applied against any external aggression or internal subversion, ■
the United States of America understood the provisions to be
applicable only against the communist aggression or subversion.
Pakistan invoked the provisions of the Treaty during the Indo-
Palcistan war of 1965 but the United States refused to oblige
and the other signatories acquiesced with the American position.
Pakistan1s membership of the South East Asia
Treaty Organisation, the Baghdad .-Pact (.Now Central Treaty
Organisation) and her friendship with the United States of
America were dictated by her economic requirements and the
preservation of her territorial integrity. Pakistan joined the
Baghdad Psxt( Central Treaty Organisation) to safeguard West
Pakistan and to foster closer relations with the countries of
the Near East with whom she had common affinities( Religion,
history and culture ), Mr.Hamidul Haq Chaudhary,the Minister
of Foreign Affairs, addressing the National Assembly said," the
development of the closest friendship with the Middle Eastern
countries has been the cornerstone of our policy..-pursuant
to our policy to strengthen the fabric of peace in this vital
region and to ensure its stability,Pakistan acceded to the Turko- 
* q
it  ->
Iraqi pact along with Iran and the United Kingdom. The Arab
opinion,however,was sharply split over the viability and the
if as*manoeuvre
purpose of such a defensive arrangement.The Egyptian/considered/
Iraq withdrew after the coup of 1958.
3.Foreign Relations(0.P.),Karachi,April,1956,p.35.
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to split the Arabs, and King Ibne Saud of Saudi Arabia 
was perturbed to learn that “Islamic state as that of 
Pakistan should accede to those who have joined hands 
with Zionist Jews11 Egypt*s dislike of the pact may be 
attributed to (a) deep rooted hatred for Turkey (b)
Nasser*s friendship with “non-aligned1* India and (c) the 
prospective challenge to Nasser*s leadership in the area# 
The Suez cirsis of 1956 brought some of the underlying 
fears to the surface and Pakistan*® relations with Egypt 
were put under strain. In November 1956 at a meeting of 
the Baghdad Pact held without the presence of the United 
Kingdom, the three Muslim members of the Pact condemned 
Israel for invading Egypt, and demanded that the United 
Kingdom should withdraw her forces from Egyptian territory. 
The meeting also admitted the sovereign rights of Egypt in 
her nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company, Mr. H.S. 
Suhrawardy, after the meeting on 2$rd November issued 
a statement in which he criticised Egypt for blockading 
the Canal. This was considered hostile to Egypt, and in 
order to manifest his, resentment President Nasser rejected 
Pakistan’s offer to participate in the United Nations 
Emergency Poree while accepting India’s contingent.
Mr. Suhrawardy in a rejoinder in December 1956 said“the 
Arab world is divided among themselves and even if they 
were united, zero plus zero plus zero is after all equal
4
to zero!?; Mr. Suhrawardy* s statement could only be 
considered in the light of Egyptian attitude towards
Prime Minister's Statement on Foreign Policy,
9th December (O.P.), p. 17
265
Pakistan and her dispute with India over the status of 
Kashmir since President Kasser had stated "Suez is as 
dear to Egypt as Kashmir is to India"*'* President Uasser 
seemed to follow the Russian way of thinking on Kashmir 
since he openly sided with India and vehemently criticised 
Pakistan for having established good and friendly relations 
with the United Kingdom and France through the S.E.A.T.O. 
and the Baghdad Pact. These two western countries had 
invaded Egypt in collusion with Israel, therefore, the 
Egyptian leader doubted Pakistan’s credentials as a 
friend of the Arabs* This whole episode made Pakistan to 
reappraise her policy vis-a-vis the Arabs and the Pan- 
Islamic movement* Pakistan initiated a more realistic 
policy towards the Muslim countries and her emotive 
attitude towards Pan-Islamism seemed to disappear. President 
Nasser’s actions thus caused Pakistan "to be guided more 
by facts and less by theories and sentiments"*
Pakistan sighed the Manila Treaty of 1954- largely 
with a view to safeguarding her truncated eastern half 
against Indian action because she believed Indian policy 
to be based on the view"that the creation of Pakistan was 
a tragic mistake which might still be corrected, at least 
as East Bengal is concerned".^ Thus Pakistan became fully
aligned with the West and, for a time, acted as a pawn in
the global strategy of the United States of America.Pakistan 
had offered communications facilities to U.S.A. in the
5* Stephen, Ian, Pakistan, p. 172
6. Round Table, 1956-57, p. 174
7* Callard K. Pakistan’s foreign Policy: An
Interpretation, New York, 1957, P*11
266
vicinity of Peshawar in the northwest of West Pakistan 
and the United States had been using Pakistan territory 
for U-2 flying missions over the Soviet Union. There is 
no denying the fact that Pakistan enjoyed great technical 
and economic benefits owing to her membership of S.E.A.T.O. 
and CENTO, but at the same time she suffered greatly in 
her relations with the Soviet Union, Egypt and to some 
extent the People’s Republic of China. These countries 
not only suspected the defensive arrangements but openly 
criticised these western oriented military groupings and 
denounced these pacts as the instruments of American 
"imperialism" directed against the emerging nations of 
Asia and Africa.
Pakistan achieved a notable success during the 
first Asian-African Conference held in Bandung,
Indonesia from 18 to 24* April 1955* This Conference 
was sponsored by Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia and 
Pakistan and was attended by 24* Asian-African countries 
in addition to the sponsors. The Pakistan Prime Minister 
Mr. Mohammad Ali Bogra was successful in allaying the 
misapprehensions of the leaders of the People’s Republic 
of China with regard to Pakistan’s membership of the 
military pacts. Mr* Chou En-Lai the Prime Minister of 
the People’s Republic of China while addressing the 
Political Committee of the Bandung Conference on 23 April 
1955 said "...I paid a visit to the Prime Minister of 
Pakistan. He told me that although Pakistan was a party 
to a military treaty, Pakistan was not against China.
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Pakistan had no fear China would commit aggression against
her* As a result of that, we achieved a mutual understanding..
The Prime Minister of Pakistan further assured me that if
the United States should take aggressive action under the
military treaty or if the United States launched a global
war, Pakistan would not be involved in it....Just as it was
not involved in the Korean war...through these explanations
we achieve a mutual understanding. This creates agreement
and harmony amongst us in understanding each other on
8collective peace and co-operation The Bandung Conference
provided Pakistan with a good opportunity for a dialogue 
with the People's Republic of China and the perusal of the 
initiative resulted in the establishment of friendly and 
good neighbourly relations between Pakistan and China in 
spite of their ideological differences,.the difference 
between the political systems of China and Pakistan and 
the divergence of views on many problems should not prevent 
the strengthening of friendship.. .with a view to promoting 
further the cordisSs, and friendly relations existing between 
China and Pakistan, due importance should be given to
Q
commercial and cultural relations between the two countries..1 
These friendly ties have been strengthened between China 
and Pakistan because of the absence of any "real conflict 
of interests".
Pakistan achieved another diplomatic success during 
the Bandung Conference where she effectively challenged the
8. HASAU,K.S.Documents on the Poreign Relations of 
Pakistan, Karachi,1966, pp.361-62
9. Ibid. p. 363
the proclaimed Five Principles "Panch Sheel” of the Indian 
foreign policy* These Five Principles were agreed upon 
between India and China during their discussions on "Trade 
and Intercourse between India and the Tibet Region of China, 
29 April 1954- and were as follows s (1) mutual respect for 
each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty,(2)mutual 
non-aggression, (3) mutual non-interference in each other's 
internal affairs, (4) equality and mutual benefit, and
(5) peaceful co-existence*^ It may be deemed surprising 
that agreement failed to incorporate the right of self- 
determination, the peaceful settlement of disputes and the 
admissibility of collective security*All of these principles 
had a direct bearing on the Indo-Pakistan relations 
especially with regard to Kashmir and the military pacts
of which Pakistan was a member* As a substitute to "Panch 
She el" the Prime Minister of Pakistan Mr* Mohammad Ali Bogra
H
presented his "Seven Principles" to the Conference* They 
were (1) sovereignty and territorial integrity of all 
nations; (2) equality of all independent nations;(3) non­
interference in the internal affairs of one country by 
another; (4) non-aggression; (5) rights of self-defence 
of each country to be exercised singly or collectively;
(6) self-determination for all peoples and abhorrence of
colonial exploitation in every shape; (7). settlement of
dispute through peaceful means, that is, by negotiations,
11mediation and arbitration. These principles specifically
10. Ibid p.40
11. Chaudhury,Pakistan Relations with India, 1947-1966, 
p. 248
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include self-determination, peaceful solution of disputes 
and individual or collective security, all three of which 
are accepted standards of international conduct and 
enshrined in the precepts of the TJ.N. Charter.
The Bandung Conference modified the "Five Principles"
and in its final communique enumerated "Ten Principles" for
the conduct of relations among the independent sovereign
states and emphasized the need for the recognition of
"the equality of all races and of the equality of all
12nations large and small". These principles were in
conformity with the cherished goals of the U.N* and upheld
"the right of each nation to defend itself singly or
collectively" but without "the particular interests of any
of the big p o w e r s a n d  upon the Afro-Asian countries to
abstain "from acts or threats of aggression or the use of 
14force" • Prime Minister Nehru was unhappy at the
endorsement of collective security, he had no other choice
but to accept the compromised version since the majority, 
accepted the principle. The Times special correspondent to 
the conference reported in a despatch: "It has been 
Mr. Chou En-Lai's week...From Turkey to Philippines,
Mr. Chou En-Lai spread reason and tolerance",^ and in its 
editorial The Times observed: "Indian diplomacy displayed 
all its customary adroitness but could not have succeeded 
in overcoming the distrust which Delhi's neutralism implies
12. Hasan opcit, p. 60
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
13. ®he Times, April 23, 1935*
in such powers as Turkey, Iran, and Thailand.. *"16. India
in the person of her Prime Minister Nehru seemed to have
lost the charm of a leader and failed to impress the
Afraisian states and Nehru's reputation suffered a setback.
Prime Minister Chou En-Lai seemed to have stolen the show
"the delegates from states which had not recognised the
communist regime were favourably impressed by his attitude,
and in general greater respect for and sympathy for
17Communist China was generated". r As a result Pakistan 
appeared to have partially succeeded in breaking the ;
Indian policy of containment against her in Asia and Africa.
The Sino-Indian border conflict in 1962 seriously
affected the political and military thinking of the regional
and world powers. The conflict underlined the vested interests
of China and India, and projected a serious trupture between
the two countries. As a result the United States showed her
great eagerness to bring India to her fold and rushed massive
military aid to India with a view to containing the People's
Republic of China. The Kennedy Administration in U.S.A.
believed that India had the right size to serve as a bulwark
in the containment of China* Therefore, it was considered
expedient to give large scale aid to India so as to
strengthen her economic base for the struggle against
communism".• .in Kennedy's view, the long-range struggle with
communism in Asia depended on how India solved its economic
problems. His goal was described as an attempt to turn India
into a "showplace" for his ideas on what the Western world
18should do for an Asian country". Mr. Kennedy was never
17. Ibid.
18. Hindu, November 16, 1960.
16. The Times,London,April ?3,1955.
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enthusiastic towards Pakistan and the direction of American 
policy to the subcontinent after the Sino-Indian conflict 
has been clearly analysed by the American columnist in the 
following words s “Washington recognises Pakistan’s loyalty 
to the two Asian alliances arranged by the Eisenhower 
administration and rather less enthusiastically endorsed by 
Kennedy. But we also recognize that Pakistan represents only 
20 per cent of the subcontinent and is divided into distant 
halves. The sole hope of establishing a viable competitor 
to Ohina is India. So our affection for an ally is tempered 
by geographical reality,"^ She changed tone of the American 
administration and their support for “neutral” India gave 
Pakistan an opportunity further to normalise her relations 
with her two mighty neighbours, that is* the Soviet Union 
and the People’s Republic of China. Pakistan has shown a 
keen interest , in the development of closer commercial and 
trade relations with these countries especially in the field 
of barter trade. The legendary “Silk Poute" has been 
converted into an all season road which has facilitated
the trade between Pakistan apd .China and provided the
. ' with port facilities at,'Karachi,
Chinese products/ Since 1962 Pakistan has signed a boundary 
agreement* an air agreement and commercial agreements with 
China. In addition China has supplied Pakistan with 
considerable military hardware. Pakistan has also received 
military aid from the Soviet Union.
Pakistan’s disillusionment with her allies made 
her reshape and redirect her external relations. Pakistan 
had no desire to take second place or live under Indian
19. C.L.Sulzberger, in New York Times, December 24, 1962
20. Round Table 1960-61, p. 409
hegemony and leadership. The American Vice President Lyndon 
Johnson had made a very disturbing statement in 1961: "At 
President Kennedy's request, I had urged Mr. Nehru to
20extend his leadership to other areas in South-East Asia".
; gcT
Johnson seen*s to have followed these lines after succeeding
to the Presidency in 1963, andthe America's neutralist
attitude during the Xndo-Pakistan war of 1965 clearly
established the changed direction of her policy. Pakistan
was obliged to adopt counter measures and began to take an
independent and positive line in international relations.
Pakistan showed indifference to SEATO and CENTO and helped
21render these military pacts ineffective. Pakistan has 
manifested increasing desire to be linked with the "non- 
aligned world" and endeavoured to adopt a more open and 
realistic approach in her external relations. The "most 
allied ally" was beginning to find independent identity 
and positive direction in foreign policy.
21. Pakistan withdrew from SEATO in 1972.
20„Round Table,1960-61,p.409.
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' CHAPTER t
A*
Conclxtsion
Geopolitieally Pakistan emerged as a dislocated 
State with a variety of inherent problems e eg«, defence, 
political incoherence5 economic and administrative 
disparitiesi and it needs emphasizing here that the 
"possession of an uninterrupted territory.is one of the 
principal requirements for the smooth functioning of a
-i
political entity®" Moreover, the birth of Pakistan was 
subjected to the tremendous psychological disadvantage 
that the State would find itself in great economic 
distress and that its vulnerability in the economic 
field would inevitably lead towards its eventual collapse® 
The two distant and distinct parts of Pakistan were bound 
by Islamic faith and an inborn'desire to frne- themselves 
from socio-economic and political exploitations® The 
people believed that the inception of Pakistan would able 
them to throw off the yoke of economic exploitation and 
tq rehabilitate their position through an acceptable 
dem©2©:fetratie process® However, the fragmented nature of 
the State caused serious problems and in spite of the fact 
that "Pakistani two Wings"®®® were united by a common 
religious faith - but divided by numerous cultural 
contrasts® As happens frequently with fragmented States, 
one part of the State, in this case the East, felt itself
1c Robinson, GoWoS®, "West Berlin"Geography
of an Enclave," Geographical Review, Vol* 
p* 54-0» 1953®
the victim of political discrimination. Charges of 
"domestic colonialism" abounded, and in the end the 
State broke up as East Pakistan « new Bangladesh -
2fought for independence, dded by neighbouring India*"
’ j j
Thesne were, some of the high ideals which the 
people cherished within the concept of a strong and 
prosperous Pakistan, but their hopes of achieving these
objectives were eroded by the entrenched position of internal
'and external .
/ v ested interests," In every state there are forces tending 
to reduce its cohesion,, In extreme cases they break the 
state into two or more parts, as Czechoslovakia was 
broken up early in 1 9 3 9 * In other eases, it may serve 
merely to make administration more difficult and to 
weaken the political power, of the Stateo»• • *««Q3he division 
of a state area into two or more parts by the territory 
of another, as Pakistan* 9.»is a matter of serious 
importance®"^ Externally the very existence of Pakistan 
as an independent state was. challenged by India who never 
gave up the idea of the eventual reunification of "Bharat 
Mata"® India used various economic, political and military 
means to demonstrate her dominance as the arbiter of the 
future political patterns on the subcontinent and in the 
pursuit of her policy she received useful help from outside 
powers especially the Soviet Union® lo counterbalance this
2• de BliJ, H.Qh Systematic Political Geography,
London, 1972* p* 4*0
3® Pounds, B®J.G®, Political Geography, McGraw
Hill, 1972, p®7®
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'. inherent threat to her security and independence, •'Pakistan
opted to align herself with Ameiica since Pakistani leaders
held, the -view' that the Americans1 with their worid-wide:
. influence would help Pakistan ,to strengthen her defences
and assist her economic development® The Americans ;wex^e
more, than keen,' -at the . time, to' aid Pakistan in both the
fields since . they thought that',a strong Muslim. Pakistan
vpurpose ■- • :
would serve;a useful/invtheir global strategy; of containing :
Communist infltience especially in the Middle East and South
Asia0 Consequently Palcistan proved, more than willing to .
support American policy by joining bilateral and multi-
■; : - - .. Asia.,
lateral defensive arrangements e.g®, South Eas.i/Treaty; 
Organisation and Central Treaty Organization (Baghdad Pact).® 
These pacts gave Pakistan a sense of security and considerable 
, economic and technical assistance ,ih addition to strengthen™ 
ing her armed forces^ Hox-/ever, her* membership of the various 
defensive arrangements mailed hen out as one of the active 
pawns in the.game of powerpolitics and the cold war® The 
Soviet Union openly and vehemently' criticised' Pakistan for 
allotting herself to be drawn into powerpolitics® Pandit 
Nehru (the., then Indian Prime MinisterX showed his indignation 
and criticised Pakistan for bringing the cold war to the 
subcontinent and employing this' as: an excuse to wriggle out 
of his international• commitments- oVer Kashmir,, and accused ;; 
Pakistan of having “destroyed the entire basis for a 
plebiscite in Kashmir1„n President Nasser: of Egypt accused
Pakistan o f :subverting the Arab .world and collusion with 
the i>ro-Israeli powers. These werejsome of the formidable
Keesings op® cit®, p 0 14895®
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obstacles that Pakistan had to, face as a result of her 
close association with the Americans end v/hich consequently 
proved more damaging than the help she received from 
America and her allies was beneficialw
Had India accepted the emergence of Pakistan as 
an independent sovereign State and showed some degz>ee of 
magnanimity towards her immediately after partition, Pakistan’s 
fears would have been allayed and an atmosphere of eoxvliality 
generated. A. logical requisite for the two developing 
countries who shared a variety of common interests. Instead, 
an atmosphere of suspicion and mutual hostility was 
nurtured on both sides much to the detriment of the two 
peoples, and as such provided opportunity.for outside 
powers to influence the chain of events on the subcontinent.
The fact that a large Hindu minority (20 to 25 
pex^ cent) remained in East Pakistan after the partition, 
the pi'oeess of national integration was undermined since 
this large minority had never opted for Pakistan and had 
rejected the very idea of "Two Nations11 and the concept of 
Pakistan® There is no denying the fact that a Muslim 
minority remained in India (ten per cent), especially in 
the United Province and the Central Province, and many 
Indians considered them.as "Pakistanis in disguise" but 
their position was comparatively weaker than the Hindus 
in East Pakistan and Sind® The Muslim minority in India 
was not in a position to influence the fissiperous 
tendencies in India, and were not effective in terms of 
their geopolitical location. Had this minox^ity been located 
within the outer fringes of India especially in the Northwest.
of post partition India then their position would have been
much stronger and they might have played more active 
role in the.'Indian politics particularly In t h e 'area 
of Indo-PaldLstan relations* This point is amply ', 
vindicated-in the case of Northern. Irelai\d: where a 
substantial Catholic minority remained after the partition 
in 1922, and who have shown every sympathy towards the 
Irish Hepttblican Army, the Republican Movement and have 
shown a real desire towards the reunification of Ireland. 
Moreover the division of Indian Punjab Into Haryana and 
Punjab clearly demonstrated that the large Sikh population 
was not pleased with the state of affair s., within' the . .
Indian Union and were clamouring.for more autonomy and 
possibly desiring the establishment of Khalistan, 
independent of the Indian Union. Had the Muslims not 
migrated to Pakistan from Gurd&spur, Jullundur, Ludhiana, '. 
Peroaepur and Amritsar the position of the Indian 
goverenment would have been comparatively weakened vis-a- 
vis the Sikh demand for Klialistanand instead of dividing 
the Indian Punjab into two-states Haryana and Punjab, the 
Sikhs could have been encouraged and helped towards the 
establishment of their own homeland or at least a fully 
autonomous state within the Indian Unions which in turn 
would have given valid grounds tO'jbhe people in Tamilnad., 
Misoland and Nagaland, for greater autonomy, if not outright 
independence® As a result India would have been deprived 
of her geopolitical competence to assimilate or annex 
Bhutan and Sikkim into the Indian Union* .
The position of the Indian Muslims weakened 
further since the Indian leadership .advanced their 
ar*gument that if they allowed the pi’omised plebiscite in
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Kashmir the potentials of communal bloodshed would 
seriously jeopardise the limes and property of the 
Indian Muslims and their interests could heiseriously 
damaged® In fact this argument was simply advanced to 
sbulhify the concept of "(Two Nations” which the Indians 
never really accepted, There have been more than nine 
hundred communal riots in India since independence 
resulting in bloodshed and wide scale loss of property* 
and the Muslim minority in India has been the real 
sufprer® This vh a s ; also belied the Indian claims of 
^ j ^ l a r i s m  and democratic socialism/1 Depsite the 
assertion in the Indian Constitution that the State 
has no official religion, it is difficult to deny that 
in fact it has been established around the Hindu faith, 
Therefore, the Indian argument cannot be considered as 
tenable*
The separatist tendencies in East Pakistan could 
be explained in the socio-economic and politic&l&is- 
satisfaction of the people in the eastern wing, the 
total lack of enthusiasm for the concept of Pakistan 
amongst the Hindu minority, who had always favourably 
looked towards Calcutta rather than Dacca, and the 
politically disenchanted dissidents whose only interest 
vested in the possibility of wielding political power<,
One of the foremost duties of the political parties and 
their leadership in Pakistan should have been ("was) to 
forge national unity through tolerance and political
Pounds, , op, cit, p©?e
compromise- so as to effectively check the growth of 
ch
parcelalism and regionalism,., and stem the tide of 
fissiperous tendencies, especially in East Pakistan, 
which could ultimately prove fatal for the territorial 
integrity and the very existence/of an independent 
Pakistan® It would not be out of place to note here 
that siich a goal could very: well have been achieved 
through some degree of democratic processes and by a 
sustained effort towards interregional understanding 
and cooperation® IJnfortunately the .political leadership 
in Pakistan failed to fully appreciate the geopolitical 
.compulsions .of a dislocated Pakistan, and the gi'adual 
drift towards author!tartanism generated a strong feelin 
of mistrust, fear and hatred for the central government, 
which the regional political leadership exploited to 
their advantage very effectively® The gradual disinteg­
ration of the Pakistan Muslim League (the political 
party which was largely responsible for the creation of 
Pakistani provided the regional' political parties to
voice their demands with added confidence and with a 
CH
definite parental and regional lines, which proved so 
damaging, and consequently led to the disintegration of 
, Pakistan®
Keeping in view the geopolitical limitations
of Pakistan a true federal structure with a ibicameral
legislature, would have safeguarded1 the legitimate rights
./■ V' ■' . ch
of the federating units, eliminating the par*o{iial
tendencies and the vicious circle of suspicion, hate and
fear among the people of Pakistan: as a whole® Instead aV1
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Quasi fedex'al or more appropriately a Quasi Unitary
State was established under the Republican Constitution
of 1956 and the Ayub'Constitution of 1962, which brought
the centrifugal and centripital forces into a direct
clash, and as such the fissiperous elements were allowed
to work fast and effectively in destroying the unity of
Pakistan® This process had, apply been demonstrated in
the failure of United Arab Federation (Iraq. and Jordan
dissolved in 1956), United Arab Reptiblic (Egypt and
Syria dissolved in 1961) and the Malaysian Federation
(Malaya and Singapore dissolved in 1965)® In the case
of Pakistan the need for national integration was much
more important because of her specific geographic 
location ” exfcreme case in the division of Pakistan
into West and East Pakistan.»«0The two are accessible to
one another by ship, but the difference between the ports
of Karachi and Chittagong is about 5000 miles. This fact
alone has necessitated a federal Constitution^ it has
increased innumerably the defence problems, and weakened
seriously the homogeneity of the State e ® * ”6*
W  tP M lW a if IxMd* wh¥n W  I l f ' 9W  W
A close study of the geopolitical factors of 
Pakistan would reveal that there were a number of inherent 
problems in th© very method bf partitioning the sub­
continent which adversely affected the geopolitical and
6” " ibid, p® 57 "
* * * * ■* -x- * iQ
&ny>Dsc'e?a,
economld life of the nascent state, u*. .few modern 
states started their independent existence®* .under 
such severe initial difficulties as Pakistan® Not 
only,1 the new country split, into two wings ®«* .many 
vital arteries were severed in the process® Thus 
the :east‘ wing lost its principal.port, the pivot 
of its railway system, and the industrial complex 
that'had,processed its jute, while the West Wing’s 
;.f rentiers.with India cut across the extensive and,- 
all-important Punjab irrigation network, leaving 
vital'.-headworksbin Kashmir and -India. „ .lacking an 
established political send administrative capital ” ' 
and commercial and financial centre.•.born in; 
communal1 strife and political and economic claas 
-bordered- b y ‘bos tilev-neighbours, the country *S mere ' y/. 
survival as,a political unit was remarkable®
Edwards has also' expressed similarf;viewsp 
"Hadclaffc 1ad had great difficulty in drawing his 
dines on uho map® Indeed he found it almost impossible : 
-to get holdkbf: large-scale maps on which to draw them®.e 
and "P.adclif fe had been forced to -work with inadequate 
_data* > Hib/pfcpblem'-dr'the Punjab was not just that of
dividing J areas, of bommimity as it mainly had "in . ,
■ " . < - q
Bengal® In the Punjab it was a matter of water.”■
Q7'"~~" Myrdal, . Gxinnar^-Asian Dramas An Inquiry into-" the 
, I Poverty of Nations, ^ol* 1'^ London, 1968, pv 305 *
9* Edwardes, P * S * Nehru:A  Political Biography,
b:Lqndon, 1 9 ? 1 ? p . 2 1 %
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The Radeliffe Award in the Punjab left her 
irrigatMW system, in jeopardy-and the Pakistani Punjab 
was made dependent upon Per.ozepur and Hussainiwala 
Headxtforks (Pigs 71 :y .xtfhlch xfere carved oivt to
India though India had less: irrigated areas' dependent 
upon these headworks (see Chapter/two)® Furthermore * 
the Award of Ferozepur.. Tehsils ^ to/Xnd’ia/left Palais tan •'
■■* 1 ^ '’V f - ,.
very much vulnerable to Indian interests geographically 
and economically since Perozepur was a very important , 
rail and road junction and a military:centre 6f . 
considerable significance® There is a/general belief 
in Pakistan that the award of Perozepur Tehsils was not 
based on contiguous majority areas1 5principle' but on 
“other factors”®' ' / "" /■ -■ '■*v’ // ■-/ . ■. ,
Again the. award pf Gur&aspixr to India
facilitated the Indian occupations of the.State of
Jammu and Kashmir which.hegated?.'the contiguous, majority
areas principle but unfortunately t h e .“other factors”
were employed,and again the/Indians seemed'to have been
favoured® In,fact the Indian, Independence Act of 19A ? 5 >
had provisionally included, the 'whole of Gurdaspur ,
District in the new province ‘ of^  , West Punjab, “Districts -
provisionally included in the new Province Of West
Punjab. In the Lahore Division,; the districts of
Gujranwala, Gurdaspur, Lahore, Bhelkhupura and Sialkbt®
In the Rawalpindi Division, the districts of Attock,
Gujrat, Jehlum, Mianwali, Rawalpindi and Shahpur. In
the Multan Division, the districts of Dera Ghasi Khan,
Jhang, Lyallpur, Montgomery, Multan and Muzaf f ax^garh® ,
9® Poplai, i3«L®. India - 19^7^50; Select Documents ,
on Asian Affairs, Internal Affairs,Yolume One, 
.O.U.P. London, 1959/ p,« -ftO.
It would not be out of place to remark that 
had Mounbb.a|5t031 given, the same advice to the Maharajah 
o:f.. Jainmii . and Kashmir which, he is said to. have given 
to the Maharajah of .Jodhpur* the peoples of India, 
Pakistaniand Kashmir -would have been saved the misery 
that ensued the questionable decision of the Maharajah 
of Jammu and'Kashmir* Lord Mount bat ton is reported to 
have impressed'upon the Maharajah of Jodhpur, % ® e that . ' 
the Maharajsh had every, legal right to accede to 
Pakistan'if he wished, but did he really realize what 
the conse 'qit&nees:might be? As a Hindu ruler of a 
largely Hindu State, he was’ surely going against the 
principle that India was being . divided into a Muslim 
and a non-Muslim ;IJominion® His 'decision to accede to 
Pakistan-mught badse considerable communal disturbance 
in Jodhpur®®vTlie Maharajah was quicliy reduced to 
bluster®/® 1 ' . ■
■ ; \ ;' ;The division of 'GpT&aspur 'district becomes
;\, v t  ■ v ‘ , learns ' '
mo3?0 questionable ' when one/ about the reported
statement made b y  Lord Mountbatton vis-a-vis the
partition of the:Punjab,” I ,put that in for the simple
reason that the district of Gurdaspur in the Punjab the V
popvilation per cent Muslim, I think, and 49®6 •/
percent moai-Muslim® With a difference of 0*8 per cent
you will see at once that it is unlikely that the
Boundary Commission will throw the whole of the, district '
11
into the Muslim^majority areas*” These observations,
"TOT Mosley,L* The Last Days” of the British Raj,
London, 1961, p® 1?8*
11® ;• All, O flM e, op® bit® pp* 215^216®
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to an impartial mind* seemed to be improper and highly 
preju&idal and were bound to influence the State of 
Jammu and Kashmir and its position vis-a-vis India 
and Pakistan* :
The .geopolitical interests of both India and 
Pakistan demand the practical implementations of the 
principle of peaceful co-existence and a complete 
rejection of the policy of Confrontation, and a failure 
to reach an amicable settlement of the outstanding 
disputes between the two neighbours is bound to 
encourage outside interference; a potential threat to 
stability peace and security in the area, ” That 
Pakistan will s & v i v e  appears certain? it could not 
be destroyed short of war, and although in that event 
the dice would' be very heavily loaded against Pakistan 
(owing to the negligible war potential vis-a-vis India, 
and the almost impossible strategic lay-out), India 
would be very unlikely to add to already numerous 
internal problems that of holding down a hostile 
population in the -granary of the sub-continent? Kashmir
I ; f ” ■nO
alone may provd a sjuite sufficient strain* M If and 
when India decided to take a major military invasion 
of Pakistan aimed at the total disintegration of Pakistan 
then India would have done irreparable damage to her 
own unity which to many observers seems tenuous and full 
of fissiparous,\andr devisive elements,“In spite of the 
geographic Kaleidoscopic appearance of India and the
Changing Map ’ 
of Asia? A  Political Geography,London, 1964”,
P<9
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resulting chain of Indian geographic unity and. ; : 
commensurate measures of political'unity in India, 
the history of India, regurggitates /innumerable 
instances of cultural, economicApolitical and 
■social disunity, and the emergencerof Pakistan as 
an independent political'unit i s , the latest and .
the most comprehensive rehuttai to the claimants of
- * ■ i ' 5  -
such illusionary unity®" ^
It is geoi^.iticaily desirable that India . 
should abandon her intransigent attitude towards an 
amicable settlement of the liashmir s q.uestioii and help 
to remove the potential threat of war® Both India 
and Paki s tan have previously . c ommi 11ed themselve s 
internationally toward^ a peaceful solution of the 
dispute, and United Nations Security Council has 
passed resolutions demandingla plebiscite to deter­
mine the future .'status- o f l h e : -St ate and. her people®
A  unilateral, action by any one of the Interested 
parties is boiind to complicate the.matters and 
jeopardise peace and security in the region®, .
Ihe continued Indian,occupation of Kaslmir 
could very well -jeopardise, the very existence of 
Pakistan, especially If the' policy of confrontation 
Is pursued by the two neighbours, "West Pakistan is % 
fundamentally better-found® * « . and -it has the;, makings 
of a decent if not spectacular agrarian prosperity,
13o layyeb, A® op® cit* pp® 24-25®
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if only the Kashmir crisis car. be settled by genuine 
agreement and relations of a?eal cooperation between
the two Dominions established® Otherwise the prospect
* *I ’ ' . * e
xs bla&k indeed| at the very best a continuance of
the present armed peace is; likely so to strain the1
modest resources of the State as to produce social 
stagnation or even retrogressions®®” Shis is not a 
very happy situation for the peoples of the sub­
continent whose energies are bound to be sapped and 
theix* socio-economic development seriously hampered® 
Therefore, it is highly desirable for India and 
Pakistan to come to a peaceful and equitable agreement 
on Kashmir so that their resources may be diverted 
fxaom a military purpose to that of raising the socio­
economic standards of their peoples®
If and when the trohbled relations between 
India and Pakistan are put on a friendly basis then 
Afghanistan could be persuaded to realise that her 
safety would be strengthened by a strong and stable 
Pakistan® The Pak-Afghaxt relations could be helped if 
Pakistan took some practical step vis-a-vis the XTorth 
West Frontier Province, Though Pakistan should not, 
and indeed, could hot accept’; the concept of Pakhtunistan” 
yet the North West Frontier Province could be renamed 
so as to meet the wishes of some of its people, and 
a desirable name would be Afghaniaf this would be quite 
a logicml step since in the word Pakistan the letter *AW 
stands for Afghania )®
14 East and Spate,op•cit»,p» 1?®*
• ' ’ / v ' v - : 2 8 7
A  detente between India, and Pakistan and 
Pakistan .and Afghanistan wouldSgreatoly help in ;. 
lessening the tension in the region and give;the 
peoples of India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Ira%- 
Bangladesh, Hepal,vBurma and Srilanka a real chance 
to live in peaceful. QO-exLstence, land to achieve . 
wider geopolitical, commercial/ billtural and social 
objectives, (This would be directly in line with the 
basic principles agreed at the Bandung onferencfc©
The outside powers, such as the Soviet Union, USA, 
the People * s .Republic of China and Japan would be 
compelled to seek open and fair competition rather 
than sow the seeds of dissension,, exploitation and, 
carving out their respective, spheres of influence» 
Developing nations such as Pakistan cannot afford 
to be pawns i n  the game of power-politics as such 
serve the entrended interests of great powers. They 
must look around for friendship, commerce,collective - 
ventures and economic.cooperation instead of looking 
towards distant corners- for, friends and .protections*
Fox' Pakistan, these aims and objectives could very 
well be served best by seeking closer relations'with 
Iran, Afghanistan, India, Bmigiadesh, China, and the , ; 
countries of Vest and South East AsiaQ This would ha- 
very much in cbnformity with the geopolitical; 
location of Pakistan*
Pakistan has succeeded, -at times, to 
establish useful dialogue-’ with the Soviet Union which 
has shown increasing intex^est -in the' region sig ■since /•
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the signing of the Tashkent Declaration in 1966© 
However, the Soviet policy seems to have done more 
damage to the Pakistani interests than brought 
constructive helx^  to Pakistan in socio-economic and 
cultux'al fields. The increased activities of the 
Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean area and the 
gradual exposition of the "Brezhnev Doctrine" of 
"Collective Security" in, Asia have aiigered ill for
Pakistan® The Soviet Union seems to he working
4\
towards a gradual desiife&mce in the region as a
i
"Super-Continental -Power" and a " S u p e r P o w e r " .  
This policy seems to have been developed around the 
concept of "Heartland" as propounded by Sir Halford 
Haekinder and later amended by H.J.Spykman® According 
to Mackinder the three contiguous continents of 
Europe, Asia and Africa formed the "World-IslalxtL"f 
in relation to other ""Islands" such as North and 
South America, Australia, the "Islands" of eastern 
Asia are satellites. Mackinder's "World-Island" 
contained the "Heartland", stretching from the Volga 
to the East Siberian mountains and from the Arabian 
iSfeav*. to Himalayas | most of the area occupied by 
Soviet Union, Iran, Tibet and Mongolia. According 
to this concept the glaches pf the "Heartland" is 
Eastern Europe., from the volgfa to the Elenesburg- 
Trieste line, and included in the area are Eastern 
Germanyluad Austeria, and whoever dominated one of 
these regions is bound to covet the other re^xp.nru 
Mackinder in Democratic Ideals and Eeality (1919)
advanced the idea that "who /"rules* East Europe commands 
the. Heartland; who rules the: Heartland commands the 
Uorl&-isiand; who rules the World-island commands the . 
World.*1, This proposition .was later.-restated'by 
Spykman, "Who controls the RimlahcL rules Kui%sia; who 
rules Eur%sia controls the destinies of the World®" ^ 
That this concept contained an important element of 
truth seems to have been demonstrated by the .events 
since 1933® From .Germany Hitler.attempted to gain 
control of Europe ahd then the "Heartland" . Soviet 
Union seems to rely even now on Ibhe .strategic value , .s 
of the glacis of "Heartland" , of: which'she .has 
gradually been gaining control of since 1 9 5 9 , regard­
less of the air«pow@r and,, the development, of missiles 
including the intercontinental ballistic missiles with 
multiple nuclear warheads * D*'W® Meini#g in his essay 
"Heartland and Himland in Eurasian History" emphasized 
that Mackinder and Spykman focused their attention 
upon the. geopolitical context of their time, which 
resulted in the inflexible interpretation of: their 
concept and as aueh. the concept became an historical 
relevance than a dynamic fdree affecting the changes 
of the changing world® According to Meinij% if the 
terms "Heartland" and "KimXand" were to be insaisiMd 
some significance and applicable beyond any momentary 
context of strategic-patterns, these definitions must 
become specific in concept yet flexible in historical- 
spatial use® •.Our definitions of heartland and Bimland .. 
must. 9.be routed in cultural, or, I should like to term
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r 46 ' ' -them, functional criteria®” :. As a result of this
exposition MeiniHg endeadmired to retrace the criteria
on the basis of which Mackinder propounded his concept -
of Heartland, emphasising the importance of hydro- . r:
graphic considerations® The propei'ties of Meinij%es :
Heartland included,bx^oadly similar cultural and
physical features as that of Machinder* s, and involved ;
the nexus of all the historic land routes interconnect- ■ V;
ing the several rimland areas of China, India, the
Levant and Europe» Melxiiiig* s, re evaluation of Spykmanis , ;
Himland is more significant since it endeaTOurs to
draw a definite attention^ to the fact that both Mackinder >
and Spykman viewed the area as the natural realm of the ;
j  5 , j  : - ■
Sea Powers around the world ; and MeiniMg questioned the 
validity of such an evaluation since the geostrategic 
position of the States constituting the Himland was not 
made very clear® According to Meinijlg the constituent 
states of the Himland change both their ideological 
and geopolitical alignments vis-a-vis the Heartland, 
and time has been of great, importance in projecting these 
changes® These changes have-.." either been ,outward or :
i ; - ■ ■ ■
inward ("outer” or "inner”) and as such Me ini jag has /
0  ■! > i ‘
suggested a "continental rimland" and a "Maritime rimland"®; 
According to him Yugoslavia Changed from "inner” (towards 
the Heartland power) to "outer”® Moreover, according to 
Meini^Lg*s concept, a state may be transitional or neutral
16® Meini|ig,D®¥e "Heartland and Himland in Eurasian
History", Western Political Quarterly; 9(1956) 
pp® 555™556*
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rimland powers; and Pakistan could be considered as an ^ . 
"outer"-state which might be moving towards ”inner" 
position| and it is further suggested that Pakistan 
might have to go through a neutral phase ,, just like 
Jugoslavia® -Some, of these concepts have already, been 
confirmed, and Cohen basically , agrees with the ,geo« ; ;
political interpretation of the Heartland as.enunciated .
by Hackinder and Spykman and as reevaluated by'Meining0- j:'/k ‘j
Keeping in view- the geopolitical ; tenets. ;of the 
above concept one is bound to reflect for a moment and 
■give1 "serious cphsidei^ations'to the extension ,of, .Soviet c
geopolitical activities in the region i „ e ® .the - Soviet 
naval .build up in the Indian. Ocean Area,"The 196? edition 
of the., Soviet Strategic .publication,, Military Btrateg 
not only stressed the *growihg •importance of the .Russian 
®avy but, for the first time, included South and South- 
East. Asia in ;the sphere of Soviet interests. isfMarch 1968,, 
a Russian flotilla « a cruiser,.& missile carrying -
destroyer, a nuelear-fdwered submarine and a navy;oil . ,
tanker - called an various ports''In'-India,/fceylon,' Iran, 
Iraq., Somalia and South Yemen® */Soviet Union sent 12 
Surface Warships and auxiliaries in 1968, 1? in 1969?
22 in 1970 and I? in-19?1 to the Indian Ocean® ®® In 1972*,®* 
these were more 100 Russian Havgil Vessels®'. ®A. recent report 
from Tokyo says that there are about 30 Russian Warships
.including the 13,000 ton ^Leningrad", an anti-submarine
i . 17
helxcopter carx^ier, in the;Indian Ocean". ® lax addition
the Soviet Union has taken, considerable diplomatic steps
17. The Round Table?January 1975? po61
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to bolsterher position in the area® The Soviet Union has 
succeeded in securing useful naval facilities from the 
littoral states in return for socio-economic and military
assistance? "At present there- are 600 Soviet Military
s" ■- i
advisers in Somalia-?, 500 in South Yemen and more than
18
1000 military advisers in,Iraq®" Furthermore? in order
■ " '\i ;
to widen the area of Soviet influence and presence Moscow
has concluded a number of treaties since 1 9 7 0  with nations
of the Indian Ocean littoral® The treaties it has
concluded with countries like Mauri ti&iis , Somalia, Iraq,
Sri Lanka and India and the fleet port facilities it has
acquired in many of them are indications of its systematic 
entrenching
progress in/ itself in important strategic points
of the region* Recently, the American President,Mr® Gerald 
Ford, in his first Press Conference on August 28, 197^S 
disclosed that the Soviet,-Uni on has three "major bases"- 
Berbera in Somalia, Umm QasrVin Iraq and. Aden in South 
Yemen - in the Indian Ocean*
The attitude of India towards the increased 
Soviet naval activities in the Indian Ocean area sterns?, 
paradaxical, whereas she is totally unfriendly towards 
American effox^&s to secure naval facilites in the region, 
especially Diego Garcia, "the ’.Indian attitude tends to be
<3 a
.soft towards the Soviet Union*"- If India really wishes 
a "Zione of Peace" then she- must endeavour to keep both 
the Superpowei’s out of the Indian Ocean, so that the
18o Rhw-S The Daily Telegraph,London 11-3-1974*
H9® : The Round Table, op* cit® p® 62
20® ibid* 67
-possibility of a future confrontation "between the two 
is eliminated* India has at times, tried to minimise the 
Sovie%,preseiice. in the. area and grossly exaggerated the 
AmericanVintentions, “Moreover, there is a lurking fear..* 
f that India"..indirectly promotes • Russian naval activities.
■ - ■' o’. 21 -■
in the Indian Ocean.” It would be correct to note here 
that a vast majority of the littoral states are much more 
apprehensive of the Soviet activities in the Indian Ocean 
;than the J Anglo-American project vis-a-vis Diego Gorcia. 
furthermore, it would not be very helpful to agree with 
the Indian view that the Soviet intentions in the region 
? are. purely peaceful. Keeping in view the geostrategic . 
location of4the Soviet Union and their socio-economic and 
military Interests, one is likely to conclude that the 
Soviet intentions are hot purely peaceful or flag showing 
"exercise‘but;calculated plan to intimidate states which " 
are not.tamenable to the Soviet interests, and to promote 
such factions which would help the global designs of the ; 
Soviet’Union. The Soviet Union would endeavour to dominate 
the entire region especially the Persian Gulf to ensure a 
reasonable share of the wealth of the area, and would very 
much want t;o have ports or port facilities in the warm 
waters of the region.“The Soviet Union which arms and 
trains the Afghan military forces has never given up its 
dreams of access to a warm water port on the Arabian 
Sea. If “Pakhtunistan were ever to emerge as an autonomous 
unit or aligned with Afghanistan, it would provide the 
Russians with the corridor it would require to the coast,.1
21. The Guardi an,London,14-3-75•
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This does not augur well for Pakistan, especially in
view of the Afghan interests in North West frontier
Province and Baluchistan, and in this respect the Soviet
interests direct or indirect cannot he ignored or
dismissed,“only if Afghanistan, as a Soviet satellite,
were able to further the cause of Pakhtunistan inciting
22
the Pathans to open revolt; against Pakistan^" then the 
Soviet Union would be willing to lend help in this 
direction and seek the total dismemberment of Pakistan. 
Although, Oohen points out that "an open Soviet-Afghan 
alliance with strenuous efforts to dismember Pakistan 
would produce the contrary effect of bringing Pakistan 
and India closer together to face the common thr e a t ; " ^  
the position has not remained so simple since a number 
of very important events have taken place, especially 
the creation of Bangladesh and the Indo-Soviet involvement 
in the whole affair after the signing of the Indo-Soviet 
Treaty of August 1971,“Although London did not see 
.anything had in the Indo-Soviet friendship Treaty of 
197^» which was signed with the limited purpose of coping 
with the situation in Bangladesh, the actual working of 
the treaty during the last three years has given rise to 
suspicions. Mr. Bhutto hassalso expressed his thoughts 
over the Indo-Soviet Treaty, "It was to a large extent 
Soviet Union*s involvement in the subcontinent which made 
possible India*s invasion of East Pakistan...whatever
22. Oohen,Saul Bernard,Geography and Politics in a 
Libided world, Methuen, London, 1964, p.202
23. ibid.
motivated the U.S.S,.R. to enter into this pact, it
certainly gave India the backing, both military and
I ' . . ‘( , 24
psychological, to embark upon her armed aggression."
■As a matter of fact there is a strong suspicion now that
India is clandestlarely providing special facilities,
for Russian Warships and submarines in Indian ports.
This suspicion was further strengthened by the admission
of India's External Affairs Minister, Sardar Swarn Singh,
last year in New Delhi that the "Soviet naval engineers"
25
were present, in the Visakhapatnam dockyard." The 
situations look more sinister to Pakistan, especially 
since' President Baud actively renewed Afghan claims on 
Pakistan territories and voiced support for dissidents 
in North West Frontier Province and ^aluchistan. There 
are signs that India sympathizes with Afghanistan over 
the Durand Line question, and the fact that India has 
close' tre:aty relationships with the Soviet Union who 
seemed to-be well entrended in Afghanistan after the 
succession of President Daud in July 1973; a concerted 
effort, by these three states is likely to put pressure
on Pakistan"tp realign her geopolitical interests in
; ■ ' /_ “ - ' 
the region. The increased Soviet interests and activities
in the area, the close Soviet-Afghan cooperation and the
increasing Indo-Soviet collaboration is bound to adversely
affectPakistan's geopolitical interests and if these
interests come into direct clash with the interests of
her northern and eastern neighbours then there would be a
concerted effort to isolate her. To counter any such
24. '..Foreign Affairs, April 1973>P*550
23,. . The Round Rable, op. cit. p. 69
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move Pakistan would be obliged to seek greater and 
closer collaboration and understanding with China,
Iran and othn?r countries of West Asia especially the 
States of the Persian Gulf, and in addition forge 
closed ties with Nepal? Sri Lanka, Indonesia and 
Malaysia. Moreover, Pakistan would have to maintain 
close economic and cultural links with the United 
States and the European community to safeguard her 
economic interests, but Pakistan would have to be 
very careful in the maintenance or development of
i
these relationships and Pakistan should not allow any 
of ids: the states, small or big to exploit her geo­
political location-to suit the vested interests of 
such a state. If[Pakistan allowed such a situation to 
develop then the opposing,forces are bound to exploit 
the situation toythe detriment of Pakistan and her so 
called ally/allies might not be willing to support 
Pakistan in her distress and let her suffer and 
possibly fall prey to the socio-economic,political 
and/or military pressures of her opponents.
It ought to be made clear that in this 
day and age a small incident might become an 
international problem and threaten peace and security 
as such; and it would not be wrong to suggest that 
either America or Russia or both might be directly or 
indirectly involved in such a situation. It is also 
clear here that the Indian Ocean is slowly but surely 
becoming a theatre of cold war and the Soviet/American
 ^ . f }
interests are bound to clash in the region. This
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dreaded thought is likely to..occupy the American 
mind for quite some time, and therefore, persuade 
the Pentagon to stay its hand over a possible 
military action against the Arab's to secure the oil. 
supplies. If and when the Arab-Israeli problem is either 
solved or the threat of w a n  ds removed then one can 
envisage a greater American and Arab collaboration in 
the area and the Soviet. Union would find it very 
difficult to secure inroads in 1 the Arab World* Pakistan 
and Iran can really play an^important and effective 
role in bridging the ..gap between America and the Arabs, 
loth Pakistan and Iran>have historical.and religious 
ties with the Arabs.:Iran in-Addition shares her oil 
interests with the Arabs and is hot very happy over 
the Russian dispositions in:the region. Even;the 
Chinese would not oppose such a cooperation between 
the various states of the area* With this background 
in mind,the strategic location of Pakistan cannot be. 
underestimated and Pakistan can play an effective role 
in the geopolitical affairs of the regions although 
“P a k i s t a n i  destiny is. inevitably intertwined with 
that of the subcontinent...her geopolitical position 
is not circumscribed by the subcontinent. Phere is a 
371-mile-long border between Chinese Sinkiang and 
Pakistan-Controlled Kashmir with its ancient silk 
route, and only Afghanistan’s Wakhan Corridor, varying 
in its width from-seven t o 631 miles, divides the Soviet 
Union and Pakistan along 188 miles. Siutated at the 
head of the Arabian Sea, Pakistan flanks the entrance 
to the oil-rick Persian G-ulf and is therefore of 
strategic importance to m a n y ,,countries of. the Middle East.
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Pakistan is also strategically placed in relation to
the sealanes between Europe and the Indian Ocean,
once they regain their former importance with the
reopening of the Suez Canal. Moreover, Pakistan
provides an overland passage from Europe to the Indian
Ocean, an area on which international attention is being
26increasingly centred.” Keeping in view the geo­
political compulsions, Pakistan should adopt a balanced 
and positive approach in her policies, and that should 
be in confirmity; with her national interests, A positive 
approach would also help towards the consolidation of a 
nation whose leaders have at times tried a negative 
argument in support of national, cohesion and unity*
This approach would also have to be applied in the 
social, cultural, economic and political fields* The 
emphasis shouldfba on building a nations with values 
of her own, and should not be based,on negative 
under standings or;, assumptions.
Pakistan faced her most difficult period during 197o/ll when 
military rulers misjudged both the world opinion and the flow 
of events at home.The Yahya Regime had envisaged a prolonged
26 Bhutto, Z* A*. Foreign Affairs,April 1973»P*553*
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period of political squabling amongst the various political 
leaders of Pakistan after the elections of 3.970, because in the 
regime’s view, no party was in a position to dominate the political 
scene in the country.The Military Junta thought that the elections , 
would inevitably result in minor victories for the various politi- ; 
cal parties in the five provinces of Pakistan( The One Unit had 
been dissolved with effect from 1st July 1970),and. this would 
result in the military emerging again as the stablising force in the 
country.But all their hopes were dashed to the ground when two . . • 
major political parties,The Awami League and The Pakistan People’s , 
Party emerged as the dominant political force in East and West 
Pakistan respectively,The Awami Lea,gue led by Sheikh Muiibur Rahman 
won a landslide victory(167 out of 169 seats)in East Pakistan on 
the basis of ”The Six Points” .The essence of its platform was to -y.j 
secure complete provincial autonomy for the eastern wing of '
Pakistan under the aegis of the Awami League,the plan envisaged a 
Central Government with powers in the field of Defence and Foreign 
Affairs but without- foreign trade and aid.This looked like a 
prescription for a confederated Pakistan which at the time was 
totally unacceptable to Mr.Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and his Pakistan
“Details of the Six Points s " ^
JUThe establishment of a Federation” on the basis of the Lahore
Resolution and a parliamentary form of government,with supremacy-
of legislature to be directly elected on the basis of adult
franch!se.112. It demanded that the Federation should only have
powers in the field of defence and foreign affairs,and all other
powers should” rest in the federating states”. 3. This demanded -
that there should be two convertible currencies for the two parte
or one single currency for the whole country provided that the
constitutional guarantees were, clearly enumerated to stop the .
flight of the capital from East to West Pakistan,In addition a i
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there should he a separate hanking reserve and a separate fiscal, 
and monetary policy for the Eastern Wing, 4° This clearljr denied y 
the Federation the right of taxation and instead authorised the';. V 
federating units to levy such taxes and the federal government ... 1 
was to he handed a fixed amount•<5.This point mainly dealt with 
foreign trad.e and the conduct of it as such,and demanded that 
there should he two separate accounts for the foreign exchange , 
earnings of East and West Pakistan and hoth the provincial govern­
ments would he authorised to control these earnings.The foreign 
exchange requirements of the Federation would equally he met hy 
the federating units or an agreed ratio would he determined hy 
the units,A free movement of the indigenous products without the 
payment of any duty was to he guaranteed$and it further demanded 
that the federating units he authorised to carry out trade and 
commerce with foreign countries,This point clearly demanded . 
the establishment of a paramilitary force or militia for the 
Eastern Wing,
These details have heen. enumerated after consulting 
the fo11owing works; 1. Bhutto,Z,A, The Great Tragedy,Vision
Publications Ltd.,Karachi,1971.
2 . Kabir Uddin Alimad, Br eakup of Pakistan, 
The Social Science Publishers,London,1972,
3, Rounaq Jahan,Pakistani failure in 
national integration,Columbia University Press,N0Y o,1972,
4, Sheikh Mujib-Ur-Rahman, Six Points-? 
Demand for Survival, pp, 2-11,'
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People's Party had won ( 88 Out of 144 seats ) a sweeping 
majority in the Punjab afod Sind.The National Awami Party of 
Khan Wali Khan had successes in Baluchistan and North West 
Frontier Province.Mr.Wali Khan and his associates advocated 
provincial autonomy but presented no concrete proposals or 
plan;and their position was very dubious vis-a-vis the Durand 
Line and the question of 1 Pakhtunistan 1 which is so vital 
for the territorial integrity and political independence of 
Pakistan.
The dismemberment of Pakistan.
At the time of the 
emergence of Pakistan as an independent state,Islam was one:-,6f 
the most powerful elements in the composition of its people.The 
national leadership,however,failed to establish a stable poli­
tical edifice,based upon consent and capable of reconciling the 
disparate tendencies.The internal divisions,the geographical 
separation,and the cultural-linguistic distinctiveness accen­
tuated the sense of relative socio-economic deprivation felt by 
the East Bengalis with respect to their compatriots in West 
Pakistan.The East Bengalis identified these inadequacies with 
the state-structure itself,whose tenuo.usiumity was increasingly 
undermined by the constant tendency in Pakistan to centralise 
authority,especially since 1958,in the shape of military 
dictatorship.In 1969,the Ayub Regime was dissolved,and his 
successor General Yahya Khan attempted to rehabilitate the 
principle of consent but by that time the situation had changed 
drastically,and as such the political concession was considered 
too little,too late.
302
The emergence of sub-nationalism ( East Bengali nationa­
lism ) had gathered momentum in 1970,particularly after the 
devastations of the cyclone in East Pakistan.The "break between 
East and West Pakistan could yet have been averted,had there 
evolved a constitutional system guaranteeing the East Bengalis 
access to power,and the reward of economic expansion and comm­
unal self-expression within the framework of a united Pakistan. 
Such a system could have attracted sympathy and support of the 
moderate elements right across the political spectrum in both 
East and West Pakistan,and the polarisation of forces could 
have been averted.This would also have discouraged the external 
vested interests from precipitating the events in East Pakistan. 
The divergent interests,however,of the two main political 
parties in Pakistan,after the 1970 general elections,left very 
little room to manoeuvre,and as such they were heading towards 
a collision,undermining the unity of Pakistan as it emerged in 
1947.The flight of the refugees to India from East Pakistan 
furnished the Indians with a golden opportunity to justify 
their intervention and subsequent invasion designed to 
dismember Pakistan,
The hostility between India and Pakistan 
was a well established phenomenon,and their antagonism has been 
expressed in the mutually incompatible principles upon which 
the two political entities were founded.Indian reluctance to 
accept the Islamic principles on which Pakistan was founded 
has been the main contributory factor towards their incompati­
bility, and the entrenched hostility that has existed between 
the two states.The instinctive Indian attitude to the events 
in East Pakistan was discernable in her deep rooted hostility 
to the very existence of Pakistan as an independent political
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entity. The pattern of events in East Pakistan,after the army 
" crackdown ” in March 1971,was largely determined by the impul­
ses of Indian policy and by the complex interrelations of 
India’s actions with Pakistan’s responses,by the mounting 
pressure of terrorism and guerrilla activities within East 
Pakistan and across her borders,and by the increasing diplo­
matic involvement of the great powers under pressure from India. 
The extensive foreign tour of Mrs.Indira Gandhi in l97l,is a 
case in point.
The international reaction represented a fair 
description of the international power-politics and the funda­
mental reconstruction of the system as envisaged by the great 
powers,especially with regard to South Asia.The Soviet Union 
sympathised with the Indian point of view;Prance,United Kingdom 
and U.S.A.refrained from condemning Pakistan,People*s Republic 
of China condemned the Indian motives and activities but fullyjg 
supported Pakistan’s position.
A kind of rapproachment had been
established between China and the United States which seemed to
have opened new vistas for international balance of power,and
naturally,involved the South Asian Sub-continent.Geopolitieally
in
the South Asian landmass represents an area/which both China 
and Russia have increasingly demonstrated their interests,in 
particular,since the Sino-^Soviet rift and the subsequent border 
clashes along the Assuri River and the Damanski Islands.The 
rapid development of nuclear technology and its inherent dangers 
have obviously convinced these mighty neighbours of the neeessitj 
to defuse the situation along their common borders,and to shift 
the area of their activities to regions where the risk of direct 
confrontation is not so acute;South Asian Sub-continent is an 
obvious choice.
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Until today the Soviet Union has "been very carefully 
excluded from the Sub-continent,"basically as a direct result of 
the deliberate policy followed by the British Empire,in creating 
the buffer zones,during the last quarter of the 19th century;the 
Wakhan region of Afghanistan is a good example.This is a very 
narrow strip ( at one point only seven miles wide ) occupied 
by the Kirghiz of Afghanistan separates Pakistan ( Azad Kashmir: 
the Pakistani held Kashmir ) and the Soviet Union;and as such : 
there does not exist a direct overland link,to the annoyance 
of the Russians,between India and the Soviet Union.China,on the 
otherhand,is geopolitically better placed since it has common 
borders with Afghanistan,Pakistan and India.
Neither the Soviet Union nor China,however,is impelled 
by these circumstances to contemplate territorial readjustment 
to improveiits geopolitical interests in the Sub-continent.Al­
though the' Sino-Pakistan Agreement of March 1963,is strictly a 
provisional one,and as such could easily be exploited by one or 
the other interested party.The geopolitical characteristics of 
the nortwestern region of the Sub-continent have largely 
influenced the pattern of the Sino-Soviet rivalry in the area. 
There is no denying the fact that the Soviet Union has enjoyed 
the Indian diplomatic support against China,but this has equally 
been neutralised by the elose ties between Pakistan and China, 
and the antagonism between India and Pakistan.In addition,both 
Pakistan and Afghanistan straddle Soviet land communications to 
India.Moreover,Pakistan has not allowed the transit trade across 
its territory either between Russia and India or between Afgha­
nistan and India.Pakistan has,at the same time,dissociated it­
self from the Brezhnev endeavours to establish the " collective 
security system " in Asia,since Pakistan considers it as a
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manoeuvre to isolate China.This refusal,on the part of Pakistan, 
has compelled the Soviet Union to rely on the distant ocean 
routes to maintain her links with India.The current geopolitical 
factors have only allowed diplomatic understanding between India 
and the Soviet Union and as such Pakistan has been instrumental 
in the failure of the Soviet Union to deepen her influence in 
the Sub-continent.Pakistan's rejection of the " collective 
security system 1 in its present shape has also meant the failure 
of India in imposing her geopolitical preponderance in the 
region.The Indian pre-eminence would decisively be confirmed 
if and when Pakistan accepted the " Brezhnev Doctrine " and 
joined the proposed scheme,and as such the valued principle of 
sovereign equality of states,as advocated by Pakistan,would 
have lost its significance.Moreover,without Pakistan's co-oper­
ation, direct or indirect,the Indo-Soviet attempts to dominate 
the region,and to isolate China are likely to end in failure.
Since the eruption of the Sino-Soviet rift there seemed 
to appear a gradual shift in the Soviet policy vis-a-vis the 
Sub-continent.The exclusive support for India was replaced by 
the Soviet policy which sought to reduce the mutual hostility 
between India and Pakistan;The Soviet efforts in this direction 
during and after the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965,and the Tashkent 
Declaration,is an example,This policy,to some extent,improved 
Soviet relations with both India and Pakistan.The Soviet leader­
ship tried,for a time,this evenhandedness especially during the 
initial stages of the crisis in East Pakistan,which was later 
dramatically replaced by its outright moral and material help 
and support for India.This was obviously a retaliatory, move
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to counterbalance the Sino-American rapproachment, which in itseli 
reflected the deepening Sino-Soviet antagonism.The crisis in 
Pakistan touched on vital Chinese interests in this rivalry.
Prom the previous argument it is quite obvious that 
if Pakistan represented Soviet Union's gateway to India,it is 
also central point in Chinese security system,for the reverse 
of the same argument.Pakistan as such is the crucial gap in 
what otherwise be a ring of hostile powers encircling China's 
most vulnerable salient.Pakistan has also provided China with 
useful outlets to vital geostrategic region of West Asia.This 
clearly establishes the fact that China is very actively interes­
ted in the preservation of Pakistan's present territorial limits 
since China's security system is directly involved therein. The 
Chinese Premier,the late Chou En~Iiai,made this abundantly clear 
in his letter to President Yahya Khan of Pakistan on 13-4-1971, 
in whix?h he stated: ” ... the Chinese Government and people will, 
as always,firmly support the Pakistan Government and people in
their just struggle to safeguard state sovereignty and national 
26 A
independence.’1 The last part of the letter is very crucial and 
carries great significance since it does not mention the terri­
torial integrity and political independence of Pakistan. In the 
diplomatic parlance this obviously meant that China was apparen­
tly committed to the maintenance of a strong and independent 
West Pakistan ( present territorial limits of Pakistan !),and 
supported Pakistan's military action in East Pakistan simply to 
oppose and undermine Indian policy,and to minimise the Soviet
influence in Pakistan.As a result the Indians rapidly achieved 
26^ Chou En-Lai,Letter to President Yahya Khan of Pakistan,
Pakistan Horizon,XXLV.No.2.
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their objectives in East Pakistan but definitely failed to crush 
the military machine in West Pakistan,and the west wing remained 
intact,Pakistan’s relations,as a result,with the Soviet Union ami 
were severely undermined but her ties with China were strengthe­
ned and Pakistan was forced to realign her external relation­
ships consonant with the changed geopolitical structure.
The opponents of Pakistan,in the past,have rejected 
the concept of 1 Two Nations " on the basis of their paradoxical 
contention that the South Asian Sub-continent was inhabited by 
one people but with different social,cultural,linguistic and 
religious values and affinities,These elements argued that the 
economic and political viability and validity of Pakistan was 
highly questionable,and therefore,it was bound to disintegrate. 
They apparently rejoiced at the dismemberment of Pakistan and 
the emergence of Bangladesh in 1971,and contended that the 
M Two Nations Theory 1 had been totally negated and demolished,
2rj
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto has very succinctly expressed his thoughts 
on the subject and argued that the break between East and West 
Pakistan did not,however,mean that Bangladesh was willing to be 
absorbed into India.The nascent state very vociferously proclaim* 
her independence,an independence which can only be predicated 
upon her distinctive Muslim character and separateness,and the 
claim of Bangladesh to secularism in no way alters this fact. 
Indeed,secularism,in the sense of tolerance and the rejection of 
theocracy is very much a part and parcel of the Islamic politi- 
cal culture.Moreover,India never really reconciled herself to
27.Bhutto,Z,A, Foreign Affairs,Vol.51,No,3.April 1973,p.545.
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the premise on which the two states were founded,and as such the 
relationship between the two nations has been disturbed# The 
Chinese Premier the late Chou En-Lai stated in December 1971,
" The fall of Dacca had laid completely bare the Indian expan­
sionists wild ambitions to annex Pakistan...the fall of Dacca is 
definitely not a so-called " milestone " towards victory for the
Indian aggressors,but the starting point of endless strife on
28the South Asian subcontinent..."
The recent events in Bangladesh have largely substanti­
ated the main point of the argument,and the Soviet backed victory 
of India over Pakistan,now looks hollow.Indian hegemony in South 
Asia is once again very much threatened by the emerging Muslim 
unity. In fact,right from the outset,many Bangladeshis have accused! 
India of exploiting their country and treating it as an Indian 
colony.^
The raison d'etre of Bangladesh as such was neither 
secularism nor Bengali-nationalism,on the contrary it was mani­
festly regionalism,parochialism,provincialism and districtism.
A survey carried out a few years before the secession of Bangla­
desh showed that the vast majority of respondents named their 
country ( In Bengali the word "country" and " district " is the
same&desh"),while educated people identified themselves as
30Pakistanis rather than East Pakistanis or Bengalis. The whole 
scenario would remain incomplete so long as Bangladesh demonstr­
ated her independence and rejected India's hegemonic role or
28.Chou En-Lai,as reported by New China News Agency,17-12-1971.
29.See Oren,S.After the Bangladesh Coups,The World Today,January 
1976,ppyl8-20.
30. ibid;
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designs of preponderance in South Asia.Moreover,to establish, 
a true Bengali nation,the two Bengals ( Bangladesh and West 
Bengal-India ) would have to he united either as an independent 
political entity or fully absobed into the Indian Union.
The vast majority of Bangladeshis is very proud to identify 
itself with Islamic ideology.and heritage,and these deep rooted 
links cannot easily be destroyed by the Indian arms or by reac­
tionary forces from within.The Muslim Bengal is very likely to 
retain its distinctiveness and independent identity since Islam 
is clearly the strongest religious force within the territorial 
limits of Bangladesh.
Since the events of 1971 Pakistan* s economy 
has managed to overcome a number of serious problems.The economy 
is no longer stagnant and the inertia has given place to dynamic 
efforts for the collective betterment and socio-cultural uplift 
of the people as a whole ( see chapter 4 ).This has been effec­
tively demonstrated in overcoming the problems created by the 
floods of 1973,basic reforms have been carried out and effective­
ly absorbed in the system.There are sufficient grounds to 
suggest that domestic production would achieve higher targets 
especially in the agricultural sector and as such attain-^aoxmomic 
stability which is so vital for the healthy development of socio­
economic and political stability of Pakistan," In bold statis­
tical terms Pakistan's economy has performed exceptionally well 
...and taking a quick glance at the performance of its neigh­
bours , Paki stan has achieved economic marvels,at least in terms 
of straight growth....The performance is the more impressive 
when one recalls the gloomy forecasts made when Pakistan was 
cut in half and ...the disruption by floods....This disaster
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seems only to have served to encourage Pakistani farmers to
greater efforts.... The wheat crop helped to produce agricultural
growth of 5 per cent.Industrial growth in 1973-74 is put at 7
per cent;and industrial output has expanded by 20 per cent,in
31
the past two years...."Similar views have been expressed by
other experts," However,stunning and distressing the events
of 1971#.*West Pakistan - has at last gained some cohesion by
the defection of its distant eastern province.lt has become a
manageable entity,both administratively and economically. The
economic benefits are apparent at once.Por example,Pakistan
now has a valuable surplus of rice which can be sold abroad
;just as textiles which would formerly have been assigned to
East Pakistan at artificially low prices can be exported more
32
profitably,to considerable national advantage."
Prom the preceding argument it may be concluded 
that the raison d'etre of Pakistan has not been demolished,and 
that the present geopolitical disposition and the territorial 
limits of Pakistan have further strengthened her chances to 
survive as an independent political entity.Pakistan cannot be 
further dismembered without a massive covert or overt subversion 
or aggression.The present geostrategic location,size and compact 
territoriality of Pakistan have enhanced her chances to emerge 
as an important regional power.
3‘l.The Financial Times,London,August 12,1974. 
32.The Times,London,March 3,1975.
311
BIBLIOGRAPHY.
AHMAD,K. S. A Geography of Pakistan,O.U.P.Karachi,1969.
w' "Introducing Pakistan" ,N.I.P.A.Publication,Lahore, 1967.
AHMAD,K.U. Breakup of Pakistan,Social Science Publishers,
London,197?.
AHMED,N. An Economic Geography of East Pakistan,O.U.P.
London,1968.
" The Indo“Pakistan Boundary Disputes Tribunal,
"The Bagge Tribunal" ,Geographical Review?, 1953,
AL1,C.Mo The Emergence of Pakistan,C.U.P. N.Y,1'967#
ALOYS,A.M. The Indus Rivers,A Study of the Effects of the 
Partition,Y.U.P.Newhaven,1967#
ANDERSON,.? *35* Pakistan's Search for National Identity,
Yale Review,vol.55,1966.
ANDERSON,J. ^ie Anderson Papers,Millington,London,1974.
ANDRUS,J.R. & MOHAMMED,A.P. Trade,Finance and Development in 
Pakistan,S.U.P.Stanford,1966.
The Economy of Pakistan,S.U.P.Stanford,1958.
APPADORAI,A. Indias Studies in Social and Political Development, 
Asia Publihhrngg House,London,1968.
AZIZ,S» The Second Pive Year Plan,Targets and Achievements, 
Pakistan Quarterly,vol.13.1965.
BALL,G.W. The Discipline of Powers Essentials of a Modern 
World Structure,London,1968.
BANER JEE,D .N , East Pakistan: A Case Study in Muslim's Politics, 
Vikas Publications,Delhi,1969.
BEG A 0 Pakistan Paces India, Babur and Amer,Lahore,1966. 
BENVENISTE,G. The Politics of Expertise,Groom Helm,London,1973.
BHUTTO,Z.A.. The Myth of Independence,0„UoP.London,1969.
1 The Great Tragedy,Vision Publications,Karachi ,1971.
» Foreign Policy of Pakistan,Karachi,1964.
312
BHUTTO, Z.A. Speech, in the National Assembly(24-7-63)
Cf.Important Speeches and Press Conferences,1964. 
it "Simla Agreement" Speech,July, 1972.
n Address to the National Assembly(14-4-72),Islamabad,
BINDER,'. 3E*e Religion and Politics in Pakistan,U.C.Los Ange­
les,1961.
BIRDWOOD,Lc Two Nations and Kashmir,Robert Hale,London,1956, 
it A Continent Decides, "" "" nn "" 1953.
BOLITHO,H. Jinnah,The Creator of Pakistan,John Murray,London, 
1954.
BOYD,A. An Atlas of World Affairs,Methuen,London,1970.
BEECHER, M. The New States of Asia; A Political Analysis,
0„U,P.London,1968* 
i India and World Politics: Krishna Menon’s View of the,.
World,O.U,P.London,1968. 9
BROWN,W.N. The United States,India and Pakistan,H.U.P.1963. 
BUEHRING,E.H, " Role of New£States in International Politics','
The Review,vol.8,Indiana University,1965.
BURKE,S.L I. Pakistan’s Foreign Policy; An Historical Analysis, ■ \ 
O.U.P.London,1973.
BURTON, J. W, International Relations : A G-eneral Theory,C .U.P. 
London,1967.
CALLARD,K.B* Pakistan: A Political Study,George Allen and Unwin,
London, 1957. ('Pakistan’s Foreign Policy:An Interpre­
tation , ii, 7.I957J.
CAMPBELL JOHNSON, Mission With Mountbatten,Robert Hale,
London,1972.
CARLSON,. , Geography and World Politics,N.J.1958.
CAROE, _ The Patjians,Macmillan,London, 1965.
CHOUDHURY,G .W • Pakistan Relations with India; 1947-66,
London,1968.
" The Last Days of United Pakistan,C.Hurst Co.
London,1974.
313
CALVOCROSS P. World Politics Since 1945,Longman Green 1 Co,1968. 
CHOU EN LAI, Letter to President Yahya Khan of Pakistan(13~4~-7l)
Pakistan Horizon,XXlV.No.2.
Statement at a "banquet in Peking,N .C.N.A. 17-10-71*
COLBY,C„C „ Geographic Aspects of International Relations, 
Kenniket Press,Washington,1970.
COUPLAND,R. India A Restatement.O.U.P.London,1945-
CRONE ,G,R. Background to Political Geography,Pitman,London,1969- 
CROSS The Pall of the British Empire,1918-1968,Hodder and
Stoughton,London,1968 *
COHEN,S.B. Geography and Politics in a Divided World,Llethuen, 
London,1964-
COWLEY . IY The Background to Gurrent Affairs,Macmillan,1963-
DAVIES,C.C. The Problem of the North-West Frontier:l890-1908, 
C.U.P.1932.
,t An Historical Atlas of the Indian Peninsula,
O.U.P.1951.
de BLIJyHoJo Systematic Political Geography,John Wiley,N.Y.1973- 
DEUTSCH,K .W• The Analysis of International Relations,Prentice
Hall,Inc«1968„
DICUTER,D* The North-West Frontier of West Pakistan: A Study 
in Regional Geography,Clarendon Press,Oxford,1967.
EAST,W.G. and SPATE,O.H.K.The Changing Fap of Asia,Methuen,
W.O O.H.K. O.A. London,1961.
EAS9^SPATE/& FISIIE#/ "" """ """ """ "" 1972
EDWARDS,M. Nehru, A Political Biography,London,1971.
EAINS0D,M. How Russia is Ruled,H.U.P.Cambridge(Mass.),1963.
FELDMAN H. Revolution in Pakistan,O.U.P.London,1967-
M From Crisis TooQrisis,Pakistan:1962-69,0.U .P .
London.L.1972.
314
FRANKEL,J. The"Making of Foreign Policy: An Analysis of
Decision Making,O.U.P.London,1963-
FISHER,C.A. Essays in Political Geography,Methuen,London,1968.
GINSBURG, H® .n The Patterns of Asia" ,N. J.1958.
GILISON,J.M. British and Soviet Politics-,';J,H.U.P.Baltimore,1972
GRENVILLE,J.A .S. The Major International Treaties; 1914-1973?
Methuen,London,1974#
GOLDMAN,M ,1,^  Soviet Foreign Aid,Praeger,N0Y„19670
GOTT,R, et <S0l, Documents on International Affairs 1960„0«UoP
 — -----------------     1964
GRIFFIN IC.& Atn .& £ ifiT oU M 0M i±ineqM ^±ifr'£ £ ^3 £ ± ^n 9loii6.on?
GUPTA,KoNo India in World Politicss A Period of Transition,1^ 2
Scientific Book Agency,Calcutta,1969# 
HAQ,MAHBUB-UL, The Strategy of Economic Plannings A Case Study 
of Pakistan,Q.U.P.Karachi.1966.
HARTSHORNS, B® . "The Functional Approach in Political
Geography" in the ed.W .A .D .JACKSON,
Politics and Geogrphic Relationships, 
Prentice Hall,London,1964*
" Political Geography As a Field of Study:
n
Definition",W.A.D.JACKSON Edition,1964. 
HASAN,Ii.S. Documents on the Foreign Relations of Pakistan:
The Kashmir Question,Inter Services Press,Karachi, 
1966.
„ China-India-Pakistan,"" "" "" "" ""1966.
n Transfer of Power, "" "" "" "" 1966.
H0LSTI,K,J, International Politics,Prentice Hall,London,1972. .
HUSAIN,AHMED, Politics and People’s Representation in Pakistan,
Feroze Sons Ltd.Lahore,1972.
HUSSAIN,Arif,Pakistan: Its Ideology and Foreign Policy,Frank
Cass,London,1966.
HUS S A IN, ARSIiADForeign Minister, of Pakistan f Ge-ne-rsl _ A
Statement,A/VP 1692.11.10.1968.
315
IQBAL,K, Presidential Address,The All India Muslim League, 
Allahabad,19 30 *
JACKSON,\7.A„D0 Politics and Geographic Relationships,
Prentice Hall,1964.
JAFRI,A.B.S. Prom the Gallery,The Pakistan Times Press,Lahore, 
1963.
JAHAN,R. Pakistan? Failure in National Integration,C.P.P.
N.Y.1972,
JINNAH,M.A. Speeches as Governor General, Paki stan Publications,
Karachi,1963.
JONES,S.B. " Boundary Concepts in the Setting of Place and Time" 
W.A 0B o JACKSON(edition),1964.
„ " A Unified Field Theory of Political Geography",
WoA.Do JACICS0N( edition) ,1964.
KARAICA,D.F. Betrayal in India,Victor Golancz Ltd.London,1950, 
KHAN,Ivl. Z. The Agony of Pakistan,Kent Publications,Oxford, 1973® 
KHAN,M.A. Friends Not Masters,O.U,P.London, 1967.
KHAN,A.M.Y. "Transfer of Power"Pakistan Publications,Islamabad, 
1970,
„ Broadcast( 26-3-1971)Pakistan Horizon,XXLV.No.2,1971
„ Broadcast( 28-6-1971 ),,n "" ,MI XXIV,No, 3,1971.
, Broadcast ( 12-10-1971) Dawn, Kara chi ,13-10-1971.
KHAN,S.M.I. The Kashmir Saga,Ripon Printing Press Ltd.Lahore,
KHO S L A , A . N. VDeveloamant .of _tha -Indus .River System" f. Ind i a 
Quarterly,XIV,No.3(July-Sept,1956)„
KISH0RE,H.Ao Jana Sangh and Indians Foreign Policy,Associated
Publishing House,New Delhi,1969.
KRISTOF, De " The Nature of Frontiers and Boundaries",
W.A.D.JACKS0N(edition),1964.
KEV7AL, W 0 The Indomitable Sardar, Bombay ,1962.
KEESINGS,Treaties and Alliances of the World,Bristol,1972,
KEESINGS CONTEMPORARY ARCHIVES? 1931-1975»Bristol,1975.
KEESINGS,Research Report:Pakistan from 1947 to the Creation of
Bangladesh,Trofabrigg^,1973
KEESINGS,Research Report? The Sino-Soviet Dispute,Trowbridge 
1970.
DAKHANPAL,P „L . Essential Documents and Notes on the Kashmir 
Dispute,New Delhi,1965=
LAMB, A, Crisis in Kashmir?1946-66,Routledge and Kegan Paul
London,1966.
n The China-India Border,O.U.P.London,1964.
ii The cmahon Line?A Study in the Relations Between-
India,China and Tibet,1904-14,Vol.I,Routledge
and Kegan Paul-,London, 1966. 
it Hardinge,Mcmahon and Simla Conference ,Routledge
and Kegan Paul,London,1966. 
it Asian Frontiers:Studies in a Continuing Problem, ■
Pall Mall,London,1968. 
ii Sino-Pakistan Boundary Agreement of 2 Farch, 1963?
Australian 0utlook,Vol.l8.No.3.
LYON, jn "BANGLADESH" World Siirvey,Atlantic Education Trust,
London,January 1973»
LLOYDS BANK LTD. Economic Report"Pakistan",London,1969(August). 
„ "Pakistan" "" »" 1974-( Fay).
ii "Afghanistan" 1972 (July).
„ " Iran" "» 1972(June).
LAMB,B.P. India? A World in Transition,London,1963*
LOSHAK,D.Pakistan Crisis.Heinemann,London,1971.
MACKENZIE K ." Turkey At the Crossroads" World Survey,A11 antic
Education Trust,Lodon,May,1974.
Malik,D.N. The Development of Non-alignment in India’s Foreign
Policy,Chitanya Publishing House,Allahabad,1967.
MARVIN,D.K. Emerging Africa in World Affairs,Chandler Publishing 
Company, ^ pK-ancisco ,1965.
317
MAXWELL,N. India's China War,Jonathan Cape * London,1970.
ItflLLER,J.D.B. The Politics of The Third World,O.U.P.London,1966*
MILLIKAEji.hE* & BLACKHER,D .L 0M . The Emerging Nations Their
Their Growth and United States Policy,Boston,1961, 
M00DIE,A.E. Geography Behind Politics,London,1947.
?J),W 0 " Heartland and Rimland in Eurasian History11, 
Western Political Quarterly,9?1956.
MORGENTHAU,H.J.& THOMPSON,K.W. Principles and Problems of 
International Politics,Alfred Knopf,N.Y.1950, 
KORGENTHAU, H . J .The Restoration of American Politics, Chi c ago ,1970 
1 The Impasse of American Foreign Policy,nn "H 1967
I The Decline of Democratic Politics, (l" 1,11 1969.
M0j&EIf$y?L o T h e ^ W A ^ ^ ^ ^ i Q ^ ^ f e r i W ^ S a ^ Lon&Bn^O^l-:9730 
MOUNTJOY, A „ B . Industrialisation and Under-developed Countries,
Hutchinson,London,1963*
lvlLTEEN-UD~DIN,G, Lnxhts Waters Treaty,Lahore, 1960.
MYRDALjGo Asian Drama,An Inquiry Into the Poverty of Nations,
Vol.I.London,1968.
NEHRU,J.L. The Discovery of India,John Day,N.Y,1946.
0*HAIiLEY,L .S *S . Modern India and the West, O.U,P.London, 1941,
OREN,STEPHEN,The World Today,London,January,1974.
H The World Today,London, January,1976.
PARKER,W 0H 0 The Super-Powers,Macmillan,London,1972.
PAIGE, G. D . Political Leadership; Reading for An Emerging Pi eld,
Collier-Kacmillan Ltd.London,1972.
PANNLKAR.KoK. ABia and Western Dominance,G.Allen & Unwin,London, 
1974.
iPHilBIBS, C.H . et al, ( ed)The Evaluation of India and Pahistan,
1858-1947,Selected Documents.
PODGORNY,NIKOLAI, Letter to President Yahya Khan of Pakistan,
Bangladesh Document,pp.510-11.Dacca.
318
P0PLAI,S.L. India 1947-1950,Selected Documents on Asian Affairs, 
Volume,I, Internal Affairs,London,1959.
POUNDS,N.J.G. Political Geography,Mcgraw Hill,N.Y. 1972,
PRESCOT,J,R,V,Political Geography,Methuen,London,1972,
QURESHI,IoH0 The Muslim Community of the Indo-Pakistan 
Sub-continent,The Hague,1962, 
it "The 'Pakistani Way of Life1 ,Ikram and Spear(ed,),
The Cultural Heritage of.Pakistan,1968,
RAHMAN,M.M. The Politics of Non-Alignment,Associated Publishing 
House,New Delhi,1969.
RAHMAN,ABDUR, Life of Abduir-Rahman, 1900,
RASHID,H.E,R. East Pakistan: A Systematic Regional Geography,and
its Development Planning Aspects,Lahore,1966
RAYMOND TANTER and RICHARD ULLMA.N,Theory and Policy in
International Relations,Princeton U 0P 0,1972„ 
ROBINSON,E.A.G,and KIDRON,M.Economic Development in South Asia, 
Ma cmi1lan,L ond on,1970,
ROBINSON,G.W.S. "West Berlin,Geography of An Enclave1'
Geographical Review,Vol,43,1953.
ROSE, SU> , Politics in South Asia,Macmillan,London,1963.
ROSENAU,JoN0 Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy,Collier - 
Macmillan,L ondon,19 67 *
R0ST0W,V/.W. Politics and the Stages of Growth,C,U.P.1971. 
ROWLAND,J,A, History of Sino-Indian Relations: Hostile Co-estist- 
ence,D„Van Nostrand,Princeton,1967.
SCI-IWARZENBERGER,G, Power Politics,Stevens & Sons Ltd,London,1964
SHABAD, China’s Changing Map,Methuen,London,1972.
SAYEED,K,B,"The Breakdown of Pakistan’s Political System” 
International Journal,1972, ( Volume.*1).
inJacques Van Doorn ed. Armed Forces 8,nd Society, 
The Hague,1968,
319
SCHU1ANjl1 Jjo International Politics,Ncgraw Hill,N0Y 01953«
SHARNA jB.L, The Pakistan China Axis,New Delhi ,19 68 „
SHARIIA , J * S 0 Indians Struggle for Freedoms Select Documents and
Sources,Volumes 1$,1L„ , S.Chand & Go, Delhi ,1962 „
SINgH,S„ Pakistanis Foreign Policy; An Appraisal,Asia Publishing
House,Delhi,1970,
A«>T,A.
SPATE, 0. h.ICo and LEARHONTI^India and Pakistan,Kethuen,London, 
1967,
SPATE,0,11,1c. The Partition of India and the Prospects of 
Pakistan,Geographical Review,1948,pp„5-29 
„ The Partition of the Punjab and Bengal,Geographical
Journal,December,1947*
„ Geographical Aspects of the Pakistan Scheme,
Geo graphi cal J ournal,S e p t emb er,19 4 3 „
S P R O U T 11® ,Foundations of International Politics,
DoVan iNostrand,ho y 0iybJ, ' '
STAKP,D .L „ Our Developing World,Faber 1 Faber,London,I960,
STEPHENS , I,PaicistansOld Country and New Nation,Hazel Watson 1 
V lney iuiL Ayies bury ,'iy7o „
STEPHEN Roi,JR,PaJcistansIndustrial!sation and Trade Policies,
0 „ u , P, London, l970»
S WINS ON,A 0 North-West Frontiers People and Events 1639-1947,
Hutchinson,London,1967,
SYED,A«H® 1 Pakistan 1 World Survey,Atlantic Education
Trust,London,April 1975 *
SYFONDS ,R „ The Faking of Pakistan,Faber & Faber,London, 1970,
TAYYEB,A 9Pakistan°A Political Geography,0. U . P .London,1967.
TUCKER,F , Whi1e Nemory Seryes,London,1950*
TREATIES AND ALLIANCES OF THE .WORLDrCHARLES SCRIBNER*S SONS,
320
TYTLER, P. Afghani stan,0.U .P.London,1950.
UL1AM,A.B. The Russian Political System,Random House,N.Y.1974. 
U-THANT, Memorandum, to the President of the Security Council, 
(19-7-1971),Pakistan Horizon,No.3.
WALL,M. "The Maghreb" World Survey,Atlantic Education Trust, 
London,April,1974.
WALTER,P. Africa: A Social,Economic and Political Geography,
Major Regions,Methuen,London,I960.
WARD ,13. The Plan Under Presstire, Asia Publishing House ,London, 
1963,
•i Towards A World of Plenty, Toronto ,1963.
h India and the West,Hamish Hamilton,London,1961.
WEEKS,R.Vo Pakistan? Birth and Growth of A. Muslim Nation, 
Princeton,1964.
WEIGERT,ilans W.ejj al." Principles of Political Geography" ,N.Y. 
1957.
WHEARE,KoC* Pederal Government, O.U.P. London,1967.
« Legislatures,0.U.P.London,1968.
it Modern Constitutions,O.UoP.London,1971.
WHITTLESSY,D. The Earth And The State,Ilenry Holt,N.Y. 1944.
WILCOX.W.A. Pakistan? The Consolidation of A Nation,N.Y.1966. 
W.A. :T7B:------------------------------------
Y/IICOy^ROS^ 1 BOYiy, Asia and the International System,Winthrop 
Publishers,Massachussets,1972.
Williams,H .E .R 0 The State of Pakistan,!ondon,1962.
" Pakistan tinder Challenge , Stacey International,
London,1975.
WHEELER,R .S . The Politics of Pakistan,Gome11 U .P .London,1970. 
WOODMA?!,U • Himalayan Affairs,A Political Review of British,
Chinese,Indian and Russian Rivalries,The Creevent 
Press London,1969-
321
PAPERS,PERIODICALS ETC„
DAWN,Karachi, 9-12-1956 , 10.-12-1956.
23-2-1957
1-9-1960 ( Statement by General N.I3.RAZA).
1,12-1960
The Daily Telegraph,London, 10-1-1972 
10-8-1971. 12-1-1972
6-1-1975 
26-2-1975 
The Economist,London, 17-2-1973.
Economic Atlas of the World,O.U,P.-London,1965.
Ear Eastern Economic Review,Vol*41,1963*
The Einancial Times,London,13-12-1974. 17.10.1970 w 12-8-1974
Eoreign Affairs,April 1957 ( Ii.S .SUHRAWARDY,Political Stability
and Democracy in Pakistan).
April, 1973.( Z. A. BHIJTTO, Paki stan Builds Anew).
The Guardian,London, 10-8-1971.
19-2-1974.
13-12-1974.
14-3-1975.
Hindu,Madras,16-11-1960.
The Jang International ( The Daily Jang) London,
20-5-1974.
11-12-1974.
9-1-1975.
Kayhan International( Weekly Edition),Tehran,
21-4-1973
19-5-1973
28-7-1973
International Affairs,London,January-February-April-July-Oct„197
J anuary-Ap ri1TJuly-0 c t.1974. 
January-April-July-Oct.1975. January,1976
. PAPERS/Periodic
322
The Report on World Affairs,Vol.52.London,January,1972,
The Round Table,London,1956-57.,1960-61.
October,1973.
January,1974.
April,1974*
July,1974.
October,1974.
January,1975.
April,1975.
July,1975•
January,1976.
The New York Herald Tribune,6-1-1972, 15-1-1972.
New York Times,16-12-1962, 24-12-1962( C.L.Sulzberger).
Pakistan Horizon,3rd Quarterly 1970,
The Pakistan Times,27-8-1967. 4-4-1975.
Survival,London, November-December 1973.
January-February 1974.
Harch-April 1974.
Hay-June 1974.
July-August 1974.
September-October 1974.
November-December 1974.
The Times,London, 20-2-1960,26-9-1969, 26-1-1970,10-8-1971,
12-2-1973, 21-2-1974, 27-2-1974,17-5-1974, 
31-5-1974,7-3-1975,8-3-1975,2 3-4-1955.
The World Today,London, Pebruary-December,1973,2Panuary-December
1974,February-Deeember 1975,January 1976.
Story of SEAT®,A SEAT® %
October,1971( The 
Indo-Soviet Treaty 
of Peace,Friendship 
and Cooperation, 
9-8-1971.).
323
AGREEMENTS yCONFERENCES,TREATIES,OFFICIAL PAPERS ETC. 
BOUNDARY COMMISSION,30-6-1947.
The Radcliffe Awards,12 August,1947.
The Baghdad Pact(CENTO),originally signed on 24-2-55?Pakistan
signed on 23-9-1955.
Bilateral Defense Agreements of the U (S(A» with CENTO Countries,' 
signed 5-3-1959.( Treaties and Alliances of the 
Worid,Charles Scribner9s Sons,Keesings Publication 
N.Y.1974.pp.183-184.).
The Durand Line Agreement,1893.
The India Act of 1935,London,1935.
The Indian Independence Act July 1/8,July,1947?London,1947.
The Indus Waters Treaty,1960*
The Indo-Pakistan Western Boundary Case Tribunal Award,Geneva, 
19- 2- 1968,
The Lahore( Pakistan ) Resolution,1940,
National Reconstruction(National Integration in East Pakistan), 
Bureau of National Re construction,Lahore,1964.
The Report of the Punjab Partition Committee,1947.
Pakistan-Burma Agreement (9-5-1966) ,ICeesings Contemporary 
Archives,Bristol,21414B.
Parliamentary Papers,Commons,London,1948-49,Vol.466,
Parliamentary Debates,Commons,London,1955-56,Vol,549.
Regional Cooperation Eor Development( R.C.D*),July 20-21,1964.
Charles Scribner9s Sons,1974,pp.184-185.
R,C,D» Annual Report,Tehran,July 21,1974.
3.E.A.T.O. Treaty Signed on 8-9-1954,Enforced 9-2-1955?
Charles Scribner9s Sons.pp.L95-198.
The Simla Agreement,1972.
The Sino-Pakistan Boundary Agreement,1963.
The Tashkent Declaration,1966.
United States Treaties and other International Agreements,
324
Department of State, Washington D.C. Vol.2Part I*195l(The United.
States-Indian Agreement of 1950).
Yfcite Paper on Jammu and Kashmir,New Delhi,1943,
White Paper on Baluchistan,Islamabad,1975.
White Paper on The A wain i League's Six Points, Islamabad, 1970.
(Extracts Prom The Awami League Nanifesto).
The Bandung Conference Resolutions,Keesings Contemporary
Archives,pp.13977A,13588A,13611A and 14181A.
The Cairo Conference,Oct.5-10,1964,K.C.A.p.20431A.
The Lusaka Conference,Sept.8-10,1970,Charles Scribner's Sons,p.
209.
The Belgrade Conference,Sept.1-6,1961,K.C.A.p.18601A.
The Algiers Conference,Sept,5-9,1973,0.0.S.pp.224-225.
The Annual Plan 1974-75,Planning Commission,Govt.of Pakistan,
Islamabad,July,1974•
Central Statistical Office,Bulletins,Karachi,1965*
"" "" nn "n "n Reports(1948-49),Karachi,1949. I
The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan,Karachi,19! I
The Constitution of the Republic of Pakistan,Karachi,1963. I
The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan,Islamabad,
1973o
Indian Aggression in the Rann of Kutch,April,1965,Karachi.
Land For The Landless,Islamabad,larch,1972.
Ministry of Finance,Government of Pakistan,The Budget in Brief, 
1970-71(Islamabad)1970.
New Deal For Labour,Karachi,Pakistan,1972.
Book of Wapda Projects 1974,WAFDA,Lahore,1975.
Annual Report, V/APDA, 1966,1967,1968,1970,1971,1972,1973,1974,1975. 
Lahore,Pakistan.
Pakistan: Basic Facts,1965-69,Karachi,Pakistan
Pakistan Economic Survey 1973-74,Islamabad,1974.
Pakistan National Finance Commission Report,1964-65,Karachi,1965.
Pakistan Planning Commission,The hid Plan Review of the Third
Five Year Plan,1965-70,Karachi,1970. J
325
Population Census of Pakistan 1961,17. inis try of Home and 
Kashmir Affairs,VoXiv.Karachi,
Pakistan:Statistical Pact Book,U.S„ A.I.D, Lahore,1966,
Pakistan Year Book, 1968-69,Karachi, 1973*1974 and. 1975 , Islamaha 
Pakistan Economic Report,LLOYDS BANK LTD,London, 1969,1972,1974,. 
Repotts Por the Pourth Five Year Plan,1970-75,Islamahad,1975, •' 
Trading Corporation of Pakistan,Annual Report 1973-74,
Karachi,1974,
Prime Finister* s Statement on Foreign Policy,Official Paper,
9-12-1956,Karachi, ( Dawn,Karachi,10-12-1956,), 
Planning Commission,Government of Pakistan,Reports of the
Advisory Panels for the Fourth Five Year Plan
( 1970-75 ),vol.i.( Islamahad ) July,1970,
Ministry of Finance,Government of Pakistan,The Budget in
Brief 1970-71( Islamahad 1970),
